51. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 8, 1974, 1:15 p.m.1 2

PARTICIPANTS:

  • POLISH:
  • Edward Gierek, First Secretary of Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party
  • Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Vice Premier and Chairman of State Planning Commission
  • Stefan OLSZOWSKI, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Richard Frelek, Member of Secretariat of Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party
  • Dr. Witold TRAMPCZYNSKI, Polish Ambassador
  • Jerzy WASZCZUK, Director, First Secretary’s Office, Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party
  • Marian Kruczkowski, First Deputy Director of the Press, Propaganda and Publications, Department of the Central Committee
  • Romuald SPASOWSKI, Vice Minister, Ministry of. Foreign Affairs
  • U.S.:
  • The Secretary
  • The Deputy Secretary
  • Ambassador Richard T. Davies
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • Senator H. H. Humphrey
  • Senator Charles Percy
  • Representative Clement Zablocki

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: Oct. 8, 1974

TIME: 1:15 p.m.

PLACE: Secretary’s Dining Room

DISTRIBUTION: S; S/S; WH (General Scowcroft)

SECRETARY: The First Secretary and the President had an interesting meeting in which they reviewed the state of our relations in a [Page 2] constructive and positive spirit. These discussions will continue before and after dinner this evening. We attach great importance to this visit. We recognize the state of your existing relations and we know the realities of geography and history and what they meant to the Poles and Poland. We do not believe, however, that there is anything inconsistent between these realities and an improvement in relations between Poland and the United States. It is in this spirit that we approach your visit, Mr. First Secretary.

GIEREK: I can only add that all the things I have said conform with our vital interests and our sincere intent to develop friendly relations with the United States. We know our place and we know what our situation is. It is precisely because we do know these things that we feel we can contribute more to developing co-existence and to the lasting friendship we have with the United States.

SECRETARY: We appreciate very much the contribution that Poland has made to helping to solve problems in the Middle East and in Viet-Nam. We recognize the special problem you have in Viet-Nam and the difficulty you face in saying certain things publicly but I must tell you frankly that a resumption of hostilities in Viet-Nam would complicate our relations. We would have to draw the conclusion that the flow of Soviet equipment had caused this resumption of hostilities and this would have a serious effect on detente. We don’t want public statements from you.

[Page 3]

OLSZOWSKI: I will have several matters to discuss with you concerning the International Control Commission. We do not think there should be a change in status but there are certain things that could be done which would help.

SECRETARY: We would look on any suggestions with an open mind. Anything that can be done which would complicate military operations we would favor.

GIEREK: Our desire is to make certain concrete suggestions which possibly might hamper the growth of hostilities in the area. We wish to tell you, however, that it is a difficult problem for us.

SECRETARY: We appreciate very much the willingness of Poland to stay in the ICCS. We recognize that Poland has no self-interest in staying in.

GIEREK: All we get out of it are cases of malaria.

SECRETARY: It’s one of the few places the Poles can catch malaria.

Which problem is of the greatest concern to you in the political or other international field?

GIEREK: For us in Poland the prime importance is given to a successful conclusion of the CSCE conference. This establishment of a new relationship in Europe is of historic importance.

SECRETARY: By the way, I am doing a sociological survey to determine which Foreign Minister has read all of the CSCE documents. Let me hasten to add that I have not.

[Page 4]

OLSZOWSKI: You are putting me in a difficult position.

SECRETARY: To my knowledge Gromyko is the only one that claims he’s read all the documents.

OLSZOWSKI: In fact, we are studying very seriously the Helsinki communique.

SECRETARY: We have too. We are interested in bringing the conference to an early end and we will cooperate to do this. Speaking very frankly, we are not prepared, however, to jeopardize our relationship with our Western European allies in order to achieve agreement. Even when we might personally be inclined to go along with the position, we will not urge our European allies to do this. But even with that qualification. I believe that the conference can be concluded the first part of next year.

GIEREK: This would be an achievement for peace in this part of the world but it would also have good effects in other parts as well.

SECRETARY: The major issues seem to be in connection with the principles on the specific language dealing with “peaceful change”. This is primarily a problem between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.

GIEREK: And us.

SECRETARY: We have no frontiers we want to change.

GIEREK: We don’t either.

[Page 5]

SECRETARY: It is not our impression that this problem will be difficult to solve. There is also the question of CBMs and Basket III. Here the difficulty seems to be that the documents are accumulating. We are trying to reduce the 13 or 14 proposals to one document that can be negotiated. Our allies, however, want to go through the process of a first reading. We support a first reading and when it is concluded we will attempt to get a single position that can be negotiated. Personally, I believe that the Communists will not change their regimes without noticing it. It’s a good idea to have these exchanges of persons and ideas. But that does not seem to us a major area of difficulty. My impression is that the conference can be successfully concluded early in 1975.

OLSZOWSKI: One matter of concern is that the fall session in Geneva seemed to start smoothly but quickly came to a standstill.

SECRETARY: That couldn’t have been a very smooth beginning then.

OLSZOWSKI: I agree, but there are too many problems and they must be reduced. We must seek to elaborate what is on the table. In Basket I the key is the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and that seems to be on the way to agreement. Basket II also seems near completion. On Basket III we think it would be worthwhile to take a realistic look at what is acceptable. As far as Polish practice is concerned, there are no [Page 6] serious obstacles for us. Looking realistically there should be proposals that both sides can accept if we select the proposals carefully. In fact, this brings us to the last question which is the post-conference body. Perhaps we could select some formulas to agree on now and leave others for the continuing machinery to work out later.

GIEREK: As far as Basket III is concerned there are 13 to 15 million people who visit Poland each year (sic). Sixty to eighty percent are from the West—Scandinavia, Germany, France, etc. We will have several tens of thousands of Americans. We have no objection to that. In addition, 8 million (sic) Poles visit outside Poland—in Czechoslovakia, France, Scandinavia and even Spain.

SECRETARY: I don’t think Poland will have difficulty with this area but what about the Soviets?

GIEREK: It is true there may be some difficulties for them.

SECRETARY: We approach this whole matter in a constructive spirit. We don’t wish to push these matters in a way that will humiliate the Soviet Union. After the first reading we will try to find some compromises. The authors of these proposals need a first reading to satisfy their pride. As far as the United States is concerned, we could do it either way. This is a procedural issue and once we have settled it we can then move toward a conclusion. On the inviolability issue, if you want my honest view, only [Page 7] the lawyers understand the differences between the various formulations on peaceful change. No one is going to be able to change a frontier by pointing to a paragraph in the CSCE Declaration. The main issue now seems to be over the placement of the word “only”. The West Germans have a difficult domestic policy issue. We have told the FRG and the Soviets to work it out. We have no quarrel with the old registered text or with the new text. The problem, Chuck (turning to Senator Percy), is that the German lawyers feel that the phrase “only under international law can frontiers be changed peacefully” means nothing because international law has nothing to say about changing frontiers and, therefore, they want a phrase “according to international law frontiers can only be changed peacefully and by agreement.”

SENATOR PERCY: If I could ask a slightly different question. We are now discussing in the UN the Mexican proposal for a Charter of Rights and Duties between developed and less developed countries. This could deal with the question of raw materials, indexing, expropriation, etc. There is one position taken by Algeria and India and another by the developed countries. Yugoslavia seems to be closer to the developed countries’ side. It ought to be possible to bring these positions together and reconcile the differences.

OLSZOWSKI: That is a very interesting subject but may I go back to the other subject for a moment. On the CSCE it is not only the Soviets who have difficulty with [Page 8] Basket III. There are others as well. For example, the Turks are not happy with some of the proposals for exchange of information.

SECRETARY: You mean the Turks want to oppose Basket III because they don’t want newspapers to come in?

OLSZOWSKI: That seems to be the problem. Now to turn to Senator Percy’s question. We have carefully studied this matter and we think it is of great international concern but we don’t believe that advances will be made quickly. The world economy is much more complicated than it was six months ago. What might have been soluble then is no longer easily settled. You have the question of sovereign rights over resources. We agree on the principles but it is the practical solution that is difficult. Summarizing briefly, we will use all means to make a contribution but we might have difficulty undertaking an obligation to the conciliation procedure.

SECRETARY: I have generally supported this proposal but there are many aspects which we cannot accept and I agree with you that it will take a lengthy negotiation. President Ford will soon meet with President Echeverria. I am sure we will hear from him about this Charter. Have you been to Mexico?

GIEREK: This is the first time I have visited this hemisphere. I have traveled widely in Asia.

[Page 9]

SECRETARY: To China?

GIEREK: Yes, and I have been to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia—all over Asia. In Europe I have been to every country with the exception of Portugal and I hope soon to go there.

SECRETARY: Do you think they will join the Warsaw Pact soon?

GIEREK: We would certainly give serious consideration to that but, as you know, in the Warsaw Pact there are both privileges and duties that must be accepted. So far, however, there has been no such development. The Soviet Union is only one of the members. We would all have our own opinion.

ZABLOCKI: Do all the members of the Warsaw Pact have an equal voice?

GIEREK: Yes.

OLSZOWSKI: As concerns Portugal, it might be better for them to start with COMECON.

FRELEK: Yes, the Portuguese have an economic problem.

SECRETARY: We may yet have a situation in which Portugal is a member both of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Do you think that would advance European security?

OLSZOWSKI: That could be Basket IV.

JAGIELSKI: That would certainly be a new experience.

SECRETARY: I am not informed but does Albania participate in the CSCE?

[Page 10]

GIEREK: No.

OLSZOWSKI: They have made speeches and public statements saying that they consider the conference disgusting.

SECRETARY: Going back to our bilateral relations, I believe that they are good. All these agreements that we are going to sign are good.

GIEREK: About Albania, I can say that they are unreservedly critical of us Poles. They accuse us of being servants of the US world imperialism.

SECRETARY: I want you to know that we consider this to be a significant visit. Poland and the United States have a history of friendship which is good.

Now, Mr. First Secretary, this is a working lunch and not a protocol occasion. But I want you to know how warmly we welcome you here. What other country conceived the idea that it should fight for the freedom of others so that it could win its own freedom? Wherever freedom was fought for, Poles were present during the 150 years of its national tragedy. We recognize reality and that existing friendships will be maintained. In that spirit we are prepared to deepen relations between Poland and the United States. We all remember our 1972 visit with memories of the friendly reception we received at that time. I would like to propose a toast to the First Secretary and to Polish-American friendship.

GIEREK: I would like to respond to the very kind words you have just expressed. I [Page 11] would like to speak here on behalf of the Polish Government and people, as well as to reflect my own personal experience. I am the son of a man who before World War I was a member of the Polish Socialist Party and who was a Polish patriot. I was brought up in an atmosphere of great patriotism. I spent 22 years abroad in France and Belgium. I was very active in the Resistance against the Germans. The whole course of my life was changed by that experience. Although I am a Communist, I have always had a special idea of Poland and what it should represent. After World War II I could have stayed in the West as many others did. But I returned to Poland with my family because I believed that every pair of hands, every mind and every brain, was necessary to help rebuild Poland. We also remember those who began immediately after World War II to rebuild Warsaw, Wroclaw, Szczecin. We Poles believe it is necessary to bring our country to an ever higher level of standard of living. Everything that we are doing now—Communists and all others—is necessary to build up our country. I am not saying this to create a sentimental atmosphere but rather because I want you to understand that we need our traditional friends as well as our present allies. The TV transmission of my arrival was received in Poland with great applause because our people believe they need friendship with the United States of America, its great traditional friend. Therefore, I wish to drink a toast to the traditional friendship of Poland and America.

[Page 12]

SECRETARY: Now you can tell me all about the football results in Poland.

GIEREK: What was your position on the team?

SECRETARY: I was goalie and those were very high-scoring games. I can tell you that the Germans are not known for their natural sense of humor. When I was in Munich for the World Cup matches, I made a statement that I was there to improve our consultations with the Federal Republic and that I would follow the Foreign Minister even to the football game to improve our consultations. This was taken very seriously by the German press. When I spoke about my own record as a goalie and the high-scoring games, the German press interpreted this as a very subtle criticism of the defensive tactics of the German football teams. I told Brezhnev that there would have been a great problem if the GDR had beaten the FRG because it would have built up their self-confidence well beyond the limits of the CSCE.

GIEREK: I can tell you what the attitude of Polish fans is—let them Germans fight.

SECRETARY: There is something about the style of football which reflects national character. I like the Polish style of attack. In fact, the two teams I liked best were Poland and Holland.

GIEREK: It is true they played very well but, unfortunately, our team dropped its guard after the World Cup.

SECRETARY: When I was seeing the Dutch play against Brazil there was a man sitting next to [Page 13] me and I later found out that he was the Chairman of the Brazilian Football Association. When the Brazilians lost they blamed it on me because they claimed I was impolite to him. I was in Rio in 1962 when they won the World Cup and the fans practically burned the place down. They had a carnival for two days.

OLSZOWSKI: After we defeated Italy, they demonstrated in front of our Embassy in Rome.

GIEREK: Yes, we were very worried that it was going to have a negative influence on our relations.

SECRETARY: You know they had a war in Central America between El Salvador and Honduras that started after a football match. In 1945 I was stationed in Nuremberg and it was a tradition that when they lost they beat up the umpire. At that time the German police were not allowed to carry arms and so they had no way to rescue the umpire. The American Military Police had to do the job for them. A big Bavarian got up in the stands and shouted “So that’s the democracy you brought us.”

SENATOR PERCY: I hope you are not going to announce any grain purchases during your visit.

SECRETARY: Not until after the elections. Mr. First Secretary, I think we now have to witness the signing of some agreements.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 72, October 1974—Poland—First Secretary Gierek (12) WH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved on October 24 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Dining Room at the Department of State.
  2. Secretary of State Kissinger and First Secretary Gierek continued their earlier discussion of U.S.-Polish bilateral relations.