Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Human Rights Foundation (HRF)

1. Reasons for an HRF²

In addition to performing the important functions listed in Section 2 below, there are several good reasons for establishing an HRF as an Administrative initiative:

—In the furtherance of human rights, we have relied most heavily on exhortation and on punitive sanctions imposed through our foreign assistance programs. Though useful and necessary, these techniques often conflict with other legitimate foreign policy objectives and risk creating a climate in which American commitment to human rights is judged solely by the frequency of public denunciations or aid cut-offs. An HRF will institute a positive, action program for human rights comparable, say, to the activities of AID to promote economic development.

—Our human rights policy generated unrealistically high expectations in some quarters. The press now reports that the Administration has “abandoned” or “sacrificed” human rights to other priorities. There is a surprising, but continuing belief on the Hill that without constant Congressional pressure there would be no human rights policy. A positive initiative such as HRF will help substantially to dispel that myth. We face many contentious human rights issues in the coming Congressional session (e.g., application of the Harkin Amendment to inappropriate institutions,³ more strictures on the IFIs, etc.). Any improvement in the current mood would be an important political plus. By proposing an HRF, the Administration can mobilize the heterogeneous human rights constituency behind a constructive proposal.

—While human rights is certainly not a new concern, it is a new policy issue, and it lacks the necessary solid intellectual base. Our frustrations in the PRM–28 exercise⁴ provided excellent evidence of the need for basic research on the varieties of human rights and on the most effective means of promoting human rights in diverse social and cultural contexts. Those inside the government do not have the time to develop such a base. It is best done outside the government—in academia, think tanks, etc. An HRF can provide the central direction, support and motivation for a successful, and relevant, scholarly effort.

—Human rights has been pretty thoroughly woven into our foreign policy bureaucracy, but this will not last long should one of your successors not share your concern for this issue. The new procedures could be undone as quickly as they have been created. An independent HRF, funded by Congress, is some insurance that human rights will be an enduring concern. Much as ACDA and the Peace Corps embody major foreign policy initiatives of previous Democratic Administrations, the HRF would be an important institutional legacy of the Carter Administration.

—Polls have shown that your human rights policy is strongly supported by people all over the world, even in places where the government opposes it. The lasting success of the policy will depend to some extent on our ability to cultivate that support, particularly through non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations of all kinds. While USIA can contribute to this goal to a limited degree, activities aimed at focusing world attention on human rights would gain credibility if sponsored by an institution with some autonomy from the U.S. government.

2. Functions of an HRF

Working with private groups and national organizations in this country and abroad, as well as with international agencies, the HRF would develop ideas and programs to further the observance of human rights on a global basis. The HRF would engage in at least five major types of activities.

—Provide financial and other support to the non-governmental human rights organizations (NGOs) in the U.S. and elsewhere. For years the NGOs have operated quite effectively with little public support, and they now have the potential to do much more. They can often act in circumstances and with techniques that would be inappropriate for the USG. The NGOs need, want and deserve our support, but at the same time, they must be insulated from direct dependence on the USG.

—Foster research on human rights. We need research on the different types of human rights, their interactions, the relevance of each in different societial and cultural contexts, and which kinds of policies work best where. We also need to know much more about conditions and longer term trends in individual countries and regions. Though State has worked hard this past year to improve its data base, most of its information comes through official channels which often give a very incomplete picture. Finally, as time goes on, we need a critical assessment of how well our policies are working.

—Aid victims of human rights violations. Support is badly needed for refugee resettlement efforts, including the retraining (language, professional standards, etc.) and placement of skilled and professional political refugees. An HRF could help to arrange and finance the resettlement of such key individuals—not in the U.S. where their talents are wasted—but in other Third World nations badly in need of these skills. Equally important, the HRF can provide direct help and psychological support for dissenters within their own societies by, for example, awarding an annual prize to an artist or writer whose works are suppressed in his own country, or by helping to finance the publication and distribution of suppressed works.

—Promote efforts to multilateralize governmental human rights policies. While the primary responsibility here rests with the U.S. government, the HRF, working on its own and through the NGOs, could prove a powerful ally in such efforts as: building support for the creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; energizing the UN Human Rights Commission; evolving harmonious policies among Western nations in the IFIs; and promoting regional human rights organizations in Africa and elsewhere. Particularly in the Third World (and notwithstanding its relationship to the government) the HRF should be able to speak with a voice independent from, and in some cases more credible than, the U.S. government.

—Keep international attention focused on human rights issues. The objective here is to generate and sustain a worldwide constituency for human rights. Activities might include:

—Supporting national and international conferences on human rights issues.

—Awarding an annual human rights prize, comparable to the Nobel, for outstanding contributions to human rights anywhere in the world.

—Serving as a central clearing house for information on human rights and on sources of assistance to victims of human rights violations.

—Serving as an “echo-chamber” to amplify the voices of individuals and numerous small groups.

—Issuing an annual report on trends and conditions of human rights globally, as well as periodic reports on particularly troubling violators of human rights.

3. Structure of an HRF

A good model for the HRF is the Inter-American Foundation, a quasi-governmental organization that receives its money from Congress but has very loose ties with the U.S. government and makes its own policies. The Foundation is directed by a seven member board, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The board includes four members from the private sector and three ex officio representatives of the Executive Branch. This arrangement has assured functional autonomy for the Foundation, while preserving a minimum degree of coordination with the U.S. government foreign policy agencies. Details of the composition of the Board of the HRF can be worked out in consultation with Congress. The important point is that the legislation can be written to reflect whatever degree of linkage is desired between the HRF and the government.

4. Objections to an HRF

In his evaluation, the Vice President raises two objections to this proposal.⁵ First, he is concerned that “such a foundation might do no more than duplicate the work of such organizations as Freedom House and Amnesty International.” After extensive consultations, I am satisfied that no one sees more clearly than do these organizations, their own limitations and the great needs left unfilled. Even if the HRF were to do no more than increase the funds available to NGOs, it would have performed a valuable service. However, as the list of ideas outlined in Sections 1 and 2 above indicate, there is a great deal that the HRF can do, that cannot be done by small groups working alone.

Secondly, the Vice President raised the important question of whether “the government would take blame for ineffectiveness or inaction” by the HRF. While there is no way to rule this out, I believe that our experience with the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), which has pursued a bold policy in a very sensitive region, indicates that this risk is not too large. The IAF sponsors unconventional development projects that are potentially quite controversial in the host country. Nevertheless, while a few U.S. ambassadors have complained from time to time about problems caused by the activities of the IAF, the overall record has been that of an independent entity functioning without embarrassment to the U.S. government.

Jim McIntyre has emphasized the need to avoid problems of duplication and policy coordination with the State Department. But the HRF would not be involved in the process of formulating U.S. government policy, so that it could not complicate that process. Most, if not all, of the proposed functions are best accomplished by an organization with some independence from the U.S. government. In the case of refugee programs, the HRF would be concerned specifically with victims of human rights repression, complementing but not duplicating current State Department activities. Moreover, assistance to refugees would be only a relatively modest part of the HRF’s overall program.

I can conclude only that the advantages of the HRF proposal substantially outweigh the risks.

5. Implementation

If you approve this proposal, I would recommend that we begin consultations with Zablocki, Fraser and Fascell, and on the Senate side with Sparkman, Kennedy and Case. If these prove successful, the consultations can be expanded to include the members of the Vice President’s human rights group. Once the details have been worked out, the proposal can be announced as a Presidential initiative with the appropriate Congressional support.

Recommendation:

That you approve this proposal, and initiation of Congressional consultations to be carried out by NSC in close consultation with Frank Moore.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 19, PD/NSC–30. Confidential. Sent for action. The President’s handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: “Zbig—Let’s hold this—J.” Tuchman sent an earlier version of this memorandum to Brzezinski on January 24; see Document 107 and footnote 8 thereto.
2. The President changed the article “an” to “a” and, next to the abbreviation HRF, wrote: “(spell out).”
3. Presumable reference to the Harkin amendment to H.R. 9179; see footnote 6, Document 108.
4. PRM–28 is printed as Document 46. The response to PRM–28 is printed as Document 73.
5. See Document 97.
6. There is no indication as to whether the President approved or disapproved the recommendation; however, his handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum instructed Brzezinski to hold the memorandum (see footnote 1 above). Brzezinski resubmitted the Human Rights Foundation proposal at the same time he transmitted the final draft of PD–30 for the President’s signature; see footnote 1, Document 119.