Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

193. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford¹

Washington, April 22, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Signature of PNE Treaty

Soviet PNE negotiators have stated that they would like to see the PNE agreement signed at the “highest” level as was the case with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed by Brezhnev and President Nixon at the July 1974 summit. From the standpoint of our overall relations with the Soviet Union, there are advantages in Presidential signature of the agreement.

Considering the tense situation in southern and eastern Africa and the Middle East, we may have to continue to make clear our opposition to Soviet adventurism in coming months. Simultaneous reaffirmation that an alternative to increasing confrontation with the United States exists could be useful in terms of Soviet leadership perceptions. This is particularly the case given the apparent current impasse in SALT negotiations and the lack of progress in MBFR.

Past arms control agreements with the Soviets have been treated with considerable fanfare; all previous treaties have been signed by the President and given considerable publicity here. The Soviets wanted to see the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Protocol given some prominence, but in view of the Angola situation we chose to handle it in the lowest possible key. A decision to treat the PNE agreement in a similar fashion could reinforce the attitude we see reflected in recent Soviet pronouncements on U.S.–USSR relations that in the election-year atmosphere little can be accomplished with us. Should this perception continue, it could fortify leadership reluctance to make concessions on issues of dispute (Africa) or negotiation (SALT) in the months to come.

We believe that a high visibility signing coupled with a statement by you reaffirming our interest in resolving differences with the Soviets by negotiation would be well received domestically. Such a statement should highlight the significance of the PNE agreement in establishing, for the first time, the principle of on-site observation. This agreement, as a most useful forward step in our efforts to control nuclear proliferation and testing, should command broad support. We expect it to be reviewed and initialled within about ten days and the signature ceremony could be scheduled at any time after that.

Recommendation:

That after the texts have been reviewed and initialled you authorize me to propose simultaneous signature “at the highest level.”

Approve _______

Desired timing of signature _______

Disapprove _______

1. Summary: Kissinger informed Ford that the Soviet negotiators stated that they would like to see the PNE agreement signed at the Presidential level. Kissinger agreed, noting that a “high visibility signing coupled with a statement by you reaffirming our interest in resolving differences with the Soviets by negotiation would be well received domestically.”

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 15, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty (1). Secret. Sent for action. Published from a copy that does not show Ford’s approval of the recommendation, but see Document 197. Boverie sent the memorandum to Scowcroft under a May 5 memorandum, indicating that Kissinger had signed the memorandum “in a rush” before departing for Africa and noting that the NSC Staff did recommend that the memorandum be sent to Ford.