34. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Knud Borge Andersen, Danish Foreign Minister
- Mr. Oldenbourg, Danish Political Director
- Mr. Dyvig, Danish Notetaker
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Walter J. Stoessel, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador to Cyprus
- William G. Hyland, NSC Staff
Andersen: It is a very great pleasure for me to meet with you. I have a statement from my colleagues. Following our conversation I will be reporting to my colleagues. I have already talked with Sir Alec Douglas-Home about his meeting with you but I have a special responsibility because I am speaking on behalf of all of the Nine. (Mr. Andersen indicated he would hand the text of his statement to the U.S.)
Kissinger: As you may know from my comments we recognize the importance of the development that Europe is speaking with one voice, although it is surprising that we read this in the New York Times.
Andersen: The story in the Times did not come from our mission. But when I saw it I was not too happy. (He then began to read from his statement, attached at Tab A.)
Kissinger: I appreciate the spirit of your presentation and also the fact that Europe for the first time speaks with one voice. This is an historic accomplishment. I want to say one word first about procedures. For the US it is a new and extraordinary phenomena, in that Europe speaks with one voice which we welcome but that in its preparations of its position we were not consulted; then a document is presented to us by a representative that is not empowered to negotiate but only to receive comments and take back to the Nine our comments. We seem to be talking to those who can’t negotiate and those who can negotiate won’t talk to us. Frankly, I must tell you that this is not a procedure we can accept as a permanent arrangement. We must distinguish between what Europe has achieved and the procedure for achieving it. If you were empowered to negotiate we would have no problems. This was not the intention of those we talked to since April. You spoke of Atlantic partnership and of the European achievement but apparently we cannot talk about partnership but are to be confronted with a fait accompli. Even in our dealings with the Soviet Union they find it expedient to consult us through their Ambassador before formulating their position. From the end of July to September 19, however, we have had no substantive contact. Now we are presented with a document which is leaked to the press. Thus we have a public confrontation. Any change in the document will be seen as a victory of one side or the other. That procedure alone risks an erosion of our relationship. You seem to be dealing with us as you would deal with the Russians, while refusing to sign a document with us that is much less than the Europeans have already signed with the Soviets.
Now for the substance. You will forgive me for being so frank. I think it is better that I am direct and it is a sign of confidence.
First of all there is an idea in Europe that for domestic reasons the President needs to go to Europe and to sign a document and that we will sign any document. This is wrong. The Europeans have to distinguish between the achievements for Europe on the one hand, and for [Page 147] Atlantic relations on the other. For Europe to adopt a unified position is an historic achievement. But Americans must also judge it in terms of its content for Atlantic relations. In your document there is nothing that has not already been agreed to in the EC summit or in the Tokyo Trade Declaration. Is a process that began as a renewal of Atlantic ties to end by a recognition of Europe’s unity—a unity that we have fostered and supported and could not have come into being without us—this will be difficult to understand. We don’t disagree with your document but it lacks balance. It is not what we had in mind. What we had in mind was that it has been 20 years since the founding of the Alliance. There have been changes in the domestic situation of all the Allies, changes in relations with the Soviet Union, and internal changes in our relations with each other. There are a number of factors. First the military threat can no longer suffice to sustain our relations. Second, there are increasing fears that we gave precedence to our relations with the Soviet Union, Third, the generation that supported Atlantic relations is fading from office. We have a new generation. We must give content to the reaffirmation of Atlantic relations and our relations with Europe. We had thought that the second term of the President would proceed in the framework of a new act of statesmanship and permit future American administrations to carry on the policies. In this sense, therefore, we were quite disappointed in European reactions since April. If we are to be successful we must find a document that in terms of its substance that really creates a framework for our relations. And second, it must result from a process of collaborative effort. If what finally emerges is achieved through adversary relations we will have achieved nothing. That might impress the New York Times but it has no historic merit. This document in which the US reaffirms the European identity is an event of greater significance to Europe than to us. But it does come close to what we had in mind. In this country we could be popular by pulling out of Europe. We believe, however, there is a trend towards sentimentality and escapism, towards giving up relations that existed. Therefore, we must make a genuine contribution towards relations with Europe and not a vague one. This is the challenge to Europe. This is the decision to be made in Europe. I want to add that the European leaks about what we have in mind are not at all helpful. I do not understand how the Europeans are proceeding, the way they analyzed my speech. If the Marshall speech had been subjected to the same kind of analysis there would have been no Marshall Plan. There seems to be no will. Do we want to redefine our relations to give the people a sense of commitment or do we want to achieve a document of the lowest common denominator.
Now for the other problems. You suggest one declaration with the EC and one with NATO. I have already pointed out the importance of the procedures from which these documents emerge, and the impor [Page 148] tance of a way to avoid adversary relations. I wonder if the Europeans have thought through where they are going. Suppose, for example, I were to meet with Sir Alec Douglas-Home as the European representative rather than yourself or whoever might be in the Chair. Would he refuse to discuss substance.
Andersen: It would be more likely to be another country.
Kissinger: I realize that. But I am just using an example. So the EC procedure is that the declaration will be signed by whomever is presiding. On the NATO declaration we will have to make a judgment when we see both. I can tell you one thing now. The EC procedure would be acceptable if the substance is acceptable. But under no circumstance will the President sign a declaration in NATO that is not signed at his level. How could we explain to our people that we were starting a new era, committing our troops, and signing a solemn declaration, but that the heads of government of our Allies would not associate themselves with it. How could we explain that the Europeans could meet at the summit in CSCE but not in NATO.
If you put side by side the agreements already signed by the Germans and French and others with the Russians, the latter are far more sweeping than what is proposed for the US. Thus if this process continues we have three choices. We can go on as before and see what emerges, or we can abandon it after or we can try to achieve something meaningful. But the constant leaks from Europe about the confrontation with America will not help us. Europeans are saying that what we are doing is blackmailing Europeans in economic relations. Frankly, I can tell you if we wanted to have a confrontation on economic issues we would simply let our economic agencies go. What we wanted to achieve was to demonstrate to the technicians that they had to realize there were bigger objectives than the technical issues in negotiations. I believe a key element of our policies must be Atlantic relations. We are trying to preserve this in American public opinion that we need to maintain Atlantic relations as a key element. We have coming up MBFR, SALT, CSCE, another summit, all on East-West relations. But in Atlantic relations there is no feeling that they are progressing but becoming more distant. This is the public view.
Andersen: I appreciate your frankness and I will use the same procedures. Concerning your speech, there was in fact much press comment but even if three or four articles were not just right the main feature of this discussion is the fact that your speech inspired us. We may not have agreed with the details but the fact that you made it has made this discussion possible. Even if you hadn’t made it there would still probably have had to be a discussion. But your initiative accelerated the process. I understand you are not very happy with the procedure and I am happy that the leaks were here in New York and not on the [Page 149] other side, i.e., in Europe. As you know, we now chair the political commission. We do not have very many officials. We do not have a large staff but we have to be the secretariat and serve for the meetings for the Nine and many groups. Five, three, or even two months ago, it was unthinkable that this process of consulting in the Nine would become the most natural process. It is, in fact, a great advantage for Europe. Even the Danish press is scolding me for asking for more money because of our European responsibilities. So this is part of our procedure. Within the family we are trying to present to you our position and we are unhappy that this has leaked out. It is our intention that the political directors are in New York and this is not by accident, they are here because of the talks with you. If you are willing, if we can clarify some points then we can have a meeting of the political directors with your staff on Thursday or Friday.
Kissinger: We can hold a meeting. Preferably we should do it on Saturday so that I have some time to discuss it in Washington.
Oldenbourg: There is some difficulty with Saturday since some of the directors want to leave.
Kissinger: Maybe they can defer their departure for a day. Monday would be even better.
Andersen: At 4:00 I am having a meeting with my colleagues. It will help if we can say that the political directors are having a meeting.
Kissinger: We agree with that.
Andersen: On your comment that some Europeans say that you need to have this Year of Europe, if you look at the Danish press you will see we have never said that. We have said this is not your motive. You said that we have talked first about our own European identity. But this is very important for the Nine to find out what Europe is. Now, after six or seven months, we are finding out and as you say you only have had two or three days.
Kissinger: After my April 23 speech we proposed that we could proceed bilaterally or multilaterally with deputy foreign ministers or political directors. But each time we start one procedure it changes. It is as if Europe is doing us a favor to get a commitment to Europe which we have already made. In July we were informed that the Nine would have to consult on a common position. This is the first time we had heard this. And then we did not hear from you again until September.
Andersen: When we were discussing this our understanding was that the President wanted to visit Europe for bilateral talks with leading statesmen and then, in addition, to have some contact with the Nine. Our understanding was that he would go to London and Bonn for discussions there and then at the same time discuss defense matters in NATO. Some want to discuss more than defense in NATO, even if economic relations are discussed in the EC.
[Page 150]Kissinger: If I were to discuss SALT in NATO it would make no sense to do so without discussing it in a political framework.
Andersen: We can settle this. It has never been my opinion that the President would go to Europe only to meet with the Nine.
Kissinger: Our problem is that from July 23 to September 19 there has been no consultation at all. You present us with a document and within a week you want to meet with the political directors. We are proceeding in an area which is of utmost importance but there are no continuing consultations.
Andersen: You must understand how difficult it is for the Nine to achieve what we have.
Kissinger: Yes, it is a considerable achievement for Europe but not for Atlantic relations.
Andersen: If we had waited the Nine would not have known what to discuss because there would have been no common base.
Kissinger: We understand that. We are not blaming you for delay. We understand it is a tough problem.
Andersen: Even if it is a great advantage for the Nine to come closer together it is also an advantage for your side because if you want to discuss the questions bilaterally the Europeans now will not say no.
Kissinger: Our problem is that we have to find a way of talking to you while you are formulating your position. This is common practice. If the Danish government were making a decision concerning US relations we would expect to be consulted, at least we would know that our position had been considered, even if it had been rejected. You are doing what we are accused of doing with Japan but you are not even empowered to negotiate. You have no powers.
Andersen: Yes, but the political directors are here.
Kissinger: Will they deal with us as one group.
Andersen: Up till now they can’t negotiate, but they are not coming with decisions, but only a draft.
Kissinger: Europe must decide if it intends to build Europe or also to build Atlantic relations. If the decision is to build Europe when the Atlantic relationship is collapsing then the European achievement will be at the expense of Atlantic relations.
Andersen: We can have a dialogue.
Kissinger: Yes, if we are actually participating, but we can’t say that the Atlantic relationship is the key element of our policy, but that the Allies only talk through preemptive proposals.
Andersen: But European coordination is an advantage also for the Atlantic relationship because we have a better basis for a dialogue.
[Page 151]Kissinger: Let the political directors meet Saturday or Monday. But I must warn you that we will not be ready for an agreement. There could be another meeting in two or three weeks in Europe. We may make some proposals but we need to know with whom we can talk while you are thinking and going into your own internal process. Suppose you had produced a document that was totally offensive to us and it then appeared in the New York Times. There is no sense in proceeding in this way.
Andersen: I will report to my colleagues.
Kissinger: You can say to them that we believe Atlantic relations are absolutely essential to American foreign policy. Our goal is to give a sense of conviction to this relationship and not agree in some ephemeral communiqué.
Andersen: I will ask about the meeting with the political directors, whether this is agreeable. And you want to know how you can have contacts with us while the work is going on, who is our Ambassador.
Kissinger: I want to tell you something for your information only. One of your colleagues said to me that his only objection was that we were not going far enough. He said he would send us a draft and he repeated this to the President. Then he said he could not comment until the Europeans have met. Then the Europeans produce a document that does not go forward at all. What is the President to think of this procedure. It is difficult to explain it.
Andersen: Eight of the Nine are in NATO and there we can form a rather strong declaration. We appreciate that the US has not tried to push the project in NATO and that you have wanted to wait until the EC had met. Now there is no reason we cannot accelerate in NATO.
Kissinger: If NATO were to come up with something quite positive then perhaps the declaration of the Nine could be less and we could accept a proposal that the significance of the declaration of the Nine was in the fact that Europe had a common position.
Andersen: I think NATO will agree to accelerate its work.
Kissinger: That would be a good way to avoid some of the problems of whom we are talking to.
Andersen: Now I have the problem of a press conference at 12:30. I will tell them about the structure of the Nine, how political and economic cooperations are handled differently. I will tell them about the meetings in Copenhagen to prepare the draft and to find out whether we would open a dialogue with you. I can say that we had frank and open discussions.
Kissinger: You should say we had constructive discussions.
Andersen: And that we touched on NATO. And that you agreed to a meeting with the political directors and after we find out about that meeting we can go further.
[Page 152]Kissinger: You could explain what is intended in NATO and what is intended in the EC.
Andersen: The question will be asked of whether the President is going to Europe and I will say you have to ask Kissinger.
Kissinger: You could say that depends on what progress is achieved.
Andersen: The Danish press will ask if I discussed bilateral problems.
Kissinger: You could say that we have none.
Andersen: I could say both that we have none but we have discussed them.
Kissinger: I think it is important to say that we are studying the European draft and the discussions with you were in the spirit of close friendship. You should convey a constructive mood because this is in the family.
Andersen: On bilaterals I could say they will be discussed in Washington at some time so the Danish press will not say there is a new crisis in our bilateral relations.
Kissinger: You could say that I will be happy to receive you in Washington. My problem is that I have not yet set foot in the State Department and then I am going to China and I have scheduling difficulties.
Andersen: There will be new doubts about our relations with you.
Kissinger: You could say that I renewed the invitation from Secretary Rogers to you to come to Washington.
Oldenbourg: We would not say the political directors will meet but say only that officials will be meeting.
Kissinger: It will be impossible in this town to disguise the fact of the meeting. You could say we plan to meet next week.
Andersen: But then they will want a press statement on the meeting.
Kissinger: McCloskey can say that no announcement will be expected.
- Summary: Andersen, Kissinger, and other Danish
and American officials discussed the outcome of the September 10
EC Foreign Ministers meeting
and the Year of Europe.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversation, Memcons, April–Nov 1973, HAK + Presidential (2 of 5). Secret. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to the UN. Attached but not published is Tab A, a September 25 paper that is marked, “Danish presentation (Not a 9-paper).”
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