Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976

31. Memorandum of Conversation, Bucharest, November 3, 1974, 5:30-9:30 p.m.¹ ²

Bucharest, November 3, 1974, 5:30-9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

• Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
• George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
• Sergiu Celac, Interpreter
• Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
• Harry G. Barnes, Jr. Ambassador (Interpreter)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 3-4, 1974

DATE AND PLACE: Sunday-Monday, November 3-4, 1974, 5:30 - 9:30 p.m. and 11:25 p.m. - 12:20 a.m., The Council of State

President Ceausescu: I’m sorry your visit is so short. Perhaps next time you can stay longer in order to see more of our country.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to.

President Ceausescu: Perhaps after peace is concluded in the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn’t like to wait so long.

President Ceausescu: In any case, I want to welcome you and express the satisfaction our leadership feels in the good relations that exist between Romania and the US and the hope that your visit, although short, will be useful.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that the good relations initiated by President Nixon are firmly fixed and the fact that we have had a change of administration no way affect the direction established President Nixon. As a matter of fact, President Ford is prepared, as I am, to continue along this course and intensify it. We appreciate these occasions to keep abreast of your thinking as provided recently when you sent a special emissary to the United States and we feel that this practice of confidential exchanges at a high level should be maintained.

President Ceausescu: I appreciate very much both your statements as well as the wish expressed by President Ford and by you, Mr. Secretary of State, to continue the understandings achieved with President Nixon in which you had participated most actively. For our part we really desire that these relations continue in all spheres. In accord with our tradition of letting the guest decide with what subject he would like to begin, where would you like to start?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, you have been so courteous to receive me at what must be an inconvenient time. I am prepared to cover all topics following any order you prefer. Incidentally, we will follow our usual custom and keep the record of these discussions in the White House and not with the State Department. While there are always leaks, none ever come out of the White House. I always say I read the New York Times because it gives me a better selection of my own cables than my associates do.

President Ceausescu.: They must have a good intelligence service.

Secretary Kissinger: My practice is to keep information away from where it can leak.

President Ceausescu: Let’s begin perhaps with Romanian-American relations. The time of President Nixon’s visit was just before the Congress of our Party and now we are just a few weeks away from our 11th Party Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: You delayed it by one day.

President Ceausescu: Yes, we delayed it by one day.

Secretary Kissinger: We haven’t forgotten that.

President Ceausescu: Of course the Situation has changed a great deal since then. At that time in the world the visit was criticized a lot by our friends. We are now in a situation where we can criticize them.

Secretary Kissinger: For what? Having too good relations with the United States?

President Ceausescu: No, but rather to prevent some agreements of theirs. So we act in such a way that they would not reach agreements which would be at others’ expense. We can discuss this at another point in more detail.

Secretary Kissinger: What agreements arrived at, at the expense of others?

President Ceausescu: I was referring to the fact that we are in a position to make criticisms in order to prevent their reaching agreements at the expense of others.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s a good strategy.

President Ceausescu: To return then to our relations with the US. In 1969 we announced that the United States would accord the most-favored nation clause to Romania and that there would be an expansion of our relations including an Increase in our commercial exchanges severalfold. Trade has increased to be sure it was very slow volume-wise, but the MFN matter has remained in the world of declarations. Perhaps we can declare at the Party Congress, which is only a few weeks off, that the United States has granted MFN.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, on the issue of MFN, I don’t want to bore you with the domestic problems which have arisen. We hope the legislation will pass in two or three weeks. As soon as it is passed we will grant Romania MFN. There is a slight problem with the Jackson Amendment which I should probably discuss with your Ambassador, but we have to show some recognition of it in order to avoid difficulties later. I don’t personally want to raise this question because I don’t consider it appropriate. It would constitute an intervention in your internal affairs. There is not of course the same problem here as in the USSR and we can handle it in a manner so as not to complicate things. We would accept any gesture by Romania as complying with the Amendment. I don’t think there are many people involved. (At this point the Secretary asked the Ambassador for some details and the Ambassador mentioned the two categories of dual nationals and relatives of American citizens with 175 cases of the former and several hundred of the latter plus family members.)

President Ceausescu: Actually, the Jackson Amendment needs some filling out as far as Romania is concerned in the sense that in addition to the demands for granting the right of emigration, which is granted by Romania, there should also be a reference to the right to return to one’s country of origin because it seems this problem is beginning to appear.

Secretary Kissinger: With Jewish migration or others?

President Ceausescu: Jewish in particular. This is something we’re negotiating directly with the Israelis.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t believe Jewish emigration would be a major problem, but something regarding dual nationals and families or American citizens of a symbolic nature would remove any doubts on this question. Our intention is to grant MFN to Romania within a few weeks after passage of the legislation and before we grant it anywhere else in Eastern Europe. This does not have to await the gestures which the Romanian side would make, but we would expect that within a month or two thereafter you would carry out what we had agreed on.

President Ceausescu: It seems to me that this is a problem which isn’t well understood. We don’t have an emigration problem. To be sure, people are emigrating in smaller numbers now, some to Israel but substantial numbers are leaving especially for the German Federal Republic. In general, there are still about 55-60,000 of Jewish origin in Romania but those who want to leave are actually very few number. There isn’t really any problem from this standpoint.

Secretary Kissinger: The only problem that exists concerns the families of American citizens and dual nationals. I’m sure the problem can be worked out. It doesn’t really concern many people.

President Ceausescu: (To the Ambassador) Have you made some requests? How many are there?

Ambassador Barnes: About 175 dual nationals and several hundred with relatives in the United States plus their families.

President Ceausescu: That’s not many. As a matter of fact we have very good relations with Americans of Romanian origin In the United States and many of them come back here to visit. Basically then I don’t really see that there exists a problem in this matter.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t believe there is either, I just mention this question in passing. In a few weeks after legislation is adopted we will grant MFN to Romania before any other Eastern European country.

(The Ambassador recalled to the Secretary the likely legislative provision that a commercial agreement would have to be negotiated before MFN could be granted.)

The Ambassador tells me that the legislation will require a trade agreement to be concluded between our two countries covering such matters as business facilities. I suggest a begin consideration of that agreement now and try to have it finished by the time the bill passes. It shouldn’t be a particularly demanding question and I suggest the Ambassador begin here and conclude negotiations within a month. These are basically standard provisions. We will expedite procedures in Washington though I despair at times whether we can ever do anything in four weeks. Still, this shouldn’t be difficult because it is a standard type of agreement.

President Ceausescu: I proposed last December that we conclude an economic agreement and I was just thinking about proposing again that we conclude a similar agreement so I’m completely of the same mind as you.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember but this agreement will not be an economic one but the standard commercial types

President Ceausescu: I’d like the economic one to be one on cooperation also in the technical and scientific fields and to be over a long-term nature. We have such agreements with almost all the Western European countries.

(The Ambassador reminded the Secretary that negotiations would be beginning next month on the cultural-scientific-technological agreement and therefore the long-term economic agreement need cover only those aspects in the technical and scientific field which would not be covered in the other agreement.)

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s do the commercial agreement first, then MFN, then the long-term economic agreement including whatever scientific matters are not covered by the cultural agreement.

President Ceausescu: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: If our schedule holds, we could begin on the long-term agreement early next year.

President Ceausescu: I completely agree. As far as the citizens are concerned (at this point Ceausescu turned to Foreign Minister Macovescu), I think we need to look again at these eases and to solve all of them so that this won’t have to be a matter for discussion in the future.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ll let our Ambassador follow up on this. I didn’t even know that we had these problems until I read some material on the way here.

President Ceausescu: We have some problems in that there are some who want to come back to Romania but we regard this as normal. Therefore from this standpoint I don’t see that any problems will appear.

I mentioned that we have achieved some expansion in our commercial exchanges but we’d like it to be still greater and also we’d like the Government of the United States to encourage investments in Romania, as well as finding perhaps some way of granting credits under more favorable conditions to Romania as a developing country, all this in connection with cooperative ventures with American firms.

(The Secretary asked, the Ambassador if Romania did not benefit from Ex-Im credits and World Bank loans. The Ambassador said yes, but added that Ceausescu was probably thinking of credits authorized under AID-type legislation for developing countries.)

We have in mind in Romania the construction at several large irrigation schemes, also systems to regulate flood waters and reclaim land, all of which should lead toward an increase of agricultural production. American investments might contribute toward this end. Of course, the industrial area remains important.

Secretary Kissinger: We would be prepared to send our Secretary of Agriculture here.

Ambassador Barnes: Secretary of Agriculture Hardin was in Romania several years ago and Secretary Butz has invited Minister of Agriculture Miculescu to the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: We are sympathetic to any ideas you may have in the agricultural and industrial fields. I recall in the past we once helped you with credits through the private banking system to get some investments and we are prepared to use our influence wherever we can. The only sources I know of, though, are the Ex-Im Bank and the World Bank. In those international institutions where we have influence we’d be glad to exercise it. The best way to proceed is for your Ambassador to raise specific projects and we will use what influence we have either in the domestic or international field to obtain what is a possible. Our basic attitude is positive and our general policy is to keep Romania the head of the line as far as Eastern Europe is concerned although I must say it is extremely difficult for our economic agencies to understand that.

President Ceausescu: In any ease in either the agricultural or industrial fields, particularly the matter or raw materials or even minerals which we have admittedly of low grade type but still in huge quantities, in these areas we could work out good cooperation with American firms in suitable conditions.

Secretary Kissinger: In agriculture, I am giving a major speech, at the World Food Conference which will give our approach to the problems of agriculture. It will represent a new departure for us who have hitherto relied almost entirely on the free market. For the first time we are trying to solve these problems on a governmental basis. I think there may be some aspects of this speech of interest to Romania. We can pursue these discussions in Washington and we would take your approach seriously.

President Ceausescu: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Fine. By the way, I told the Foreign Minister earlier that we would be prepared to do something on CCC credits for cotton but on feed grains all I can do is to look into the matter when I get back home.

President Ceausescu: We have a program to exploit some copper deposits; although they have not too high a cooper content they can be handled through the open pit method and are therefore economical. If the United States would be interested, then American firms could participate with some investments advantageously priced as far as interest is concerned and could be paid back in ore.

Secretary Kissinger: This could be something for the Ex-Im Bank to get into. What about contacts with American firms, do you have them?

President Ceausescu: We have. But credits at a high interest rate don’t interest us.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand.

President Ceausescu: American companies are suggesting that we be more insistent with the Administration.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve talked to you I believe at least once before about my views concerning the heads of American companies. Marx and Lenin were not right in their view that capitalists would understand the political interests of their countries. They are idiots. I’m talking about them in the political realm, not the economic which is something else. In any case, it’s not how hard you insist with us that determines whether you get something. What we do has to do with the state of our political relations. I just wanted to as this in passing.

President Ceausescu: I appreciate what you have said. Still, I think that they appreciate the political aspect. The combination of this political aspect with the economic one shows that they are true Marxists.

Secretary Kissinger: They’re idiots, I know them. Last year the head of one of the oil companies called on King Faisal shortly after the embargo and congratulated him on it and said that it was long overdue. The individual is no longer Saudi Arabia.

President Ceausescu: What about freedom of expression?

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly. Whatever they want to say, they can, in Europe, for example, but in Saudi Arabia where they want our political protection, they cannot talk against their own government’s policy, if they want that protection.

President Ceausescu: You know, as far as Romania is concerned judgment is good enough. They say that the United States gives out several billions of dollars in credits at low interest rates and several billions in aid. And hardly any of it ever comes back. Whereas if some credits here provided to Romania for some of the productive purses we have been talking about, this would be advantageous both for the US and Romania.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. I think the way to proceed is for these companies to develop projects, then submit them to the Ex-Im Bank and if they’re then considered to be economically feasible we will give political approval and will in fact encourage them.

President Ceausescu: A political credit is basically what I after.

Secretary Kissinger: That would require Congressional action, and in the present state of Congress would be very difficult, but if we look ahead a few years and as we get control of this situation, which I believe we can, perhaps we can think about it again.

President Ceausescu: Last of all, not long ago I sent one of my Counselors to the United States and he had discussions with you and the President. I want to raise the question of the President’s visit to Romania. I don’t know whether it’s possible to have in mind the idea of next year for this visit to take place.

Secretary Kissinger: You were very generous to invite the President. He and I have actually been discussing the matter. Our basic attitude is positive, but of course he has to go to Western Europe first at some point. One idea was to come in connection with the European Security Council session at the highest level, after that to Eastern Europe and certainly to Romania, in fact only to Romania. Let us try to take 1975 as a target date.

President Ceausescu: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: This guest house where I’m staying is very elegant. That of course isn’t the principal reason why he would come but it would be very pleasant. It would be useful for us to plan for 1975.

Foreign Minister Macovescu: Could we mention this in the communique.

Secretary Kissinger: There is some uncertainty in the President’s program. If we could state that President Ceausescu was interested in the visit taking place in 1975, that I expressed President Ford’s appreciation, this might do; however various things could intervene so one can’t be 100% sure. There are sometimes difficulties if you give a date and then can’t meet that date. Let’s say instead the President was invited for an early date. I would accept it on his behalf and say we would try to arrange a visit at an early convenient date.

President Ceausescu: Let’s try to find a formula.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be better than saying 1975. Let’s issue the communique from here tonight.

President Ceausescu: Fine.

Secretary Kissinger: There’s no great hurry. It could be any time tonight.

President Ceausescu: Until 6 a.m. it’s still evening in the US. Let’s refer also to the beginning of negotiations for the commercial treaty and also to a long-term agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Agreed.

President Ceausescu: Also we ought to mention the encouragement or exchanges of private citizens in the context of the principles we agreed to.

Secretary Kissinger: As a matter of fact this would help us.

Ambassador Barnes: Perhaps we could draw on the December 1973 language and refer to humanitarian problems.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s a good idea.

President Ceausescu: We could say we were supporting the solution of humanitarian problems, especially since we have some problems of this sort with the United States so I’m therefore quite ready to accept this language.

Secretary Kissinger: Really?

President Ceausescu: With the church. I don’t want to discuss it really. I was thinking about the Romanian Orthodox Church which has ties with our church here.

Secretary Kissinger: There is an Orthodox priest who gives us a lot of trouble but he’s not Romanian.

President Ceausescu: Shall we turn to international matters?

Secretary Kissinger: By all means. Why don’t you begin and I’ll give my views.

President Ceausescu: It would be better if you began. You’ve traveled a lot, you have many impressions and probably you could choose something more interesting.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m ready to discuss any subject of interest to you, but I might start by talking about Latin America.

President Ceausescu: We pay a lot of attention to the development of our relations with Latin America.

Secretary Kissinger: I know the Foreign Minister has just been Mexico.

President Ceausescu: And we have friendship treaties with two countries in Latin America.

Secretary Kissinger: Which ones?

President Ceausescu: Argentina and Costa Rica. We have good relations with almost all Latin American countries.

Well, let’s begin with the situation in Europe. There is first of all the concrete problem of the European Security Conference and then the more general situation that exists. There are certain states of things which lead to very grave problems such as that of Cyprus. I want to mention several things which sometimes people pass by with out giving them too much attention in terms of trying to solve them. Despite the fact that a series of good results have been obtained in a variety of countries, the situation continues to be rather complicated and in many respects similar to that just prior to the Second World War.

Secretary Kissinger: In Europe?

President Ceausescu: In Europe. And in the whole word for that matter.

Secretary Kissinger: Why in Europe? I can see why in other parts of the world.

President Ceausescu: Things need to a seen in close connection with the energy and financial crises, with a whole set of economic situations which create rather serious problems. Then there’s this shifting, also rather serious, of financial means which creates problems in the economic domain and as a consequence the political domain as well.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree about these phenomena. They are serious problems.

President Ceausescu: It’s difficult to say how various countries will act to solve these problems. In the past, especially In Europe, states resorted to the military path. Then there are unsolved problems in Europe, despite that some steps have been taken and some understandings realized. The Cyprus situation is eloquent testimony of this state of affairs.

Secretary Kissinger: It proves that there’s no medicine for stupidity. Between the Greek and Turkish military they’ve made a mess of extraordinary proportions.

President Ceausescu: Viewed from another angle, there’s a very high concentration of military forces in Europe, the biggest concentration in any one area, and without precedent in the past. Europe remains in our opinion, problem number one which needs more concentration, although there are of course other danger spots in other places.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that it is problem number one.

President Ceausescu: Or course this raises the question of how one should solve these very complicated problems. To be consistent with the approach I’ve used in the past, I want to tell you frankly some of our thoughts.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s why I wanted you to talk first.

President Ceausescu: I have the impression that the Soviet Union and the United States consider that problems can be solved only through understandings between the two of them. This could mean there might be repeated the situation that existed on the eve of the Second World War. History demonstrates that this sort or solution isn’t valid.

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think that that’s what the USSR believes. Our thinking is more complicated.

President Ceausescu: In any case, in order for the problems of Europe to be solved, to achieve security on the continent, new concepts, new actions, are necessary. I’m going to say something to you about some thoughts which we will be debating at our Congress. You’ve come before the Congress. I’d like to outline them for you.

Secretary Kissinger: When is the Congress?

President Ceausescu: November 25. The first problem is how does one achieve some real military disarmament in Europe and reduction of troops which are concentrated here. What’s being discussed in Vienna we consider as having no value at all.

Secretary Kissinger: Agreed.

President Ceausescu: I wanted to tell you that we are debating, though we haven’t taken any decision, what advantage there is for us to participate even in the role of observer. We consider that it really is necessary to approach these problems with new concepts, with a new spirit, these problems of concentration military forces and armaments in Europe. It’s something unheard of in modern times that thirty years after a war a peace treaty should not have been concluded and for that matter no one is even considering one. Basically Europe is living in a state of armistice, the armistice signed at Potsdam. So the second problem that raises is that of eliminating this provisional statement of things and all that’s connected with it, doing away with any traces of the state of war and any rights that flow therefrom. This presupposes the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other states and all that is connected therewith. It’s in this light that we judge this general European security conference and why we consider that this is not a moment for ending things but rather for a beginning of moving toward the final solution at these problems.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve already explained to the Foreign Minister that so far as the Geneva conference is concerned we were not among its early champions but this is not the principal reason for its moving slowly. We’re willing to bring it to a reasonable conclusion. I think by early spring this is accomplishable. There has not yet been agreement on the level of which the conference should end. Everybody says it depends on the outcome but the outcome is perfectly foreseeable. It is my personal conviction that it end at the highest level. This is my personal, not an official, view but before this happens foreign offices will fill up hundreds of file cabinets on the subject but this is not the basic question.

President Ceausescu: In any case, our main concern is not the level of the meeting but with what sorts of things we will come to the conference.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand that in the first basket the issues concern the peaceful change of frontiers and if every principle has equal validity or rather if each is to be implemented with equal strictness. These are solvable because nobody understands them. I won’t review all the other issues. It would take all night. The big issues are in baskets 3 and 4. I think we will come to the conference with something reasonable still at the end I don’t believe it will mark a turning point in history.

President Ceausescu: You see I too believe the principal problem will be solved. I think this is valid for the economic ones and even for the so-called third basket of humanitarian problems. The main problem, though, has to do with measures of a military nature designed to prevent a new situation of tension, and equally with the creation of an organization of a consultative nature - I’m not raising the question of any particular format which could assure some continuity for discussing the problems which remain to be solved.

Secretary Kissinger: We have agreed that our Ambassadors in Geneva would be in touch on this subject. I want to be quite frank. Our concern is exactly the opposite of yours. In my judgment you want to prevent by means of some general system of organization a superpower from interfering in state relations in Eastern Europe and for that such a mechanism would be very useful. We want to prevent that same superpower from increasing its influence within Western Europe and for that such a mechanism has certain dangers.

President Ceausescu: It depends on how it would be organized.

Secretary Kissinger: For that reason we have suggested getting together. We have not taken a final position. We will look at your ideas of a mechanism with an open mind.

President Ceausescu: We realize that the United States is an important factor in Europe and we hope that it will take on certain further responsibilities. It would be a positive thing if they were in the direction of achieving a new climate of political security in Europe and for that matter new economic relations.

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to look realistically at what you have in mind and give our candid comment. On the military discussions I think that those that are taking place in Vienna are not useful at this point and we think that the Soviet Union doesn’t want any progress now. That’s our impression.

President Ceausescu: In any case problems in Europe are ones we consider extremely complicated and consider the dangers very great, dangers which could lead at any time to complications like Cyprus, with implications that are extensive and difficult to foresee.

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to stabilize the situation and make it more secure.

President Ceausescu: I realize that there isn’t enough time to discuss all this now. I raised these questions from a desire that we should reflect on them and on the solutions which might be called for.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be interesting to have your ideas on how to move things toward a peace settlement and a general idea of what it would contain.

President Ceausescu: What all peace treaties contain, elimination of the state of war with all the consequences that flow therefrom. There are even problems with the UN Charter which are tied to the state of war and which need to be solved. I’m not referring to the right of veto. This isn’t a current problem, but in the Charter there are certain provisions which provide for the rift of intervention in the affairs of other states.

Secretary Kissinger: You want to prevent this?

President Ceausescu: I think the whole world does.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell me, are you an enemy state of the USSR? I know you are an ally.

President Ceausescu: Legally no, but Article 53 allows for intervention in the affairs of former enemy states and any interpretation could be given to this article.

Secretary Kissinger: I see now what you have in mind.

President Ceausescu: It’s not a question only of Romania. This is something unique in history to provide for and continue to maintain the right, derived from a state of war, to intervene whenever one wanted in the affairs of others.

Secretary Kissinger: I see your point of view very well.

President Ceausescu: Therefore a treaty of peace presupposes a sort of regulating, a sort of eliminating of these anomalies and leftover situations.

Secretary Kissinger: I personally think that a peace treaty, if it includes Germany, would be very difficult to negotiate but I see no reason why one couldn’t be with other states.

President Ceausescu: We have a treaty or peace signed in Paris in 1946. I’m not raising any questions as far as Romania is concerned. But we didn’t want the same thing to happen as in the story about the lamb and the wolf.

Secretary Kissinger: No. I know what you have in mind but I personally think that a peace treaty with Germany is very difficult because of the conditions and mentality in both parts. I told Brezhnev that the greatest danger would be if the German Democratic Republic won the European football championship. He didn’t completely disagree with me. Their self-confidence would have acquired unmanageable proportions. In addition, they play football as if it represented the philosophy of Kant, very methodically.

President Ceausescu: You know the Germans very well.

Secretary Kissinger: True. We’d like to ease military confrontation in Central Europe, anywhere in Europe.

President Ceausescu: Certainly, you see, the problem deserves discussion in more detailed fashion, because the United States, in assuming certain responsibilities, is thereby affected much more by all the states in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand very well what you are saying and it is an important point and frankly I had not considered it in the rather subtle way you have put it here.

President Ceausescu: I’d like to pursue what I have begun. To go along with the idea that problems can be solved between just two countries is something which will lead to failure. I appreciate the role of the United States and of the Soviet Union and I have said this to Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. But I also appreciate the fact that even based on this role problems simply cannot be solved without taking into consideration the interests of others.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t rely on this role in the United States.

President Ceausescu: You remember how it was in 1939. Stalin and Hitler had signed an agreement which was to last for a thousand years. You know how long it lasted and what the results were. I know that the United States can’t be compared with Hitler’s Germany. Yet understandings between just two countries are opposed by all of Europe, including your closest allies.

Secretary Kissinger: Why, so they can make them themselves?

President Ceausescu: Perhaps they are impelled by the way the United States acts. I say this without denying that some might want to make agreements themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think French policy has anything to do with what we do? We have made every effort with them.

President Ceausescu: As far as French policy is concerned, no, but in any case I consider it somewhat more realistic than the policies of others.

Secretary Kissinger: In Europe or with the United States?

President Ceausescu: Europe. The danger doesn’t come from France.

Secretary Kissinger: But -

President Ceausescu: It’s still a problem however in that one can arrive at an accentuation of the division of Europe, perhaps without the United States even wanting to contribute to this sort of thing.

Secretary Kissinger: How?

President Ceausescu: I am speaking not just as a President with the Secretary of State of the United States but as a statesman with another statesman who needs to have an understanding of more general factors, irrespective of the specific responsibilities he may have at any time.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with the necessity of looking at historical trends and not just at daily symptoms. I believe also that the problems of Europe are much more complicated than most Americans understand, but what concrete steps at any one time one can take is a difficult question.

President Ceausescu: One of the concrete steps is connected with the European Security Conference, namely to write into the documents from a political point of view the necessary provisions to open up ways for solving problems. I personally am not someone who has illusions about the durability of agreements. They remain effective only for so long as they are based on a certain correlation of forces. They can, however, play a role, they can help. We therefore consider that these conference documents should be as clear as possible. From this point of view I believe that you remember the discussions we had five years ago in this very room when talked about the fact that great changes would be coming soon. They have come on a much larger scale and much more rapidly than we expected and I don’t think everyone is prepared for this or understands them as they should.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a number of problems we have to deal with in the West. The only country that can deal with them is our own. We have to maintain a constant dialogue with the Soviets on nuclear weapons. Otherwise the danger is too great for both sides. That is evident. We have to try to do something about the problem of energy. If we don’t take the leadership it could lead to such political weakening of the West that the whole structure of the post-war period would disintegrate. So this creates a certain perspective, but we don’t believe we can solve all these problems only with the USSR and we need in Europe a sense of national consciousness. If the United States attempts to deal with every problem in every part of the world on our own we will be exhausted. We want Europe to have a great ability to deal with problems itself. It’s necessary for our own well-being.

President Ceausescu: I have confidence in Europe. Certainly there are complicated problems but they can and must be solved. Both the United States and the Soviet Union can make an important contribution to the extent that they both remain aware of the aspirations of the other peoples of Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me tell you first of all I understand your concern. Let me say then something indirectly. I studied the foreign policy of Bismarck when I was a professor. When you look at the situation within Germany at that time, one country was somewhat more aggressive, Prussia, and another less aggressive, which was Austria. And all the small German states looked to Austria for protection. In 1864 Bismarck convinced Austria that the small German states were nuisance and interfered with solutions to problems, that these problems should be settled directly between Prussia and Austria without reference to the all states. Austria accepted this idea. All the small German states were dismayed. Two years later Prussia attacked Austria which had totally isolated itself. So one can sometimes learn from history.

President Ceausescu: Let’s hope so.

Secretary Kissinger: There will be no condominium while I’m Secretary of State. We are not children. We know what their strategy is and what after all have we actually done compared to what we say that leads toward condominium?

President Ceausescu: I think we’ve discussed a fair amount about Europe. I, in any case, want to repeat my hope — that the United States at the conference will have as constructive a position as possible and in general that it win be active in carrying out the responsibilities it has assumed for solving the problems at European security and peace.

Secretary Kissinger: After talks with your representatives we became somewhat more active at the European Security Conference. I can tell you confidentially we intend to be more active. We will speak seriously to the German Chancellor when he comes to the United States in December. So I think I’ve understood your fundamental position about the American role in Europe.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Middle East and an after-dinner discussion of Cyprus and other international issues.]

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 52, General Subject File, HAK European Trip, 1974 (6) WH. Secret; EXDIS. Drafted by Barnes. Attached but not published are Barnes’s notes for subsequent conversations on November 4. The meeting took place in the Council of State.
2. Secretary Kissinger met with President Ceausescu to discuss Romanian-U.S. bilateral relations, trade, Romanian restrictions on Jewish emigration, and CSCE.