Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

160. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 15, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Portugal

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco
• Ambassador Frank C. Carlucci, Lisbon
• Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt
• Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research
• L. Bruce Laingen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• L. Paul Bremer, III, Special Assistant

Amb. Carlucci: I very much appreciated your message of support.

The Secretary: You deserved it. You have done a good job.

(There then followed a discussion of procedures regarding tomorrow’s meeting with the French, German and British political directors, to discuss Portugal inter alia.)

The Secretary: Their principals wanted this discussion on Portugal, particularly as to what position we should take in the event of civil war there.

Amb. Carlucci: That possibility seems much less likely now.

The Secretary: At that time it wasn’t all that clear, given Goncalves’ activities. But I still think it would be useful to discuss what we might do should conditions lead to that kind of situation again. Our policy would be to assist the non-communists but the question would be how. We would be prepared to help with military equipment if necessary. So would Callaghan. I think the French would too but not as a part of a joint action. But the Germans?

Mr. Hyland: They may have problems with any military assistance which they wouldn’t have with financial assistance.

Amb. Carlucci: Perhaps more important than military equipment as such would be the question of arming paramilitary forces. Small arms are available in Portugal. Small arms could be moved [less than 1 line not declassified] if we would choose to do so.

The Secretary: Are we doing that?

Amb. Carlucci: Well I need to discuss with you our general posture with the PPD and the Socialists. Should we, for example, leave the Socialist field entirely to the Europeans? I have hinted at financial assistance with Soares but he is reluctant. He clearly expects to get substantial financial assistance from his European friends and does not want to be identified, at least not personally, with us in the financial area. The Europeans don’t want to pick up the PPD and the CDS.

The Secretary: What is the CDS?

Amb. Carlucci: They are a group to the right of the PPD, essentially equivalent to Christian Democrats elsewhere in Europe.

The Secretary: Why aren’t the Europeans prepared to help them?

Amb. Carlucci: Basically because they are preoccupied and enamored with Soares.

The Secretary: How did that happen?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Because they had all known him before and is one of their own.

Mr. Hartman: But the Europeans accept our doing something for the CDS and the PPD because they are anxious to have a buffer to the right of the Socialists.

The Secretary: But what is the European objection to the CDS?

Amb. Carlucci: They don’t object to them but they want to focus on the Socialists. The CDS has good leadership and should be preserved as a political force.

The Secretary: I agree. It is in any case a very dangerous political spectrum to leave it running from the communists on the left to the Socialists on the right. Besides I still think Soares is somewhat a fool, although I suppose no one around here will support that view now.

Amb. Carlucci: He’s got courage.

The Secretary: Courage yes, but judgment?

Amb. Carlucci: That’s not clear, I admit, and he is also a lousy administrator. But he clearly has shown a strong side in recent weeks and I think deserves our support.

The Secretary: I agree that he has done better in recent months.

Amb. Carlucci: In any event we have got channels available to him and his colleagues and we have established them now with both the PPD and CDS as well.

The Secretary: How much are we talking about in terms of assistance?

Amb. Carlucci: It could total anywhere from $1.2 to $1.4 million to all three political parties, although this depends in part on several uncertainties as yet, including what Soares wants.

The Secretary: Look, if he doesn’t want our assistance there is no point in pressing it on him.

Mr. Hyland: [2 lines not declassified]

The Secretary: But why don’t we ask them to provide some to the PPD and CDS as well.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Does Brandt know about this? He has his own contacts. . .

The Secretary: This is a separate operation we are talking about.

Mr. Hartman: I would like to see us have some contact with the Socialists and not leave it entirely to the Europeans.

Amb. Carlucci: I agree with that.

The Secretary: Look if Soares is getting millions from the Europeans already and if we only have a million and a half available, it is crazy for us to put any substantial amount with the Socialists. [2 lines not declassified] And I am assuming we can raise this total program if we need to.

Mr. Hyland: Shouldn’t we make it clear to Soares by our comments to him that we can take some credit for arranging all this European money he is getting?

The Secretary: But is this the time to do that?

Amb. Carlucci: All we need to say is that we understand that you are getting financial assistance from the Europeans.

The Secretary: Well I agree with the views that have been expressed [4 lines not declassified]

Amb. Carlucci: He knows from what I have said that such help is available.

The Secretary: But I don’t want any begging of him.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: By the way, Mr. Ingersoll did talk to Palme regarding help to the newspaper Journal Novo.

The Secretary: That’s fine. By the way does he have any instructions on what he says to the Swedes and others about Portugal?

Mr. Hartman: Yes. And I have gone over them carefully myself.

Amb. Carlucci: Could we discuss now the question of overt aid. There are a number of questions including whether we attach our request to the Middle East supplemental.

The Secretary: There is no supplemental for the Middle East.

Mr. Sisco: It is not a supplemental; it is a separate package specifically for the Middle East. I have discussed procedures and timing in some detail with Nooter of AID.

The Secretary: The President doesn’t want to go forward with bits and pieces; he wants to go forward with the entire package when he does.

The Secretary: What about the airlift?

Mr. Hartman: You have indicated your agreement to double it from two to four planes.

The Secretary: Wait a minute; I haven’t agreed to anything on this.

Mr. Hartman: Yes you did . . .

The Secretary: No. My first instructions haven’t even been carried out yet. I am not going to agree with any increase until we have some better understanding with the Portuguese on Angola than we have now. I want the Portuguese to understand that we object to the role that they are playing there and particularly their help to the MPLA.

Amb. Carlucci: Well now wait . . . Costa Gomes made a démarche to us on Angola some weeks ago which we never answered. Basically they were asking us to help hold Mobuto off. They profess a policy of strict neutrality.

The Secretary: They may be but we have seen several reports to the contrary; involving military operations on the ground in Angola, which roads the Portuguese advise the MPLA to take, etc.

Amb. Carlucci: That’s correct but we need to move carefully to be able to document our case in making any such presentation.

The Secretary: Well can we do that? The facts of the matter are that the MPLA went from being the third strongest force in Angola to the strongest one today. Somebody must have helped them accomplish that.

Amb. Carlucci: I don’t object to discussing this with Antunes. I’ll do that, but we need to be sure of our ground.

The Secretary: What’s his view? He is probably for the MPLA too.

Amb. Carlucci: That’s not so clear. The overriding objective of the Portuguese is to get out.

The Secretary: But I don’t want to see them tipping the scales in favor of the MPLA while they are getting out and that’s what they are doing.

Amb. Carlucci: If that’s the case I think it is more a matter of omission than commission in specific actions.

Mr. Hyland: Well clearly ships can’t offload in Angola military equipment like armored cars, etc., without the Portuguese knowing what is going on.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes but we need to be realistic about this . . .

The Secretary: We are being realistic. But we are not going to go further on the airlift unless they show some cooperation.

Mr. Hartman: I would object to that general proposition in the sense that the refugees are going to return in a mood of anger against the MPLA and so in that sense we want them back in Portugal.

The Secretary: Now wait, their return is obviously useful in Portugal but in Angola they can be helpful too because of their attitudes toward the MPLA and the FNLA.

Amb. Carlucci: But Art’s point is well taken . . .

The Secretary: I repeat; their return will help us in Portugal but could hurt us in Angola.

Mr. Hyland: A good many of them have yet to be gotten out. Let’s remember that November 11 is the date for independence; the date for Portuguese withdrawal is not until February.

The Secretary: We are not asking the Portuguese to push the MPLA out. We want three things of the Portuguese in Angola: we want them to be genuinely neutral, as they profess to be; we want them not to acquiesce as they are doing now in the shipment of arms to the MPLA; and we want them to stop pressuring Savimbi to come to terms with the MPLA in any kind of coalition. We’d like to see this reflected in their policy between now and November 11.

Mr. Hartman: If Antunes comes in as Foreign Minister we can discuss this with him.

The Secretary: Look, I have tried for six weeks to get this Department to prepare a clear instruction to Lisbon on what we expect of the Portuguese in Angola and we are not doing it.

Mr. Hartman: But Carlucci did take this up with Costa Gomes when he returned from his last consultations here.

The Secretary: Yes and probably with that communist Foreign Minister who was in office then!

Mr. Hartman: I think we can agree however that Antunes would be much more amenable to our representations.

The Secretary: We have got about eight weeks before the situation in Angola is irreversible. If we can’t get to the Foreign Minister, go to the President. You have shown me Frank what you can do when your heart is in it. You have done a good job on the political situation. You know what I want you to do on this.

What’s Coutinho up to?

Amb. Carlucci: Well he has been generally helpful to the MPLA.

The Secretary: I have no doubt of that. But what’s he doing inside Portugal?

Amb. Carlucci: Not much of anything at this point.

The Secretary: Do they understand what we want of them in Lisbon; that we want them to start moving into a neutral position?

Amb. Carlucci: I think they understand what our desire is. Their doing something is another matter. We can strengthen our representations.

The Secretary: We should do that.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Our position ought to be reinforced with the Europeans too.

(At this point the Secretary left the office to take a phone call.)

Amb. Carlucci: I think a discussion with Antunes is now in order. The question is what special arrangements or benchmarks we want to put in play for any consideration of increase in aid.

The Secretary: We would like some assurance from them regarding the MPLA—that they are truly neutral with them. We want some concrete assurances as to what they are doing about Soviet arms deliveries. And we want to know what they are doing about the pressures being put on Savimbi.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You want me to raise this with the Europeans tomorrow?

Mr. Sisco: I would leave this to higher levels, although leaks are possible there as well.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The problem in delaying that long is one of timing.

The Secretary: When are you going back, Frank?

Amb. Carlucci: I hope to leave tomorrow night because I want to be there when McGovern arrives. He is going to be there five days.

The Secretary: Five days!

Amb. Carlucci: Yes and with me he will go straight to the question of what CIA is up to. He wants to see Cunhal?

The Secretary: Why?

Mr. Hyland: Fine, let him see Cunhal if he wants to.

The Secretary: But how can he be so crazy as to want to do that. In any event let him use his own channels to get the appointment. I don’t want the American Embassy in any way to be assisting in arranging appointments with Cunhal. It’s a nutty thing from a political point of view for him to see Cunhal.

Mr. Hartman: He probably wants to find a basis to claim that the U.S. is acting against its own interest and against those of Europe. He probably wouldn’t even believe us if we told him of our contact with Soares.

Amb. Carlucci: If he asks about the CIA, I would like to say that he should discuss that with you.

The Secretary: You can tell him that those are your instructions.

Mr. Hyland: His Committee of course has been briefed at the appropriate level.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes, but I can’t say that because that’s a dead giveaway that something is going on. For that matter, if I say he should talk to the Secretary he might interpret that as a giveaway too.

Mr. Hartman: I think it important that we have an agreed position back here as to the kind of posture our Ambassadors should take in response to questions about CIA activity. There ought to be approved guidelines that Ambassadors decline to discuss such matters with visiting Congressional figures on grounds that there are established procedures as to how the Congress becomes engaged in such matters and the Ambassadors ought to leave it at that. They should be authorized to say that questions as to whether covert operations are or are not being conducted in a given country ought to be raised in Washington rather than in the field.

The Secretary: I agree completely; we need to issue that kind of instruction.

Amb. Carlucci: That’s exactly what I need and the sooner, the better.

Mr. Hartman: When we are satisfied on political grounds to expand our Angolan airlift activity then we need also to consider the next stage of economic assistance which is refugee relief.

The Secretary: That I am ready to do immediately. Carlucci can go ahead on that. That’s totally different from the Angolan thing. I am strongly in favor of relief to the refugees. This will help us in Portugal.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have delayed any action on this to see how the new government would evolve.

Mr. Hartman: I would like to see a figure of $35 million refugee relief put into the Congressional submission now . . .

The Secretary: But look, surely no one here thinks we need $35 million for this.

Mr. Hartman: Oh yes! The total need is estimated at something well over $100 million.

The Secretary: How much have we provided in Cyprus?

Mr. Hartman: The figure last year was $25 million.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Shouldn’t we also talk to the Europeans about this?

Amb. Carlucci: Yes I think we should.

Mr. Sisco: It would be hard to justify not moving now, assuming the new government is going in a positive direction, when we have not moved in the past.

The Secretary: I can understand the communists having one or perhaps two ministerial posts but only on condition that on the next turn of the wheel they get rid of them. But this would be participation on an individual basis and not a coalition government.

Amb. Carlucci: That’s right, and I think the outlook is fairly good. It is most significant that the pro-Goncalves commander of the northern region, Carvacho, is gone. And the Fifth Division is out as a powerful influence.

The Secretary: What’s happened to Goncalves?

Amb. Carlucci: There is talk of his returning to his military unit, but Soares told me he thought he might also be used in some way by the PCP. In any event he is not all that dead; he is still in the wings.

But there are other positive developments. Lourenco is restructuring the Revolutionary Council and that body remains much more important than the composition of the Cabinet. There is also some favorable movement in the labor area and there are efforts underway to get a more effective control over the press.

One final point; we are moving essentially from a power structure where the AFM radicals and the PCP dominated the situation to one where the Socialists are in the power structure and the AFM moderate voice is strong.

The Secretary: Yes, but not all of these are necessarily great friends of ours.

Amb. Carlucci: Generally they are cooperative. The question now is whether we want to help this new government or not.

The Secretary: That’s not the total question. The question really is are we now going to relax our efforts on the basis of this partial success and risk a situation developing like that in Italy six months hence, or are we going to keep the pressure up. Frankly I heard many of the same arguments six months ago that things were going our way, and that we should stick with the then Goncalves regime.

I would like to understand a bit better where this process is going before we make any final conclusions. You know that the Europeans are going to fall all over themselves now in rushing in to help Soares on the basis of an incomplete picture.

Amb. Carlucci: The problems this government faces are overwhelming, especially in the economic area. There are major disciplinary problems in the military. There is a weak Prime Minister and a President who at best is weak and at worst is a member of the PCP.

The Secretary: He certainly put on a great act when he was here.

Amb. Carlucci: Nonetheless a group is now in power with which I think we can work. We have made commitments to them in the process of their coming to power, especially in economic aid and I think it is now in our interest to help them.

The Secretary: What does that mean in dollars?

Amb. Carlucci: We are thinking of a program of $70–75 million. That is a modest step up from our existing program and a symbolic act on our part that we believe things are going the right way.

The Secretary: What do you think Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think we need to go cautiously and with careful regard for who is pulling strings in the AFM. We can be supportive.

The Secretary: What do you think Bill?

Mr. Hyland: I agree, but we need to make it clear that we want to see communist participation cut back over time.

The Secretary: If that is made clear, then I agree we can go ahead.

Mr. Hartman: We need to move now with the $35 million in refugee relief and then subsequently begin discussions on longer-term aid.

The Secretary: But won’t we need to put the whole sum into the upcoming submission to the Congress?

Mr. Hartman: Yes we will.

Amb. Carlucci: We are talking about a relatively small portion of new appropriated money.

The Secretary: I still have problems, particularly since I remember that after the Portuguese leadership was here last fall, I myself made a major effort for assistance, but then the communists began to get into positions of influence shortly thereafter.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes, but I think our aid has been on the whole effective in keeping the pressure on with a view to maintaining and strengthening the moderates in the regime.

The Secretary: Oh, I think the real reason for the improved position of the moderates is that the communists overplayed their hand.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes, but the fact that we held in there and were ready to support was also helpful. Antunes has stood publicly on what amounts to an anti-communist line and we want to indicate our support to keep the momentum up. We need to remember that we will never get a government entirely to our liking. Goncalves is still in the wings. And we should remember that we may have a more fundamental question coming down the road later; i.e., that there may develop a falling out between Soares and Antunes . . .

The Secretary: My sympathies in that kind of situation would be with Antunes.

Amb. Carlucci: But the Europeans would be on the Socialists’ side.

The Secretary: What is the European definition of help to the moderates?

Amb. Carlucci: The EC has been talking of aid in the order of $300–400 million.

The Secretary: How would Soares organize the country?

Amb. Carlucci: This program is fairly reasonable, but of course strongly socialist in context.

The Secretary: But what is his political program?

Amb. Carlucci: He speaks of political pluralism, and access to the media by all parties, and a major effort to remove communist influence in both the labor unions and local government. He may be able to succeed but the economic problems Portugal faces will be overwhelming and could be seriously disruptive.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: What is their gold reserves position?

Amb. Carlucci: They are drawing down on their regular foreign exchange by a hundred million a month and would probably need to begin drawing on their substantial gold reserves about January.

There is also a major question of investment confidence that needs to be examined. We should use the Export-Import Bank as a means of giving a signal ourselves, provided the general political situation is moving in the right direction.

The Secretary: But how do we know we will move in the right direction?

Amb. Carlucci: We can’t be entirely sure but the efforts to restructure the Revolutionary Council, the strength of the Socialists, the removal of Carvacho and the cutting of the wings of the Fifth Division are important developments.

The Secretary: But we risk slipping back, if we put too much stock in small signals.

Amb. Carlucci: I agree, and I think the American press has overplayed what is now described as a substantial victory by the non-communists. We do need to keep the pressure on. But let’s remember too that the situation can’t be cleaned up overnight. The Azevedo program that he announced on Saturday sounds good.

The Secretary: What will Cunhal do?

Amb. Carlucci: He has got his own problems in his party and for the moment is licking his wounds.

The Secretary: And then what?

Amb. Carlucci: If I were he, I would sit back for awhile.

Again on the whole I think we have a situation where we can take some calculated risks.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I agree; it amounts to a question of degree.

The Secretary: I just want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding that our basic objective is to get the communists out and that we are not going to play with the idea of coalition governments. I can understand playing this thing out for some time more with one or two communists in the government, but we have got to keep the pressure on.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes but this will take time and there will be a lot of problems in the process, including the task the GOP faces of absorbing up to 300,000 refugees from Angola.

The Secretary: No, I agree that we should go ahead with the $35 million for refugee relief. But I know that everyone’s instinct will now be to let up and relax. I agree with Hal that we have got to move by degrees.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think the polarization that developed over the last several months and that we contributed to by our efforts helped achieve what we now have—although we may not have known at the time how this would develop.

The Secretary: I agree; our visible opposition to Goncalves helped.

Amb. Carlucci: That’s correct. But we need now to move to begin to redeem our own commitments to those we have been backing.

The Secretary: All right, but let’s keep up the pressure and not relax it too early.

What do you think Joe?

Mr. Sisco: I agree with that. I think Carlucci is right that we need to move this way but certainly keep up the pressure at the same time.

Amb. Carlucci: That will be no problem; the moderates know themselves that the ballgame is not yet finished.

1. Summary: Kissinger, Sisco, Carlucci, Sonnenfeldt, Hartman, and Hyland discussed the possibility of civil war in Portugal, potential covert and overt assistance to non-Communists, and Angola.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, Portugal 1975 (13) WH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Bruce Laingen. On September 10, Kissinger told Ford, “On Portugal. We are heading for a split with Europe and the liberals on having Communists in the government. I think we shouldn’t give aid so long as Communists are in the government.” Ford said, “On Portugal, the Portuguese group yesterday said Meany wanted to send some people. Let’s work with him—can we use some 40 Committee money? If we work with him here it will show him we are tough. It will help with him with our things on the Soviet Union.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 10; ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 15) George Meany was President of the AFL–CIO.