Attached at Tab A is an assessment of the extent of discontent in Chile
made by the Central Intelligence Agency at our request as a result of a
series of reports indicating discontent with the Allende Government. The Agency’s
principal conclusions are as follows:
—There is no evidence that discontent is being translated into potential
for armed resistance either within the military or outside it.
Tab A
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency2
2070/71
Washington, September 20, 1971.
Discontent in Chile: Its Extent and Prospects
Summary
Discontent with the Allende
government has become more vocal in recent weeks. There is no
evidence, however, that this discontent is
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being translated into any significant
organizing for armed resistance, either within the military or among
disgruntled civilian groups. Neither is there any indication that
discontent is so serious as to permit enemies of the regime to
provoke outbreaks of violence, except on a small scale and in
isolated instances. President Allende is aware of the extent of discontent and,
consummate politician that he is, retains the capability of keeping
it within manageable bounds. All signs suggest that he will remain
in control for the foreseeable future.
1. The increasingly vocal discontent in Chile is in part the natural
welling of criticism that has faced all recent Chilean presidents as
they near the end of their first year in office. In Allende’s case, it is aggravated
by growing economic difficulties, by the social and economic
dislocations brought on by his programs, and by a residual fear of
Communism among a minority of Chileans. Chileans are jealous of
their traditional right to speak up and criticize the authorities.
Since the opposition press, radio, and TV have been enfeebled under
Allende, much of the
criticism is of necessity by word of mouth.
2. There is no evidence that present discontent is being translated
into organized plotting against the government. Observers of the
Chilean scene have long noted the Chilean propensity to substitute
virulent vocal criticism for action. Discontent may well become even
more stridently expressed in coming months, but present indications
are that it is unlikely to be translated into concerted action
against the regime.
3. Chilean landowners and their allies in the business and industrial
communities as well as certain Chilean military officers have
figured in recent reporting on alleged antiregime plotting. The
first category—men who have lost or stand to lose the most as
Allende implements his
programs—are still able to engage in some activities through such
organizations as the Sociedad de Fomento
Fabril, which is currently engaged in a rear-guard effort
to defend the interests of the private business community. [name not declassified] a leader of the
society, recently asked Ambassador Korry for assistance in getting his family to the
United States in case his position in Chile “becomes untenable”—a
sign that the organization may be losing faith in its continued
viability under Allende.
Some elements of the political right last year organized a group
called Patria y Libertad to resist the
regime. According to unconfirmed reports, Patria y
Libertad cells are being armed with smuggled weapons. At
present, very little solid information is available on this
organization.
4. Chilean landowners probably have weapons in some quantity. Many of
them stockpiled arms in 1964 when they feared Allende might win that year’s
election. They did not engage in concerted resistance, however,
during the wave of illegal land seizures early this year. Their
numbers and dominion have now been whittled away and, whatever
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the degree of their anger,
they probably feel that the time to act has passed.
5. Some representatives of the Chilean private sector are apparently
in contact with like-minded men in neighboring Latin American
countries, as well as with Chilean colleagues who moved to Argentina
after Allende’s election.
There is no hard evidence, however, that the Chilean stay-at-homes
have secured significant assistance from these sources in the form
of money or weapons. Some could be forthcoming, and it is possible
to smuggle small quantities of weapons into Chile from Argentina and
Bolivia. In the continuing absence of any sizable group within Chile
willing and able to use these weapons against the regime, such
smuggling would appear to have no immediate importance.
6. Many beleaguered landowners and businessmen probably hope somehow
to enlist the Chilean military in an effort to “put things right” in
Chile. They do have some contacts among retired or active military
officers, but there is no evidence that they have made significant
progress in any effort to put things right.
7. High Chilean military commanders have reiterated in the past year
that they will not permit Allende to transgress the constitution. These
statements may in part be motivated by an abiding suspicion of
Communism held by a number of military officers, and their awareness
that the Communist Party has a key role in the administration. At
the same time, however, Allende is the constitutionally elected president
and military leaders often restate their commitment to defend him.
Chile’s armed forces remain among the least inclined in Latin
America to intervene in politics. Many military officers, moreover,
are convinced that Allende’s
programs contain many positive and long-overdue reforms. Allende, for his part, has
cultivated the military more assiduously and skillfully than any of
his recent predecessors.
8. The recent increase in vocal discontent in Chile has nonetheless
had some effect in the military. Chilean military officers, too,
have a propensity for grumbling. There is no evidence, however, that
opposition to Allende, even
on the vocal level, is widespread or cohesive in the armed forces or
among members of the well-disciplined Carabineros (national police). There is no information on
any conspiracies.
9. Specific reporting on military unrest in recent weeks suggests
that it is scattered—as are most military units. None of the
officers mentioned in these reports commands units of strength or
strategic location. If an uprising were to be attempted by some
provincial military unit in the hope of setting off a chain
reaction, it could easily be isolated. A rebellion would have to
turn quickly to Santiago if it were to be successful, and it would
require at least passive support from the Carabineros.
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10. Since it came to power over ten months ago, the government has
steadily increased its capabilities for monitoring the development
of conspiracies within the military. The small group of officers
linked to imprisoned General Viaux, the Comite
Revolucionario, was probably thoroughly penetrated. Members
of this group never got beyond the talking stage, have not been
heard from in recent months, and may have disbanded. Four retired
generals are currently reported to be under surveillance because of
their involvement in antigovernment activity. A clandestine source
reports, however, that the generals have not yet been detained
because their activities are not considered a threat to the
government.
11. As for the near future, nothing has happened to change our
judgment of last month (in SNIE
94–71) that the military is unlikely to unite against Allende unless he commits a
blatantly unconstitutional act, tries to suppress the opposition by
force, or makes a move that the military considers a threat against
the armed forces as an institution. Allende recognizes this and will avoid such actions.
In the longer term, however, a deterioration of the Chilean economy
which brought on severe social unrest could prompt military
intervention. Chile is presently a long way from that degree of
unrest.
12. Allende is aware of the
present discontent with his government. He may be concerned, but he
has given no sign that he feels obliged in any way to modify his
programs. He has known from the beginning that he must operate
within the constraints of the political facts of life in Chile.
Moreover, he does not need to go beyond the present constitution to
consolidate further his political power and bring about many of the
social, economic, and political changes he has in mind for Chile.
When he judges the time to be right he will probably be able to
change the constitution legally, or at least in ways that will not
antagonize the military.
