Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

88. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, March 25, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Message from Chancellor Schmidt on NORTHAG Brigade and Other Defense Issues

FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has sent you the message at Tab B reviewing three defense issues of current importance to him:

—the relocation of a US brigade to northern Germany,

—the need to ensure that NATO members other than the United States and the Federal Republic do not relax their defense efforts, and

—his hope, for both domestic and foreign policy reasons, that it will be possible for you to develop an advance consultation procedure with him should the United States plan to use U.S. forces or equipment in Germany for assignments outside the NATO area.

Chancellor Schmidt’s message comes at a time when, in addition to the brigade relocation issue, we are still in the process of negotiating successor arrangements to the Offset agreement with the FRG, when we are encouraging the FRG to buy the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and when US and FRG tanks are about to enter into a stiff competition which will be instrumental in the awarding of the multi-billion-dollar US tank contract. Accordingly, I believe that Schmidt wants to ensure that he is aware of your personal views on the relative importance of the brigade as he sorts his several defense priorities. Of greater importance, Schmidt is very sensitive to the political implications of an additional U.S. brigade on German soil at a time when other members of the Alliance are looking for ways to quietly cut back on their conventional strength.

Addressing still another of his defense concerns (going back to the 1973 FRG domestic problems when the U.S. resupplied Israel with U.S. equipment from the FRG during the Yom Kippur war) Schmidt raises the issue of consultations. The prospect of the NORTHAG brigade renews his worries that the United States might at some point in the future draw on this manpower and equipment for an out-of-theater mission. Accordingly, to enable him to deal as effectively as possible with his domestic and international situation should this need arise, he would like your assurances that you will consult in advance. Each of these issues is reviewed in greater detail below.

NORTHAG Brigade

For the past several months we have been exploring with the FRG the desirability and practicality of relocating to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) area of NATO one of the two new Army brigades resulting from the Nunn Amendment. Former Secretary Schlesinger proposed this to FRG Defense Minister Leber last September; Secretary Rumsfeld continued the discussions with Leber last December. General Haig strongly supports the proposal, part of a larger plan under which the United States would increase our overall commitment of divisions to Europe by designating the NORTHAG brigade as the advance element of a three-division U.S. corps to be moved to Europe to reinforce NATO’s northern defenses in the event of hostilities.

The principal impediment to early relocation of the brigade has been that of obtaining a guarantee that the FRG would defray the initial construction and rehabilitation costs involved in relocation. We have been discussing NORTHAG in the context of US–FRG talks on a successor arrangement to Offset, suggesting that the NORTHAG costs be counted as part of the FRG offset expenditure. There would seem to be the possibility that Schmidt has concluded incorrectly that NORTHAG—with the FRG offsetting funding—is not high on the list of U.S. priorities. The proposed response to the Chancellor at Tab A informs him that the NORTHAG relocation proposal has your personal support and it encourages him to proceed with the offsetting relocation funding.

NATO Conventional Force Levels

Responding to the Chancellor’s question on how the United States and the FRG can work to ensure that conventional force levels are maintained by the other members of the Alliance, your message would state your complete agreement that U.S. and FRG efforts should not be a substitute for responsible action by the rest of the Alliance. Your response advises that the United States will continue to take a strong stand on the need for adequate conventional force levels.

Consultations on Out-of-Theater Use of U.S. Forces

In response to what is, perhaps, Chancellor Schmidt’s greatest concern, your reply would express understanding with the considerations which have caused him to propose direct, advance consultations relating to the possibility that U.S. troops and equipment in the FRG might be required to be used outside the NATO area. Your reply explains the need for relying at times for NATO assigned troops for out-of-NATO contingencies and proposes the working out of procedures for full and timely consultation.

Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld concur in the proposed letter. Bob Hartmann’s office has approved the draft.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Chancellor Schmidt at Tab A.

1. Summary: Scowcroft discussed a message from Schmidt on NORTHAG, NATO conventional force levels, and U.S.–FRG consultations on out-of-theater use of U.S. forces.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany (5) (12/11/75–3/29/76). Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A, a March 25 letter to Schmidt signed by Ford; and Tab B, a February 18 letter to Ford from Von Staden forwarding a February 11 letter from Schmidt. For the resolution of the NORTHAG financing issue, see Document 302. For U.S.–FRG defense relations in the event of another war in the Middle East, see Documents 283 and 284.