Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

40. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, December 9, 1973.

SUBJECT

• Private discussion following Quadripartite Dinner in Brussels, December 9, 1973

Following dinner, the French, U.K., FRG, and U.S. Ministers, plus Political Directors, went into the study for a restricted conversation.

Douglas-Home (to the Secretary): What will you ask for tomorrow in the Ministerial Session about consultation procedures? This sort of thing is difficult about questions like the Middle East. However, there might be some point in consulting about what will happen in Yugoslavia when Tito goes.

The Secretary: I will have no concrete proposals to make.

Douglas-Home: But the situation is not right now. We should find some way to correct it.

The Secretary: There are two procedures involved; one is in NATO and one is with the Nine. With regard to the latter, by 1980, you will have one foreign policy. At some point, the two procedures must merge.

Douglas-Home: We are trying to get consensus in the Nine. We may not get this by 1980. NATO has defensive purposes. Still, the procedures for consultation don’t seem right. Eventually, they will be.

Jobert: Tito will be dead before 1980. There also could be problems in Spain.

Scheel: But that will not give rise to intervention. In Yugoslavia, there could be intervention—some factions could ask for aid from abroad.

It is difficult to develop consultative procedures between the Nine and the U.S. The situation will be improved very much when the EC forms a common policy and has one representative. I did feel that, during the Middle Eastern crisis, it should have been possible to discuss the intentions of the U.S. in the Middle East and in the course of the conflict as it developed.

The Secretary: Let me be frank. It is not just a question of procedures, but one of confidence. Also, there was a totally different perception of what was at stake as between the U.S. and the Europeans. The Europeans really did to us what we did to them in 1956. What we did then was wrong, and I feel I have a moral right to say this, since I felt and said this at the time.

Churchill could have told the Soviet Union, after Hitler attacked, that it had been wrong and therefore England would not lift a finger to help her. However, he did not do so. In a way, the Europeans behaved towards us in the Middle Eastern conflict as Churchill could have done but didn’t. I agree with Sir Alec that you all were right and we were wrong; we should have brought a settlement in the Middle East before 1973.

However, after October 6, we had to prevent a victory of Soviet arms. We were not interested in backing the status quo of the prior period. We wanted the U.S.—and not the Soviets—to play the primary role in the peace settlement. I think we have achieved this. We have substantial influence now in the Arab world.

On the question of EC unity, it was said last week here in Brussels that such unity was good because it enabled Europe to stand up to the U.S. At the time, I recalled the Jordanian crisis of 1970 and the influence the U.K. exerted on us during that crisis. It was incomparably greater than anything Europe has exerted on us during the recent crisis. You were in office then, Sir Alec, and you will remember that we considered nothing without checking first with you. It is no longer appropriate for the U.K. to play this special role with the U.S. But, if information we provide is to be used against us in the Middle East, and if European leaders speak against us so sharply, the consultation won’t help. What we need is a special relationship with Europe.

Douglas-Home: There can be no peace in the Middle East unless Israel can be persuaded to withdraw. Israel wouldn’t listen to such advice in the past, and I must say U.S. administrations have not helped.

The Secretary: You must remember that we had the Viet-Nam war on our hands and also had a big domestic problem.

Douglas-Home: I don’t want to rub it in about our being right and your being wrong. But I would be interested in knowing when exactly you were convinced that Europe was lacking in its support of the U.S. in the Middle Eastern crisis. The Russians began their airlift and then you began yours. However, I wouldn’t have thought at that point that NATO was seen as being involved. For ourselves, we didn’t feel that this was the case. It did represent an escalation of the war, but it was still localized. Also, we had heard that you and the Russians had made an agreement. Nevertheless, at some point you must have felt that we let you down.

The Secretary: From the beginning, we knew what your Ambassadors were saying around the circuit in the Arab countries. This didn’t fill us with joy. It seemed a deliberate effort to disassociate yourselves from us. Even so, this probably wasn’t terribly important.

Once the airlift started, it was obvious that, if Egypt and Syria won, the Soviet policy would be dominant in the area and Western influence would be correspondingly reduced. We had the idea that no European country—and certainly not the U.K. or France—would help us get technical equipment into the Middle East. We didn’t ask for your help because we knew it would be refused. Thus, we had a situation where the Soviet airlift planes overflew NATO territory more easily than we could do ourselves. And this was at a time when we felt our action was more in the European interest than in our own.

Then we went to the Security Council. At about the same time, and this was a case of unfortunate timing—Luns said that it might be all right to sacrifice US-Soviet détente, but the détente of the European countries should not be sacrificed.

After the start of our airlift we became unhappy and increasingly annoyed at statements that we were humiliating and degrading Europe. This was after we had been urged by the Europeans to settle things with the Soviets.

Douglas-Home (to Scheel and Jobert): Would you have recognized the airlift as a time when NATO came into the picture?

The Secretary: It was not so much NATO but the reaction of our Allies. Simply because they have no legal obligation under the Alliance, this should not preclude them from acting outside the NATO area.

Douglas-Home: Yes, this was the case in Cuba. But how did the feeling arise in the U.S. that the Europeans were unhelpful?

The Secretary: We felt our efforts helped European interests and blocked Soviet interests.

Scheel: All of us felt that NATO was not involved until the time of the alert.

The Secretary: These are two different things. We didn’t feel that NATO should take a position on the alert. We simply informed NATO at that time.

We had two general impressions. One was of a general lack of sympathy for our efforts, and the second was that almost anything we do is used to organize Europe against us.

On the alert, we are doing a study to see how we might have handled the question of information better. We felt our action helped Europe since it was decisive and fast. Many questions had been raised in the past by Europeans as to whether we would debate a long time before doing anything on the Autobahn in response to Soviet pressure. Our action during the Middle Eastern crisis should have reassured people.

(The Secretary then reviewed the circumstances of the alert, his contacts with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, the letter from Brezhnev, etc.)

Scheel: In an emergency of that kind, I can see that such action was necessary. The U.S. really has a double responsibility both for the Alliance as well as for areas outside of NATO. We should study how matters of this kind can be handled in a better way.

The Secretary: No procedural arrangements can prevent situations arising where action must be taken on an emergency basis in a crisis. As Sir Alec suggested, if we can look ahead and anticipate emergencies, then we can foresee how things might develop and this would be helpful.

Douglas-Home: I hope we won’t get into all of this tomorrow.

The Secretary: No, I’ll only refer to these problems in general terms.

Douglas-Home: Yes, there is a problem. We are concerned about the U.S. attitude on all of these things and I hope we can resolve matters for the future.

The Secretary: This is not the real problem. It can be solved. But the way in which European unity is being formed is another matter.

Douglas-Home: Our policies are only now beginning to be coordinated.

The Secretary: We have always favored European unity. But now we continually read in the European press that this unity really is against the U.S.

Scheel: It is very difficult to achieve European unity. Now we are dealing with nine countries rather than six and this makes it even more difficult. Our actions, however, are not anti-American at all.

The Secretary: I could collect many speeches made by leading personalities which would disprove what you are saying.

Scheel: If Europe had been united it would not have been treated by the U.S. as it was during the Middle Eastern crisis.

The Secretary: This is nonsense. A united Europe would be much better off.

One reason for the lack of consultation concerns a lack of confidence. We have ways of learning how your Ambassadors are reporting and we know they were sending reports back saying that the U.S. was trying to do bad things against Europe. This did not help matters.

In some respects, Paris and the U.K. knew more than Washington did about our talks in Moscow. After I had briefed the Ambassadors in Moscow following my talks, we tried to send messages back to Washington using our facilities in the airplane, but this did not work and we could not communicate.

I remember that when I saw Jobert in Washington October 11 he said that we should settle things with the Russians and that France and Europe could do nothing.

Jobert: I don’t think your memory is very good. I said that you had sent masses of arms and it was therefore up to you to try to settle things.

The Secretary: We hadn’t started the airlift then.

Jobert: I don’t want to argue about this. The problem now is that we have no information about what is going on.

The Secretary: I don’t remember that we kept anything from you.

Jobert: We still don’t know what is going on. And who pushed us out of the settlement. If we are to be non-persons, that is one thing. I don’t want to argue this. We do want to participate, but if we are pushed out we will be able to manage for ourselves.

Now, we have a problem with our unity and we also have a problem with oil.

The Secretary: Both of these are our problems, too. I can’t believe that Europe can suffer without our also being affected.

Scheel: I am sure you recognize that our economic position in the short run is different from yours.

Jobert: I remember when I saw you in Washington that I said there would soon be a meeting of the Arab oil producing states and they would double the price of oil. You didn’t seem to be concerned.

The Secretary: I’m sure we can multiply the charges against each other. For one year, we’ve asked Europe to take a common position on energy, but nothing has happened.

Jobert: It is not we who do not want a common position of the consumer countries.

Douglas-Home: There is a lot of back history to all of this. I think the U.S. and the Israelis are now coming around to another point of view.

The Secretary: I wish I could say this were true for the Israelis.

Douglas-Home: Again, at what point did Europe and NATO recognize when the Soviet Union became involved in the Middle Eastern crisis. It wasn’t apparent to us.

The Secretary: We didn’t ask for support—only understanding.

Douglas-Home: There’s really little difference. You did get some from the Germans. We said that you shouldn’t ask us.

The Secretary (to Jobert): You said that we pushed you out. I don’t want to discuss this in detail now, but it is an interesting question. This whole thing about the Middle East is going to be a messy business. There will be no glory in it. Israel will have to withdraw. This is all going to be heartbreaking and very difficult. I am looking for the most efficacious means. But it does seem that, if we quarrel about these things, we should do it in forums where the Arabs and the Russians aren’t around.

Douglas-Home: We certainly don’t want to quarrel with the United States. We hope you can settle things with the Soviets.

The Secretary: Our basic strategy is to push the Soviet Union to the sidelines. We don’t want to radicalize the Arabs. Our aims are really more ambitious.

Douglas-Home: We can stand aside, and if we can be of any help we will be glad.

The Secretary: That would be fine. It would be good to have a division of labor. A solution of the problem would be in our common interests. It’s absurd to argue.

I agree that this is the most probable outcome. First, however, we must get some movement and not try to solve everything all at once. We haven’t taken a position ourselves on the territorial question. If we did, this would only damage things with the Arabs.

Scheel: We didn’t, either. We only said that the territorial occupation should be ended.

The Secretary: The Golan Heights will be difficult. Something must be done about that. I don’t want to go into details now.

Scheel: The main thing is to get the parties to the table.

The Secretary: And to get the Israelis moving back. Psychologically, this will be very important. They have never moved back in their history.

Jobert: What are your views on the oil situation?

The Secretary: There are two things about this which I will talk about tomorrow. The oil problem was made more acute by the Arab/Israeli conflict but it was not caused by it. Also, demand is increasing but production is not. Even if the cuts are restored, there will still be a problem.

Jobert: But what about the embargo?

The Secretary: This is really aimed at us, not you.

Jobert: But France depends 80% on imports.

The Secretary: I think we can get it ended if we don’t put too many temptations in the way of the Arabs.

Jobert: Who will do this?

The Secretary: The Arabs have a monopoly on oil: we have a monopoly on getting the Israelis to withdraw. This is why we refuse to bargain with the Arabs. If we started that there would be no end to it.

Douglas-Home: What do you hope the Council will do tomorrow? I hope we don’t go too much into the past. We can reflect on it and try to do better, but we should look to the future.

The Secretary: I’ll give an explanation of what has bothered us about the way things went, but I won’t be too aggressive. After my experience with my last speech, I’m not too confident, but hopefully I can say something constructive about where we should be going.

Partly I will speak about machinery, partly about attitudes, and partly about energy matters for the long term in developing alternate sources and arrangements.

Douglas-Home: I hope you won’t think that the Nine are organizing their policies against the United States.

The Secretary: That’s just what I do think!

Douglas-Home: That’s not true, that’s not justified. We are trying to describe our identity but this is not against the U.S.

The Secretary: I will have nothing specific to propose. I doubt if the Council meeting is a suitable place for that. In general, I must say that the mood of our Congress is not very suitable for handling international affairs. You see, we have domestic problems, just as you have.

Jobert: We’re concerned about the reinforcement of Russian power.

The Secretary: You are right. These are serious trends. There are also serious trends in the underdeveloped countries and in the non-aligned countries. With all of this, it’s hard to believe we are arguing as we do. After all, there are 45,000 Soviet tanks between the Elbe and the Caucasus.

Jobert: And 20,000 planes.

The Secretary: And 20,000 tanks on the Chinese front. All of this is not very comforting.

I should tell you that Mao said he didn’t understand Europe. He said the Chinese had not been consulted by us about the alert, yet they approved of it very much!

Jobert: We were not consulted either but we approved.

Scheel: Yes, we applauded silently. However, we should find ways to have better consultation.

Jobert: What should we do with poor Waldheim?

The Secretary: I made a proposal to Alec that we should oblige him to stay in each of the capitals of the permanent members for two months a year. He calls me several times a day and I would like to share the burden. In any case, he will be at the conference and probably will preside. There probably will be a mandate from the Security Council. I don’t object if he has a watching brief.

Douglas-Home: It’s better for him to preside than to be there in any other capacity.

Jobert: He objects, however, and there will be a problem if he does not have a good mandate and can make reports to the Security Council.

Douglas-Home: I am sure he will be able to report that. The talks are bound to get stuck at some point.

The Secretary: Then the Security Council will get them unstuck. The real work of the settlement will not be at Geneva.

We should be delighted to concert with you. We have no interest in pushing Europe out of the Middle East. But there must be some reciprocity; we should know what you are doing.

Jobert: But we don’t know what you are doing.

Douglas-Home: You should definitely know what we are doing. But you are the only people who can get the Israelis to withdraw.

The Secretary: Once the peace talks start, then much is possible. We have moved the Israelis quite a bit. They are really very difficult. Golda Meir was in Washington earlier and she was very tough—really worse than President Thieu. And then we were just talking about withdrawing to the October 22 lines.

Jobert: Now that question has been pushed to one side.

The Secretary: Yes, and it shouldn’t be raised again. It’s becoming irrelevant.

Jobert: We have an economic problem in Europe now which is very difficult.

The Secretary: I know it is very easy for me to say how to solve it but it would be best not to show excessive nervousness toward the Arabs.

Douglas-Home: Perhaps we gave that impression, but actually we have been following the same policy for years.

The Secretary: Our principal objective is to end the embargo. But we never talk about it and we never ask for this.

Tomorrow in my speech I will talk about some of the disquiet we feel over certain trends and I will also mention consultation.

Jobert: My speech will be very calm—you will see.

1. Summary: Kissinger, Douglas-Home, Jobert, and Scheel discussed U.S.-West European relations.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, United Kingdom (12). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel.