Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

46. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, May 17, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Activities Regarding Chemical Weapons Issues

Below is a brief description of the bureaucratic, international, and congressional activities regarding chemical weapons issues.

Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192). This report will be ready for formal agency clearance early next week. The report examines three basic CW posture alternatives, but the immediate issue is whether or not we should significantly improve our presently limited CW retaliatory capability by producing and stockpiling binary chemical weapons. All indications are that DOD and the JCS will support acquisition of binary chemical weapons while State and ACDA will oppose it.

The binary question is already being addressed in part on the Hill since the FY 75 proposed budget includes a DOD request for $5.8 million to begin establishing a binary production, loading, and filling facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas.

The Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments (Zablocki Subcommittee) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee just concluded extensive hearings dealing with the binary question and with all of the issues mentioned below. DOD/ISA (Jordan), State (Sloss), and ACDA (Ikle) testified for the Administration on the various subjects. (I understand that General Wickham may have had some concern about Sloss’s testimony. All written testimonies were cleared here and with the other interested agencies. Nothing in Sloss’s testimony should give anyone cause for concern.) The Subcommittee’s report is expected to be out sometime in mid-June.

Chemical Weapons Limitations (NSSM 157). This study was completed in 1972. Decision on it has been deferred pending decision on the NSSM 192 report discussed above. The central issue now is whether to support a ban on further production of CW agents. State and ACDA have recommended such a ban. DOD and the JCS have opposed it primarily because it would preclude significantly improving our CW retaliatory capability with binary weapons.

You will recall that during the April discussions in Moscow, General Secretary Brezhnev suggested that we agree to negotiate a ban on the production of lethal CW. Secretary Kissinger noted that such a ban could not be adequately verified and that we would look into the matter.

Geneva Protocol. The Protocol in effect prohibits first use in war of chemical and biological weapons. In 1970 the President submitted the Protocol for the Senate’s consent to ratification with the understanding that it does not prohibit first use in war of tear gas and herbicides. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee strongly supports the Protocol but disagrees with our understanding on these two agents. In 1971 the Committee asked the President to reconsider this position and was informed that we have the issue under study.

The central issue is whether we wish to preserve the first use option for warfare uses of tear gas and herbicides. Dr. Kissinger decided not to submit an earlier study for decision. Pursuant to a directive in November, an updated study and all agency views except State’s have been forwarded. DOD and the JCS support preserving the first use option for these agents. ACDA and probably State believe we should be willing to relinquish this first use option. There will probably be no favorable Senate action on the Protocol unless there is some change in our position.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The President submitted the BWC for the Senate’s consent to ratification in 1972. The BWC expressly reaffirms the Protocol’s significance and objectives. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee may continue to defer action on the BWC until there is an Administration response on the Protocol issue. Since 30 countries have already ratified the BWC, ratification by the U.S., UK, and USSR is all that is needed to bring it into effect. The UK and the USSR are ready to ratify. Prompt and favorable Senate action on the BWC can be expected if the Protocol issue were resolved satisfactorily.

As noted in my memorandum to you on May 15, ACDA believes we should move now on the Protocol issue to try to achieve ratification of the Protocol and the BWC prior to any summit. State would concur in the objective but would probably not concur in Iklé’s suggested way to resolve the Protocol issue.

1. Summary: Guhin described various bureaucratic, international, and congressional activities regarding chemical weapons issues, including NSSM 192, NSSM 157, the Geneva Protocol, and the Biological Weapons Convention.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 23, NSDM 192 (Chemical Weapons Policy) 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Kennedy and Huberman. NSSM 192 is Document 29. Concerning Kissinger’s meetings with Soviet officials, see Document 37. NSSM 157 is published as Document 263 in Foreign Affairs, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972. Guhin’s May 15 memorandum to Scowcroft has not been found.