Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)¹

Washington, July 13, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Next 18 Months

I ASSUME:

—terrific bind on resources, —state budget (cut for FY 80 by 5% yesterday), AID, FMS, ESF, etc., plus SALT military and energy.

—very tough political environment for Carter—possible squeaks or losses in early primaries, overwhelming emphasis by White House on election related policies both domestic and foreign (Kirby² tells me this is clearly evident already in Bob Strauss’s approach to Middle East negotiations).³

—SALT treaty passes the Senate—for if it doesn’t, Vance will be spending all his time mending the Soviet fences and our allied wells.

THIS MEANS:

—even less likely Carter or Vance should want to take on major new initiatives. We’ve assumed that all along. It is simply underlined triply now.

—programs that may cost money or imply new outlays are not going anywhere unless they are strictly in support of what we’re already doing and of the highest priority (e.g., Vance’s approval of another $60 million in PL–480 for Egypt without even waiting to see what other claimants may be or even what our resource base for the PL–480 pie is likely to be).

—Vance is going to have to spend a lot more time SELLING our foreign policy domestically; the President doesn’t have too much to sell on domestic economic policy.⁴

—foreign policy credibility of the US administration—always uncertain during an election year in terms of our ability to commit and deliver on new policies—is going to be lower than we’ve seen it since Watergate. This means hesitation by allies and others to be strongly supportive of US initiatives which may not have bipartisan support inside this country and their own.

I SUGGEST, THEREFORE:

—that Vance focus particularly on defending and articulating what we’ve done;⁵

—that he concentrate on strengthening existing policy areas where they are sagging and where we may suffer losses;

—Central America⁶

—non-proliferation

—relations with Allies

—relations with energy producing states, Middle East and elsewhere

—and above all, ensuring we do not suffer visible setbacks in 1980.⁷

—that he intensify his involvement in pressing Congress and the White House for the indispensable minimum resources we need. With a recession and countervailing claims all over the domestic economy and from Defense, that will be something he’s going to have to spend much more time on than he has previously.⁸

—that he not devote excessive amounts of his time to North-South issues. Not because they may not be important but because in the domestic environment of 1980 that is not where people are going to be looking, EXCEPT where active US involvement is necessary in order to prevent a grave and visible deterioration.⁹

—that to the extent he becomes involved in new issues—long-term debt relief for LDCs, energy development in non-OPEC LDCs, etc.—these be clearly tagged as issues for the next term but for which ground needs to be laid, etc.¹⁰

Paul H. Kreisberg¹¹

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director: Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298: Box 18, Next Eighteen Months 8/9/79–9/10/79. Confidential. Copies were sent to Lissakers and Berger. Kreisberg added the “from” line by hand. In the top-right hand corner of the memorandum, Lake wrote: “Ed—Hold for this PM. TL.” Presumable reference to Edward O’Donnell, Lake’s Special Assistant. Kreisberg drafted the memorandum as part of a larger project coordinated by Lake and Tarnoff to provide Vance with recommendations designed to structure and define the remainder of Vance’s time as Secretary. Lake and Tarnoff submitted their recommendations to Vance in an August 9 memorandum, Document 123.
2. Presumable reference to Policy Planning Staff member William Kirby, Jr.
3. Strauss resigned as Special Representative for Trade Negotiations on August 8. Earlier in 1979, the President appointed Strauss as Ambassador at Large for the Middle East negotiations. Resigning from his Special Representative position allowed Strauss to focus more attention on the Middle East.
4. In the right-hand margin next to this point, Lake placed a checkmark and an asterisk.
5. In the left-hand margin next to this and the following points, Lake placed a checkmark.
6. In the left-hand margin next to this and the next three points, Lake placed a checkmark. He also deleted a dash placed erroneously before “Middle East.”
7. In the left-hand margin next to this point, Lake placed a question mark.
8. Lake placed a vertical line in the margin to the left of this point and added a checkmark and asterisk.
9. Lake placed a vertical line in the margin to the left of this point and wrote “[unclear] and rebut.”
10. Lake placed a vertical line in the margin to the left of this point and added two checkmarks.
11. Kreisberg signed “Paul” above his typed signature.