84. Telegram 16745/Tosec 10170 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger1
For the Secretary from Lowenstein, Acting. Subject: Briefing Memorandum: Outcome of Helsingor Meeting of Socialist Parties.
1. The following are EUR’s comments on the Helsingor Conference, traffic on which has been repeated to you and on which Jorgensen undoubtedly briefed you fully.
2. The conference was unable to agree on the issue of Socialist-Communist cooperation and there are no indications that any real effort was made to gain a consensus. While we will have to wait for final returns before making considered judgements on the impact of our pre-conference presentations, it seems clear that the debate focused more sharply on this subject than it would have in the absence of our approaches. As expected, Brandt, Schmidt, Wilson and Mitterrand were the dominant figures at the conference.
3. Socialist-Communist Cooperation
It is revealing that the parties favoring cooperation with the Communists were mostly those out of power, while those opposed were in power. Except for Portugal, this was a South-North division. It reflects not only the relative importance of the Communist Parties in the former countries, but also the smaller ideological distinctions they draw between their kind of Socialism and Marxist-Leninism. It also reflects the difference in South-North economic development. The conference therefore developed along predictable lines.
4. Unique among the southern parties at Helsingor were the French because of their numerical dominance of their left alliance. A factor working in Mitterrand’s favor over past years has been the neo-Stalinism of the PCF, and Mitterrand said as much publicly at Helsingor. Not surprisingly, this provoked PCF recriminations in Paris, so that one effect of Helsingor has been to renew the ideological festering between two parties which still see no choice but to try to work together. Mitterrand’s view of the left was shared by almost no one at Helsingor, but he intends to persevere along these lines at the meeting [Page 336] of the European Latin Socialist Parties which he has called for January 24–25 in Paris. (If Marchais continues to move toward the Berlinguer line, Mitterrand will start having problems, and this might be what Marchais had in mind when he characterized as an “absurd idea” Mitterrand’s assertion that the left alliance strengthened the Socialists at the expense of the Communists.)
5. Italy
While no one appeared to support De Martino’s thesis that in view of the situation in Italy the PCI must be associated to the majority, there was understanding for his real problem, i.e., the threat to his left flank by the Christian Democrats via the historic compromise which would make the Socialists irrelevant to any government majority.
6. Spain and Portugal
While all seemed agreed on the need to help their Spanish and Portuguese colleagues, there were no details given on the kind of aid they might have in mind. The Portuguese delegation had no illusions about the Communists and said so at the conference. As for the Spanish Socialist leader Gonzales, he said his party would not enter the Cortes until the Spanish Communists became a legal party. Neither attracted the kind of attention that might have been expected.
- Summary: The Department
forwarded a memorandum on the outcome of the Helsingor Socialist
conference.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Harlan Moen in EUR/WE; cleared by Mack in S/S and O; and approved by Laingen in EUR. From January 21 to 23, Kissinger was in Moscow for talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko. On January 23, he flew to Brussels to brief NATO representatives on these talks.
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