Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

194. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, October 22, 1979

Goals and Objectives for the Next Eighteen Months

Bureaucratic

—Full participation for HA in the Foreign Policy decision making process. Despite the high priority the President has assigned to human rights in U.S. foreign policy HA is still a very junior partner in the decision making process. We are often excluded entirely.

The rationale in some cases is that HA’s need to know disappears in any crisis and that the issues are now “political”, not human rights. We saw that in the Nicaragua special mission² in its most discouraging form. We were routinely cut off from cables, meetings, and discussions. Frequently we are told that our views are “known” and taken into consideration. However, we don’t get to make our case. This is bad for policy. It is bad for our standing in the bureaucracy. It does not serve the President to present him papers so sanitized that there are no real choices in the human rights field. There have been some pluses for him in human rights and some severe criticisms for failures on issues which I believe he never had a chance to consider adequately. Our calling things back or raising issues again after the decisions have been made is handicapping and inefficient. We should participate in the SCC meetings on certain countries; someone should be able to make the case for human rights considerations. The result too often across the board is: “The President has decided”, when we have no sense of the human rights issue being raised and argued. Correcting this situation will require your and Mr. Christopher’s attention. It will also necessitate a more active effort by HA to overcome still formidable bureaucratic resistance to the policy within the Department and the Foreign Service.

—Adequate Staffing

From the outset HA has been hampered by too few slots and inadequate staffing. The Foreign Service personnel system has failed to produce the quality officers we require to staff our positions. Consequently our officers have been enourmously overburdened. The system is exceptionally slow in replacing officers who have completed their tours in HA. Our AF officer³ left in late June and we do not have a replacement even now. Our Security Assistance/PM officer left in January and was replaced six and a half months later.⁴ Our country reports officer⁵ was on overcomplement and we didn’t get a slot for that job for many months. We are still operating with an overcomplement officer for the second country reports slot⁶ and it took several months for the system to produce an officer. Our asylum officer⁷ is said to be the USG’s foremost authority on asylum, but his rank is not commensurate with his duties or skills. He is unspeakably overworked and our only assistance to him is an erratic overcomplement system. We have had to resort to outside hires which have been a source of some criticism. Personnel must be persuaded that HA deserves as much priority in receiving qualified personnel as the geographic bureaus. Service in HA should be recognized. A number of our officers and potential officers have told us that their personnel counselors have advised them not to come to work in HA. Our officers have received good onward assignments although I was disappointed at the way HA fared in the recent promotion list.

—Improved Human Rights Training

This is necessary for Foreign Service officers and later for other USG officers with foreign affairs responsibilities. There has been an unfortunate tendency for some officers to disparage the human rights policy and occasionally HA in their official and unofficial contacts.

If we are taken seriously, have the quality personnel needed to staff our positions and can attenuate bureaucratic resistance to the policy, we can make more progress toward achieving our substantive goals. These are:

—Human Rights Strategy Papers for Problem Countries. These should be the product of HA and Regional Bureau collaboration.

—Senate Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties. HA, H and Department principals should work to ensure their favorable consideration. U.S. failure to ratify the Genocide Convention, International Covenants, Racial Discrimination Convention and American Convention seriously impairs our credibility in the human rights areas.

—Development of a mechanism to permit effective response to complaints about U.S. domestic human rights violations. This will require close coordination between HA, IO and the Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Commission. We might consider the creation of an interagency group along the lines of the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.

—Closer cooperation with the NSC to coordinate the activities of and promote acceptance by domestic agencies of the human rights policy.

—A more creative human rights approach at the United Nations including a more forthcoming position on apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa. We need a major review of our human rights policy towards South Africa in which HA, IO, AF, and S/P would participate. We must avoid a repeat of the incomprehensible decision to support seating Pol Pot’s representative.⁸

—Fuller integration of human rights considerations in our economic decision making (Ex-Im, CCC, etc.)

—A re-examination of our arms transfer policy with special attention to the human rights factor. Restructuring of the Arms Export Control Board (AECB) so that participants express their bureau or agency views, make proposals, vote on them and provide a record of votes and arguments to the decision makers. It is now a rubber stamp operation. There is no logical forum for all policy points to be openly discussed and considered.

—Closely related to the study of arms transfers is a special study of how to promote human rights most effectively in violating countries with which we have a security relationship (e.g., Korea, Philippines. Our record here is poor). This could be independent of the country strategy papers or incorporated in them.

— OAS. Full funding of the Inter-American Court.

— CSCE. Systematic preparation for the Madrid Review Conference requires the immediate appointment of a full-time Ambassador and staff to coordinate the process. It also will require your and Mr. Christopher’s attention to the problem of how we deal with the CSCE Commission.

—Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. Notification time between decisions and votes is variably inadequate, not providing time for explaining our position, or garnering the support of like minded states. The inevitable conclusion is that we are not serious about this human rights tool.

Overview

We have done more in human rights than any other administration and have some positive results to show for the policy. We have done less than we could or should have. Our policy is erratic and confusing. We send a mixed message; in the past we sent a consistent one, (e.g., it’s business as usual), so a mixed message is an improvement. But we should be striving for a consistent message. We could achieve that goal. I don’t see the will to do it or to do more than coast along. I believe the perception that the President does not support the policy is wrong. I recognize that the NSC frequently is an obstacle. We could do a better job in making the case for human rights in our policy discussions with the NSC, as well as with the President, if HA were more directly involved. During this campaign, we need to help the President avoid editorials like Saturday’s (October 20) on Korea⁹ by advocating and explaining the human rights opportunities as well as costs.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, unlabeled folder. Secret. Drafted by Salmon and Derian. The memorandum is a response to a Department-wide effort to prioritize goals during the last 18 months of Vance’s service as Secretary, following Vance’s decision that he would not serve in a possible second Carter administration. In a June 9 memorandum to Vance, Tarnoff and Lake discussed the intellectual framework for such an undertaking. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Goals and Objectives) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
2. Reference is to Bowdler and Pezzullo’s June 1979 mission to Latin America to meet with Sandinista officials and leaders of Andean governments. The Carter administration favored a four-step program, including the resignation of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza, to end the civil struggle in Nicaragua. (Graham Hovey, “2 U.S. Diplomats Off to Nicaragua In Growing Bid to Replace Somoza,” The New York Times, June 28, 1979, p. A–3) Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XV, Central America.
3. Reference is to Robert Maxim.
4. Reference is to Ellis “Ollie” Jones, III. Robert Jacobs had replaced Jones by the fall of 1979.
5. Reference is to Frank A. Sieverts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Coordinator for POW/MIA Matters, who subsequently assumed additional responsibilities as the Director for Country Reports during 1979.
6. Reference is to the Deputy Director for Country Reports Kenneth Rogers.
7. Reference is to Lawrence L. Arthur.
8. The UN General Assembly voted on September 21 to allow the Pol Pot regime to take the seat of Kampuchea in the United Nations. (Bernard Rossiter, “U.N. Assembly, Rebuffing Soviet, Seats Cambodia Regime of Pol Pot,” The New York Times, September 22, 1979, p. 1)
9. Presumable reference to “Karate Politics in Korea,” The New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. A–22.