59. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council
Under Secretaries Committee (Rush) to President Nixon, Washington, May 18, 1973.1
2
Washington, May 18, 1973.
Subject:
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
May 18, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
In response to your request for a brief report on the current status of
our relations with Yugoslavia and US-Yugoslav economic, scientific, military and technical
cooperation, including an assessment of attitudes toward the United
States displayed by Yugoslavia’s leaders and by the Yugoslav media in
recent months, and a review of pending US
policy decisions relating to Yugoslavia in the political, economic,
scientific, and military fields, including proposed exchanges of
high-level visits, the Under Secretaries Committee is submitting this
memorandum, which covers a more detailed report.
Discussion
The Committee believes that the several recent instances of friction in
US-Yugoslav bilateral relations that
have arisen out of Yugoslavia’s zeal as a non-aligned leader and out of
internally-motivated distortions carried by the Yugoslav press are
relatively superficial when viewed against the larger background of
constructive developments in our relations. These differences should not
be allowed to obscure the larger US
interest in the continued independence and unity of Yugoslavia,
particularly at a time when Yugoslavia undergoes the stresses and
strains of strengthening its institutions in preparation for the
[Page 2]
inevitable departure of
President Tito from the scene.
Periodic exchanges of high-level visits can help moderate the rhetoric
in those matters where our positions are different, and generally
enhance bilateral cooperation to our joint advantage.
The Committee does not view the course of Yugoslav foreign policy in
recent months as indicating any change in Yugoslavia’s basic policies of
resisting Soviet control, seeking improved relations with the US and other Western countries, and
maintaining a non-aligned posture. The main emphasis in the internal
policies of the Yugoslav leadership of late has been on strengthening
the central authority of the governing League of Communists as a check
on disruptive manifestations of regional nationalisms stimulated by a
decentralization program undertaken several years ago. Tito’s efforts have met with some
opposition, but he is convinced they are essential to the stability of
the Government, and stability is a result we would welcome.
The Committee views the Yugoslav military as a major cohesive force and
one that can be expected to play a major role in maintaining Yugoslav
unity with the passing of the Tito era. We also expect that during Tito’s lifetime, this role will
continue to be subordinate to the Communist Party (LCY), exerting a stabilizing influence from
a distance and in low profile. After Tito, the role of the military in defending national
unity may well become more pronounced.
The gradual improvement in exchanges between the US and Yugoslav military establishments achieved in recent
years could be further enhanced by a visit to Yugoslavia of our new
Secretary of Defense, as soon as this is feasible. The Departments of
State and Defense are actively considering methods by which exceptions
to the National Disclosure Policy could be obtained, to facilitate the
sale to the Yugoslavs of certain carefully-selected military items thus
far denied to them on security considerations.
The Yugoslavs have also invited the Secretaries of the Treasury,
Commerce, Agriculture, the USIA
Director, and our Special Trade Representative to visit Yugoslavia
whenever convenient. Such visits
[Page 3]
properly spaced during the next eighteen months would be helpful to
the advancement of US interests. These
include specifically the growth of trade and economic cooperation and
the continuation of our active information and cultural programs in
Yugoslavia, neither of which have been negatively affected by recent
frictions.
With regard to future high-level Yugoslav visits to Washington, in July
1972 Yugoslav Premier Bijedic
expressed the hope to Secretary Rogers that he might be able to visit the US sometime in 1973. You decided earlier
this year that your schedule for 1973 would not permit receiving the
Yugoslav Premier this year, but we have held off notifying him pending
decision about prospects for 1974.
Recommendation:
The Under Secretaries unanimously recommend:
that you authorize our Ambassador to express your regret to the Yugoslav
head of government, Premier Bijedic, that it was not possible to schedule a visit
with him in Washington for 1973, to carry forward the useful exchanges
of high-level visits that have contributed effectively to the
development of friendly relations in recent years, but that (A) you hope
to be able to propose a date later this year for a visit in early 1974
or that (B) you can at this point propose a visit for a given period in
early 1974.
Approve A
Approve B
Proposed Dates
Disapprove
[signed]
Chairman
Attachment:
Report on Current Status of US-Yugoslav Relations
[Page 4]
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
REPORT ON CURRENT STATUS OF US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS AND US-YUGOSLAV CONSULTATIONS,
EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND
MILITARY FIELDS
| Summary |
Page No. |
| Part I - Status of Relations |
1 |
| A. Political |
1 |
| B. Economic |
5 |
| C. Scientific-Technical |
7 |
| D. Informational and Cultural |
|
| E. Military |
9 |
| Part II - Attitudes Toward the US |
12 |
| A. Attitudes of Yugoslav Leaders |
12 |
| B. Attitudes of Yugoslav Media |
15 |
| Part III - Pending Policy Decisions |
20 |
| A. Political and High-Level Exchanges |
20 |
| B. Economic |
22 |
| C. Scientific-Technical |
22 |
| D. Informational and Cultural |
22 |
| E. [Military] |
22 |
[Page 5]
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
REPORT ON CURRENT U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
Summary
The Under Secretaries Committee has reviewed the current status of
US-Yugoslav relations, including
economic, scientific-technical, information-cultural, and military
exchanges and cooperation, with particular attention to the
significance of the attitudes toward the US displayed by Yugoslavia’s leaders and by the media
since November 1972, as they may relate to pending policy decisions
and plans for high-level exchanges in the coming months.
The Committee believes that recent instances in which Yugoslav policy
actions were at odds with a US
objective, and in which media attacks were especially ill-founded,
have their causation in an atmosphere created by the Yugoslav
leadership’s perception of (a) their internal political requirements
as that country prepares for the difficulties of the Tito succession, and (b) their
need to appear a leading member of the non-aligned nations.
Such policies and media distortions can and should be countered and
deterred, but in ways that take into account the larger US interest in Yugoslavia maintaining
its independence and unity. The Committee favors continuation of the
cooperation, exchanges, and consultations that have characterized
US-Yugoslav relations in recent
years, and recommends that our Ambassador be authorized to invite
the Yugoslav head of government, Premier Bijedic, to visit Washington in early 1974, at
mutually-convenient dates.
The US has important strategic and
political interest in the continued existence of a stable,
independent, non-aligned and economically-viable Yugoslavia.
[Page 6]
Strategically, a
non-aligned Yugoslavia helps to protect the southern flank of NATO and contributes to the general
security of our NATO partners. An
independent Yugoslavia continues to provide a highly desirable
example to other Communist countries by resisting Soviet control,
actively seeking closer relations with the US, and evolving moderated policies aimed at
decentralized government and a market-oriented socialist economy.
The Committee does not view the course of Yugoslav internal and
foreign policies since 1971 as changed in any of these essentials,
and believes that such frictions as have developed in our relations
of late are more than offset by an increased capacity on the part of
the Yugoslav Government to cope with the strains of the coming
succession period.
Externally, Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union have much
improved over the 1968 level. This improvement was aided by the
general reduction in East-West tensions and the Soviet tactic of
avoiding criticism of Yugoslav deviations and of offering
developmental credits. It is clear also that the Yugoslavs believe
better relations with the Soviet Union will help inhibit Soviet
trouble-making during the difficult Tito succession period. Not-withstanding this
improvement, Yugoslav trade and cultural ties with Western Europe
and the US continue to predominate
over those with the USSR and its
Warsaw Pact allies.
Particularly since November 1972, it has been the Yugoslav zeal in
support of the non-aligned world that put the Yugoslav Government in
a more pro-PRG, pro-Palestinian,
pro-Egyptian, and pro-Panamanian posture than is readily compatible
with US objectives in seeing the
Vietnamese, Middle East and Panamanian issues settled by
negotiations.
The recent emphasis on Yugoslav-Marxist orthodoxy, and Yugoslav
resentment of pessimistic and confidence-sapping analyses of
Yugoslav developments in the Western press, helped create an
atmosphere in which Yugoslav press and public criticism of the
US and other Western countries
became somewhat sharper in style than in recent years.
[Page 7]
In March and April, for example, the US Government was obliged to protest the fact that the
Yugoslav Government:
- - supported the positions of Panama in UN Security Council
deliberations with insufficient regard for US interests in the
establishment of a negotiating climate;
- - permitted publication of baseless PLO stories implicating the
CIA in the Israeli raid
in Beirut;
- - permitted publication and repetition of the false charge
that the VOA “gives its
microphones over to Ustashi (Croat terrorist)
emigres”;
- - permitted repeated publication of distorted reports
attacking American Embassy officers for putting political
questions “on behalf of the CIA” to Yugoslav students applying for summer
camp counselor jobs in the US, as part of their screening for language
ability.
Nevertheless, these criticisms have often been balanced by other
positive treatment of international and bilateral issues which has
attracted less attention. The continuity of essential Yugoslav
policies was reasserted most authoritatively by Tito in a major internal and
foreign policy speech to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly and the
leadership of all mass organizations April 23, 1973, in which the
Yugoslav President stressed maintenance of Yugoslavia’s independent
and nonaligned course, and deplored speculation abroad to the
contrary. The Committee believes that the moderate tenor of this
speech confirms other indications that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs by now has concluded correctly from our protests that the
US Government will not remain
silently acquiescent when our interests are abused, even though we
do not expect the non-aligned Yugoslav Government to agree with and
support all of our positions or actions.
[Page 8]
The Committee has observed that underneath the surface noise,
internal consolidation of the Party and the new emphasis on
non-aligned positions have had no significant effect limiting the
ability of the US effectively to
pursue its political, military, economic, informational, cultural,
and scientific cooperation objectives in and with Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, the Yugoslav Government will need to be reminded on
occasion that US goodwill should not
always be taken for granted. It will be in the US interest to react to, and better yet,
foresee and deter Yugoslav actions adverse to our interests, but not
to over-react to a degree that would harm the long-term and
principal US objectives.
These US-objectives are well served by
high-level visits. In recommending that Premier Bijedic be invited to visit
Washington, the Committee notes (1) that no Yugoslav head of
government (as distinct from Tito who visited here in 1971 as chief of state) has
yet visited Washington and (2) that when the subject was first
discussed between Bijedic and
Secretary Rogers in Belgrade
in July 1972, it was hoped that the visit could be scheduled
sometime in 1973.
Both countries share an interest in an improved relationship between
our respective military establishments, no longer the relationship
based on massive US grant assistance
as in the 1950’s, but one in which mutual understanding is promoted
by the exchange of visits. A visit by the US Secretary of Defense could contribute to enhancing
this relationship.
Other visits could include those of the Secretaries of the Treasury,
Commerce, Agriculture, the USIA
Director, and the Special Trade Representative, all of whom have
invitations.
Among current issues in which agreement would be in the US interest are: air charters and
scheduled services; decision with respect to bids by American
[Page 9]
companies on the Krsko
nuclear power plant construction contract; new arrangements for a
jointly-funded program of cooperative research in science and
technology; agreement on the non-utility of a formal information
agreement; agreement on arrangements for the sale of carefully
selected defensive military items to Yugoslavia; agreement on the
treatment of dual nationals visiting Yugoslavia; and appropriate
cooperation against international terrorism of all kinds,
Palestinian as well as Croatian.
