Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

80. Memorandum From Stephen Hadley of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, January 10, 1976.

SUBJECT

• A Review of the Defense Theater Nuclear Force Program

We indicated in our memo forwarding the proposed Defense Posture Statement that the section on theater nuclear forces tracks very closely the Theater Nuclear Force Modernization paper that Secretary Rumsfeld would like to present to NATO later this month. By going forward with these two documents, the US will in effect be setting its theater nuclear doctrine and force posture for some years to come and will be placing it on the record simultaneously with both the Congress and our NATO Allies. For this reason, now is the last major opportunity for a meaningful review of these issues. This memo provides our views on the substance of the DOD theater nuclear force program and describes some alternative ways that a review might be accomplished.

An Analysis of the Defense TNF Program

An overall military balance probably exists in Central Europe, but in terms of strictly conventional forces NATO is clearly inferior to the Pact. While we have made a major effort to upgrade the capability of our conventional forces (and to convince our Allies to do the same), we still must have a credible theater nuclear deterrent. Without this deterrent, the Soviets might be tempted to exploit their conventional advantage—gambling that if the only effective fallback were our strategic nuclear systems we would choose to accept the defeat of our conventional forces in Europe rather than risk initiating a strategic nuclear exchange involving the continental United States. Our Allies would undoubtedly see the situation in the same way, and the resulting anxiety about their own security might fragment the Alliance and encourage some states either to develop their own nuclear weapons or to seek an accommodation with the Soviets. A credible theater nuclear deterrent continues to be essential to military and political stability in Europe.

The Defense initiatives provide for the first time a coherent doctrine for the use of these weapons and suggest a variety of changes in our force posture that will improve its real warfighting capability. Without some modernization, Defense argues that we will be left with an obsolete theater nuclear posture of limited military effectiveness and highly vulnerable to preemption.

Defense proposes increased reliance on Poseidon rather than on nuclear-capable aircraft to cover the targets in SACEUR’s General Strike Plan (GSP). This is probably militarily sound, for Poseidon is a more survivable system not subject to preemption, has assured penetration, and poses less of a command and control problem. Shifting from theater to strategic delivery systems for GSP targets will have little escalatory impact, since the GSP would only be executed in conjunction with the US SIOP (i.e., after a US decision has already been made to resort to central strategic systems).

The major focus of the Defense program is not on Poseidon, however, but on shoring up our capability for direct nuclear support to the battlefield. By increasing the mobility, range, and accuracy of our surface-to-surface missile and artillery systems (Pershing and Improved 8-inch), we increase their survivability and capacity to concentrate fire for specific military objectives. Increased reliance on the Poseidon will free up tactical air assets that no longer need be held in reserve for GSP missions but can be used for nuclear battlefield support (as well as for strictly conventional missions). While their effectiveness will be hindered by the dense Pact air defense systems and the lack of an all-weather capability, the mobility and flexibility of tacair still make it an important asset in support of our ground forces.

The other aspects of the Defense program—improved C3 , greater political control over nuclear systems, reduced collateral damage, and increased peacetime storage site security—are just common sense.

Most of the reservations about the program center on its possible impact on our Allies—whether it will feed European anxieties about our willingness to risk nuclear war in the defense of Europe, raising the decoupling issue. Increased reliance on SLBMs at the expense of US nuclear-capable aircraft, replacement of existing surface-to-surface missiles on a less than one-for-one basis, and reductions in the size of the warhead stockpile will be seen not only as reducing our nuclear capability but moving it off the continent and increasingly into exclusive US control—reducing still further European participation in and control over the nuclear deterrent.

If we take the NATO consultations seriously, however, we should be able to convince the Allies that developing a sound theater nuclear doctrine and an effective posture reflects a strengthening of the nuclear commitment, not a weakening of it. In examining any proposals for theater nuclear forces, the Allies will discover for themselves that many of the warheads are obsolete or deteriorating, and that for several of our presently dual-capable weapons (particularly defensive systems), the nuclear capability contributes little to military effectiveness.

We must be willing, however, to alter some aspects of our plans if the Allies have sincere reservations. We have already done that to some extent in connection with the DPQ exercise, assuring the Allies that we will maintain a substantial level of nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe (perhaps more than might be required in strictly military terms). We can also point out that the Allies have significant nuclear aircraft programs of their own (F–16, Jaguar, MRCA) which will assure their continued role in the nuclear deterrent.

There is some concern that focusing on improvements to our theater nuclear forces might detract from our efforts to convince the Allies of the need for a strengthened conventional defense. But if we use the dialogue on theater nuclear forces to develop an understanding not only of the utility of these forces but also their limitations, we will have ample opportunity to emphasize the importance of continued attention to conventional force improvements.

Questions can also be raised about the impact of the TNF program on our arms control negotiations, particularly MBFR. By hinting at drawdowns in nuclear aircraft and warhead levels beyond the reductions offered in the NATO Option III initiative, the Defense program, if leaked, could undermine the negotiating value of our Option III proposal. More generally, there is the prospect of withdrawing FBS-type systems without attempting to gain “credit” for them in terms of reciprocal concessions from the Soviets. Finally, by eliminating inefficiency and streamlining forces outside the negotiating context, any reductions that are negotiated after these improvements will appear to cost us more in terms of real military capability. (We have already faced this problem with our ground forces in Europe, and decided to make the support-to-combat conversions without waiting for an MBFR Phase I agreement.)

There is no escape from these dilemmas—we will continually have to balance the need for force improvements against the impact on specific negotiations and the prospects for obtaining reciprocal quids from the Soviets. Because the theater nuclear force issue is such a sensitive one with our Allies, our NATO consultations will have to be careful and deliberate—and will take time. Our recent MBFR experience on Option III demonstrates that consultations on even the most sensitive topics can be handled if we are willing to proceed slowly, without pressuring the Allies. Because of this time element, we can safely initiate the dialogue now and begin to build a consensus behind some form of improvement program. Actual force structure changes will come much later, and the pace of these changes can be dictated by MBFR and our negotiating prospects with the Soviets. (Ambassador Bruce is in favor of a dialogue on theater nuclear forces and feels that now is a good time to begin.)

While we basically endorse the Defense initiatives, there are four aspects we should watch carefully over the next few months:

—Level of Nuclear-Capable Aircraft in NATO. After Defense has completed its studies on the nuclearization of the F–15/F–16, we will need to obtain internal US government consensus on a level of nuclear-capable aircraft that reflects military, diplomatic, and negotiating factors. Defense has argued that any reductions of nuclear-capable aircraft in favor of conventional replacements should come in the Center Region, since that is where the conventional mission will be most important and nuclear aircraft would be most vulnerable. Since this could result in nuclear aircraft reductions in the MBFR reductions area beyond the 54 envisioned in Option III, the implementation of the Defense program will have to be paced by progress in the MBFR talks.

—Use of Poseidon RVs for Limited Nuclear Options in Europe. Defense is studying this possibility, as is SACEUR in developing his Selective Employment Plans (SEPs). Use of Poseidon for limited options does appear, however, to raise escalation problems—using what has been considered a strategic system for a limited target in a strictly theater confrontation might give the wrong signal to the Soviets. Nuclear-capable aircraft might be better suited for this role.

—Modernization of 155 mm Artillery Projectiles. If Congress approves the 8-inch modernization, Defense may seek to improve the nuclear shell for the 155 mm. While this may be advisable, at least some analysts argue that the 8-inch alone provides adequate nuclear artillery support and that continued nuclear role for the 155 adds little to the nuclear deterrent while detracting considerably from training and readiness of artillery units for the conventional role.

—Improving the Capability of US Forces to Operate in a Nuclear Environment. This is a real problem area, and we should support Defense’s efforts to remedy it. Theater nuclear forces are of little utility if conventional forces are not capable of operating in nuclear environments to exploit their effects.

In addition to the concerns discussed earlier, there are two other criticisms that will probably dominate any public discussion of Defense’s proposed theater nuclear program. First, critics will argue that improving the warfighting capability of our theater nuclear forces makes their use more likely and hence lowers the nuclear threshold. While the critics are probably right—an improved warfighting capability does make their use more likely should war occur—the contribution of a credible theater nuclear posture to deterring altogether the outbreak of any war outweighs this risk. Lowering the nuclear threshold becomes a semantic argument if we can avoid hostilities in the first place.

Secondly, there is the concept of escalation control. Defense assumes that a limited use of nuclear weapons to halt a Soviet tank breakthrough would provoke a “pause” in the conflict, and pave the way for negotiations between the political leaders of the two sides. But Soviet nuclear hardware, doctrine, and military exercises do not envision such selective or controlled use of nuclear weapons. They assume instead a rapid escalation from the first use of nuclear weapons, and as a consequence, Soviet plans favor the prompt use of their own nuclear weapons on a massive scale in response to either actual or anticipated NATO first-use. While Soviet doctrine and posture may move toward recognizing the possibility of limited strikes and controlled use, NATO reliance on these weapons to create a “pause” in the conflict would for the present be a risky matter. But this is not an argument against the force posture proposed by Defense, for that posture will be effective for both limited and more massive strikes (largely because of the selectable yield feature of the warheads). In any case, it is the contribution to deterrence that is the primary justification for the program anyway.

While we basically agree with the Defense proposals, we feel that theater nuclear forces are such an important part of our deterrent strategy and military posture that Presidential review of the program is imperative. Complicating the timing of such a review is Secretary Rumsfeld’s desire to present the program to NATO at the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting January 21–22 and to Congress in the Posture Statement that he submits with the Defense budget. An NSC meeting next week would be ideal.

Less satisfactory would be Presidential review of a written summary and analysis of the program. If no Presidential review can be scheduled before the NPG and the release of the Posture Statement, Secretary Rumsfeld could in the interim confine his NATO presentation and Posture Statement to general concepts of theater nuclear doctrine and avoid any discussion of specific modernization actions. Alternatively, you may feel that no Presidential review is required, in which case another session between yourself, Secretary Kissinger, and Secretary Rumsfeld would be all that is needed to clear the Defense theater nuclear program. (We will have to make sure that any changes in the program are reflected in the theater nuclear sections of both the NATO paper and the Posture Statement.)

Your Decision

Try for an NSC. (We have recommended this option to you and have already sent you a schedule proposal by separate memo.)

Prepare a discussion paper on the Defense theater nuclear program for the President.

I will discuss with Secretary Rumsfeld the possibility of limiting his NATO presentation and Posture Statement to general concepts, pending a later NSC review of the US theater nuclear program.

Presidential review is not required at this time, and I will meet with Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Kissinger to go over the Defense theater nuclear program.

1. Summary: Hadley analyzed the Department of Defense’s proposal regarding NATO theater nuclear forces.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 13, NATO, 1/1/76–11/76. Secret. Sent for action. Hyland initialed his approval of the fourth option on Scowcroft’s behalf. Under cover of a January 6 memorandum to Scowcroft, Hadley forwarded and commented on a December 12, 1975 Department of Defense paper entitled, “Improving the Effectiveness of NATO’s Theater Nuclear Forces.” (Ibid.) In a September 3, 1975 letter to Schlesinger, Haig discussed the effects of U.S. efforts to raise the nuclear threshold and modernize the NATO theater nuclear force posture in Europe on its NATO allies. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0059, NATO 320.2, 3 Sep 75)