Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

100. Memorandum From Michael Armacost of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 13, 1977

SUBJECT

• Human Rights and our Aid Efforts

At the risk of becoming a bore on this subject, I should like to raise with you again my concerns about the way human rights considerations are being handled, particularly in relation to our aid programs. We are injecting political (i.e. human rights) considerations into the disposition of loan requests in the international and regional banks in contravention of their charters, and despite the fact that we recently walked out of the ILO on grounds others were “politicizing” that institution.² We are maneuvering ourselves into a position where we appear to the public and Congress prepared to withhold shipment of commodities of such basic importance to human welfare as food in order to advance our concepts of political and civil rights in developing countries. And this is being done by a sub-Cabinet Committee which in my judgment operates with extraordinarily sloppy procedures and without much oversight from the Cabinet members with a stake in their decisions. My specific concerns are about the procedures.

—The law requires that we not provide PL–480 to countries which engage in a pattern of gross and consistent violations of human rights. The Administration has also pledged to use its “voice and vote” to encourage International Financial Institutions to allocate funds with similar concerns in mind. Yet to my knowledge there has been no formal determination that any specific country has been adjudged guilty of a pattern of “consistent and gross violations”.

—More serious, no one in the Human Rights Bureaucracy can define with any clarity the standards by which such a determination might be made. The standards against which “consistent and gross” violations are to be judged have not been clearly specified. On the contrary, the Christopher Committee has consciously chosen to hang loose on this.

—While foreswearing any formal criteria, however, an informal “hit list” has begun to emerge. With respect to the allocation of PL–480, Title I assistance, for example, thirteen countries are being asked to accept special reporting requirements which amount to their admission that they have engaged in consistent and gross violations. The common thread that binds these 13 countries is not apparent to the untrained eye. I expect this list, designed for PL–480, will acquire a measure of “legitimacy” when it comes to determining those who are to be penalized when other forms of assistance are being distributed.

—Nor have I seen much evidence that the Human Rights bureaucracy is very interested in results. At least in the EA area my colleagues at State inform me that they are rarely questioned by D/HA about the consequences of particular measures—e.g. a statement, a loan, an arms transfer, etc.—on the human rights situation in a particular country in the mid-term. The concern of the bureaucracy seems more clearly directed at dissociating the U.S. from manifestations of what particular individuals regard as unsavory political practices in other countries, rather than achieving concrete and tangible advances in human rights within the context of what is realistic and practicable in a given country. I cannot help but wonder whether in this area we are operating on the basis of the “Me-generation’s” Golden Rule: “If it feels good, do it”—an approach which reduces foreign policy to a form of personal therapy. I believe Max Weber’s essay “Politics as a Vocation”³ provides a more reliable guide to responsible ethical conduct. It counsels less perfectionism and more professionalism—an effort to grasp the longer term consequences of our actions than is apparent in our current methods.

—Our expectations must be tailored to specific national situations and framed in terms of long-term trends. We cannot manage a sensible policy in terms of yesterday’s headlines. The recent decisions of the Human Rights Committee, however, are ad hoc and improvisational. Trends appear less important than current events—to wit, our abstention on the Philippine loan was explicable in terms of the Aquino sentence.⁴ Worse yet, we introduced new reporting requirements from Indonesia in the PL–480 contracts the very week that the GOI supplied us their plan for releasing 10,000 political prisoners on December 20.⁵ Our decision can only be regarded by the Indonesians as an insult—evidence that their concrete measures undertaken largely to accommodate our concerns result merely in new, insensitive, bureaucratic intrusions into their affairs. To date the Human Rights Committee has not developed much skill in developing longer term human rights objectives in relation to particular countries, or in relating its activities to longer-term trends. Our policy exhibits as a result a sporadic and punitive aspect which arouses resentment.

I understand—though I have not seen the draft—that an effort is under way to define our human rights policy guidelines in a PD.⁶ It is my own judgment that before issuing any further guidelines on the subject, it would be very healthy to have a detached outside observer of impeccable and unquestioned balance and judgment come in and undertake a quiet survey of our human rights policy. With nearly a year behind us, it is time for sober reflection and a systematic appraisal of our performance to date by someone who has no axe to grind. We need to consolidate those initiatives which have genuine promise; to weed out those practices which are harmful and mischievous; and, above all, to rationalize our procedures in ways which will assure that human rights considerations are taken into account but do not overwhelm all other aspects of our foreign policy.

I don’t have any candidates for such a review in mind, though Inis Claude⁷ has always struck me as a man who manages to combine idealism and hard-headedness. My point is not to identify the person. If you agree with the merit of such a review, I’m sure the right person can be found.

Recommendation:

That you and David meet with Jessica, Tom Thornton, Mike Oksenberg, myself, and any other interested parties on the Staff to consider procedures for integrating human rights concerns with other foreign policy considerations as well as the possible utility of an outside review of this area of policy.⁸

Attachment

Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)⁹

Washington, December 14, 1977

SUBJECT

• Armacost’s Memorandum on Human Rights

I disagree with virtually all of the specifics Mike cites and believe they should all be seen in a different light. For example:

—Mike says that “We appear to the public and Congress prepared to withhold shipment of commodities of such basic importance to human welfare as food in order to advance our concepts of political and civil rights”. In fact what we are doing is precisely the opposite—adopting new procedures to try to insure that the food aid goes to the people who are really hungry, and not to speculation or to balancing trade deficits. Several talks on the Hill with both members and staff lead me to believe that (after the brief scare that our surpluses might not be shipped at all) Congress both understands and supports what we are doing.

—The decision to avoid defining precise and clear standards of what constitutes “a consistent pattern of gross violations” of human rights is not the result of sloppy procedures, but was consciously taken after much thought, including consideration at the Cabinet level (as well as an explicit directive from yourself). The reasoning was that global standards for such a thing would have little meaning and would overly rigidify our policy.

—Mike’s concern that the PL–480 list will become a de facto hit list for other programs has little grounds, since none of the other programs in which actions have been taken have acquired such standing. Why should this one?

—Mike asserts that human rights decisions should be based on long term trends. I fully agree. But the two examples he chooses to illustrate this point do not support his argument. In the case of Indonesia, we clearly ignored the short term event (release of the prisoners) and based our decision on the long term pattern. Yet Mike objects. In the Philippine case we did not base the decision on the Aquino sentencing (though it was probably a contributing factor in some people’s minds) as we subsequently informed the Philippines.

—On the question of whether the human rights bureaucracy is indifferent to results, I also disagree. While Derian’s staff is far from perfect, they are extremely well informed. Perhaps EA doesn’t hear from them because D/HA reads all the same cables. I don’t know. Again, however, the question of time frame is relevant here. It is questionable whether day to day events are of as much importance as longer term trends. The regional desks may have to worry about every little blip in our relations, but there should be someone who stands back and looks at the overall pattern. For example, much too much has been made, in my opinion, of Indonesia’s initial rejection of the new PL-480 reporting requirements. Indonesia has now accepted the requirements, and looking back a year from now, I suspect that the entire incident will be seen as totally insignificant—while the principle that food aid should go to people who are hungry will have been advanced.

Having said all this, I want to emphasize that—as you know—I share Mike’s unease with our policy in the IFIs and with the Harkin amendment in general. That is the reason why the draft PD calls for a rather extensive study of this issue. I would have no objection (in fact I think it would be useful) if outside people were involved in this effort as Mike suggests, though I don’t believe the study should be done wholly by outsiders.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Public Law 480: 11–12/77. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Thornton and Oksenberg. Although Tuchman’s name is listed with Thornton and Oksenberg’s, Tuchman did not initial her concurrence; a typewritten note reads: “(see attached note).” Armacost added the following handwritten comment next to Tuchman’s typewritten name at the end of the memorandum: “I will forswear my own rebuttal (to the rebuttal) for the agreed-for meeting. MA.” Tuchman prepared a sep-arate memorandum for Brzezinski, dated December 14, which is attached to this memorandum.
2. See footnote 4, Document 63.
3. Reference is to German sociologist and political economist Max Weber, author of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. “Politics as a Vocation” was a lecture Weber delivered at the University of Munich in 1918 and was published as “Politik als Beruf” in Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Munich, 1921).
4. On November 25, a Philippine military tribunal had imposed a death sentence on Benigno Aquino, Marcos’ foremost political opponent. According to press reports, Marcos indicated that he was leaning toward staying Aquino’s execution by firing squad. (Jay Mathews, “Marcos Strongly Hints He Will Spare Key Foe,” The Washington Post, December 9, 1977, p. A–22)
5. The NSC Global Issues Cluster’s December 21 evening report noted that the Indonesian Government had “followed through on its pledge, and released 10,000 political prisoners who have been held 12 years without trial. 20,000 remain in custody.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 11–12/77) On December 31, the Department of State issued a press release that noted the release of political prisoners in Indone-sia, South Korea, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1978, p. 39)
6. See Documents 96 and 98.
7. Reference is to Dr. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Stettinius Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia and author of Power and International Relations (1962).
8. Brzezinski did not indicate his approval here, but wrote at the top of the first page of the memorandum: “RI Set up requested meeting. ZB.”
9. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Armacost, Thornton, and Oksenberg. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Denend saw it.