Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

72. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1975, 8:10–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Ford
• Vice President Rockefeller
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
• Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list attached)
• Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

SUBJECT

• Report on President’s Trip to Europe

The President: Thank you all for coming this morning. The Speaker, Tip O’Neill, and Phil Burton are coming but they will be a little late.

I wanted to give you this morning a quick overall summary of what happened on my trip to Europe. Before the trip there was an undercurrent of feeling in Europe that the United States, because of Vietnam and Cambodia, did not have the will to stand firm in Europe where our basic foreign policy interests are really concentrated. When British Prime Minister Wilson proposed a NATO Summit, I thought this was a good idea and readily agreed.

The overall results of this meeting were excellent. In my talks with the NATO leaders, I stressed that the United States does have the strength and the will to maintain our commitments to the Alliance, but I want to say that the most persuasive and convincing reassurance we could give them was not what I could say but it was the votes the Congress has given me on the Defense Bill. I used a statement by Tip O’Neill and comments like yours, Mike [Mansfield]. These actions by the Congress were extremely important in the eyes of the Europeans. These statements and actions plus what I said left NATO feeling very reassured about the United States.

But let’s not fool ourselves; there are serious problems to be addressed. I met with Demirel and Karamanlis, the Prime Ministers of

Greece and Turkey. They both have very difficult problems, but the net result of our meetings and because the atmosphere in Brussels was so good, Demirel and Karamanlis met themselves on the Saturday after we left.

The action, Mike [Mansfield], taken in the Senate with regard to the Turkish aid cutoff was very helpful. There are indications they could reach a settlement if the United States did not hold a club over the head of the Turks while they were trying to reach a Cyprus solution. I told Demirel and Karamanlis that I would work with the House in attempting to achieve a lifting of the restriction.

(Representative Burton entered the meeting at this time.)

I am convinced that if we can knock out the embargo soon, we can get significant movement on Cyprus. All of the issues to be settled are well defined, the positions of both sides are not that far apart, and the problems are manageable; but Turkey cannot settle as long as it appears that there is a United States club over its head. At the same time, Greece cannot appear to be too forthcoming on this issue.

There was also the problem of Portugal. In my discussions with the other allied leaders and with Prime Minister Goncalves of Portugal, I repeatedly expressed my deep concern about the developments in Portugal and the continuing evidence of Communist control in the government there. I must say it was one of the greatest discussions I ever had with anybody when I talked with Goncalves. I spoke to him along the following lines. I asked him if there was a Communist influence in the Portuguese Government. He denied it. I told him it was hard to understand how a NATO government could have Communists in it when NATO was set up for the purpose of resisting communism. The Portuguese attempted to describe their governmental structure to me. They see the armed forces as the only organization in the country that represents all of the people. They say that political parties are not democratic because they represent only portions of the people, and therefore the political parties would not be allowed a role in the government. It was a most fascinating explanation; Kissinger) said that that would write a new chapter in any political science textbook.

I believe that in our discussions with other leaders there was a strong feeling that the other diplomatic forces in Portugal must be strengthened. [Socialist leader] Soares will try to fight for a greater role and to keep the socialist newspaper alive. I have the impression that everyone in NATO wants to help the people of Portugal, but how you do it in a government infiltrated with Communists is difficult. I see it as a real touch-and-go-situation and remain rather pessimistic about the future there.

We went on to Spain. The situation there is rather obvious. Franco is still in control and while he appeared to be in better health than when I saw him some 15 months ago, he is 82 years old and his strength is clearly declining. There are forces in Spain working for political prog-ress and they are forming what are called “political associations” but they are not called parties. If there is some development there, things could get very serious. I met with Juan Carlos and had a good talk with him. He very much wants to play a stronger role in the politics there, but everything in Spain is just hanging in the balance.

I made clear to the Spanish leaders that our bilateral military agreement plays a significant role in the defense of Western Europe. All the other NATO governments made clear that they wanted nothing to do with Spain before a change in government, though they all recognize the defense contribution Spain makes. I think Spain will be welcome after the government changes there. In my talks with the allied leaders, I made the point that it was hard for me to understand the double standard, whereby they could live with the dictatorship in Portugal while excluding Spain, where democracy could make some progress.

We next went to Salzburg. I had a little trouble arriving there. I was coming down the steps of the airplane; it was raining like mad. I had Betty on one hand and was holding the umbrella with the other. Betty tripped me. I went flat on my face in the rain and she walked off with the umbrella. (laughter)

In Salzburg I had an excellent meeting with Chancellor Kreisky, who is a very able fellow, very suave, intelligent and knowledgeable. But the primary purpose of Salzburg was my two long meetings and other discussions with President Sadat.

Sadat is a very, very impressive person. I am convinced that he really wants a Middle East settlement but this is where we really face a very difficult situation. As you know, we are now taking a long, careful look at how we might move to get some progress toward a permanent settlement in the Middle East. We tried last fall and last winter to work closely with Egypt and Israel on an interim settlement, but in the March negotiations it tragically failed and the talks were suspended.

We now see three alternatives in our reassessment:

—First, we could try to revive the step-by-step negotiations. There are some rumblings that this may be possible; however, I am pessimistic about the resumption of such talks because I know how very difficult they were during last March.

—Second, we could come up with a broad, comprehensive settlement in which the United States could put on the table all of its answers to all of the issues which have festered in the Middle East for 25 years. This would include our ideas for the permanent borders for Israel. This would be a comprehensive plan laid on the table at Geneva. This may, in fact, be the best way to launch the talks. Many who criticized at first have now suggested this route despite all the problems inherent going to Geneva, having to deal with the PLO for example. I believe this will not be an easy thing to do, but it may turn out to be the best and the only thing we can do, but I’m not predicting this is what we will do.

—The third option would be to go to Geneva, lay out all the problems on the table—the PLO, the Arab Pact, the Golan Heights, even Jerusalem, and then try to expand that with some bilateral agreements under the umbrella of Geneva.

I will be meeting with Prime Minister Rabin next week. This will be the same kind of in-depth discussion I had with President Sadat. After that meeting, we will make the final decisions in our reassessment. We will tell the Congress our ideas and our decisions. Let me say that in the meantime I will be happy to get any ideas or suggestions from the Congress.

After Salzburg we went on to Rome, where I had some very fruitful discussions with President Leone and Prime Minister Moro. Even more important was the meeting I had with the Pope, who is a very impressive and interesting man. He is desperately concerned to see the United States keep up its humanitarian activities in the world. I found the Pope to be very well informed on world affairs, and although he is reported not to be very well, I certainly found him to appear very vigorous. Henry [Kissinger], do you have anything to add along these lines?

Secretary Kissinger: No, Mr. President, you outlined very well the results of the trip. I have attended a number of NATO meetings and I do want to say that this is the most positive NATO meeting I have ever attended.

Events of recent months have brought home to our allies how important the United States is to the stability of the alliance. They were worried that after Vietnam and Cambodia, the United States might try to withdraw from our role in the world. In his talks with the allied leaders, the President did not so much reassure them with his words, but by focusing on the new agenda ahead of us and outlining the approaches and solutions the United States has in mind, he clearly convinced them that we were there to stay.

The meeting with Demirel and Karamanlis was a very important event. Let me just say a little about the Turkish domestic situation. Ecevit, who was Prime Minister when Turkey moved onto Cyprus, is now in the opposition, where he can accuse the current Prime Minister Demirel of giving away what Turkey acquired under Ecevit. Demirel, therefore, needs a lifting of the arms cutoff restrictions to strengthen his position in order to move in a conciliatory way. The President’s meeting with Demirel was very good and very useful.

The overall success of the NATO meeting was best indicated by the proposal of the Canadian Prime Minister, who has never been very enthusiastic about NATO affairs, for annual NATO meetings. The French blamed us for putting Trudeau up to his statement, but we had no talks with Canada on the matter; we were as surprised as everyone else.

With regard to Spain, the President’s conversation with Juan Carlos was [a] very helpful chance to meet with Franco’s successor. There is an evolutionary process going on in Spain and our embassy is trying to keep contact with the important opposition groups. Our difficulty will be to steer between Franco and the development of the situation like that in Portugal.

With regard to the meeting with Sadat, he is really very ready to move toward a settlement. He will consider any of the three options we have put forth. We also find the Israelis making helpful sounds at this time too. We have great hopes that Salzburg may represent a great turning point. After Rabin’s talks next week we hope to be in a position to decide which of the three options will be the best to pursue.

Secretary Schlesinger: Despite some reports of dissension within the Defense Planning Group, the fact was that in the end the ministerial guidance was passed unanimously. It contained the right mix of nuclear and conventional force planning. The harmony in NATO is the result of the hard work by the U.S. to improve its force posture, and this provides important evidence that the U.S. is serious about the defense of Europe. I think our own efforts under the Nunn Amendment to increase our fighting strength in place of logistic forces has given a great impetus to our efforts to get the other countries to do their best. Spain is a problem for the Alliance, but all the Ministers recognize the importance of the Spanish contribution to the Western Alliance.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey.]

Senator Byrd: [Omitted here is additional discussion of the Middle East, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey.]

Secondly, Mr. President, I was very encouraged by your trip. You spoke my sentiments exactly when you came down hard on the Portuguese issue and in trying to get Spain recognized as a vital component of Western defenses. I share your concern about Portugal. I just hope the other allies are as serious about NATO as we are. I also hope that the other countries are not thinking about a protracted conventional war, especially in the face of the strong Soviet strength in Eastern Europe. We would lose in a long protracted war with the Soviets. I think a war would be quick and decisive and I hope we are prepared for that kind of conflict.

The President: Bob, we are pressing for standardization of weapons. We are wasting too much money in NATO in differing weapons systems. I think there is now a move in Europe to standardize and modernize. I think there is now a new recognition and a new resolution in NATO to do so. I think they recognize they can’t face the Soviets with outdated and obsolescent equipment.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am quite confident we will see some movement in this direction. The other countries are serious and are making improvements to keep current their defense posture. With regard to the issue of a protracted war, we are planning the kind of force structure that would deter such a war, not fight it.

Representative Wilson: AHEPA visited me last week. They expressed great concern for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus. If we could do something very feasible for the refugees, it would be very helpful. Perhaps we could do something as part of a package on the Turkey arms restrictions.

Secretary Kissinger: We could do that. We could also put together a package of economic and military aid for Greece, although it would be hard to do so long as the arms cut-off to Turkey exists. I would also point out that the provisions of the Cyprus settlement would permit the Greeks to go back to the land the Turks would give up.

Representative Wilson: We need to dramatize the refugee situation.

The President: I am very fond of AHEPA. They are fine people who have been my friends, but let me tell you what Demirel told me. “The Turks fought with the United States in Korea and we have a cemetery there. There are items we have paid for which are now embargoed and are in storage in the United States, and the U.S. is now charging us for storage on the things we own. We don’t understand why the United States doesn’t understand Turkey.” How the hell do you answer a question like that? This arms embargo just makes no sense at all.

Thank you for coming down here today.

1. Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Schlesinger briefed Congressional leaders on their trip to Europe.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12. Confidential. Attached but not published is a list of meeting participants. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors, and “[a]”, added for clarity. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Ford and Kissinger briefed the Cabinet on their trip on June 4. (Memorandum of conversation, June 4; ibid.)