77. Telegram 3412 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, July 23, 1975, 1746Z.1 2
TELEGRAM
Department of State
USUN 3412
2317462 JUL 75
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1126
USUN 3412
FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN
E.O. 11662: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, VN,
VS, KN, KS
SUBJ: THE ADMISSION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS
1. THE DECISION ON THE ADMISSION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH WILL BE MADE IN THE NEXT DAYS OR WEEKS, WILL IN EFFECT BE THE FIRST DECISION OF THE THIRTIETH GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND OF THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION. IT WILL BE A FATEFUL ONE. ACCORDINGLY AS WE ACT, THE WORLD SYSTEM THE UNITED STATES ESTABLISHED AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR COULD COMMENCE TO COME APART ALTOGETHER. OR BY ACTING WITH COURAGE AND CONVICTION ON THIS ISSUE AMERICA, AS THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED IN HIS TULANE SPEECH, “CAN REGAIN THE SENSE OF PRIDE THAT EXISTED BEFORE VIETNAM”. HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS WE CAN BEGIN TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE QUEST FOR A STABLE AND LIBERAL WORLD ORDER.
2. OUR JUDGMENT IS UNHESITATING. WHEN THE RESOLUTION IS PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (IT WILL PROBABLY BE ONE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE ADMISSION OF BOTH COUNTRIES) THE UNITED STATES SHOULD STATE THE GRAVEST POSSIBLE DOUBTS THAT EITHER OF THESE REGIMES CAN BE JUDGED TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. A DETAILED, AND IF THE SECRETARY SO DESIRES, AN EXCORIATING ACCOUNT OF THEIR PAST AND PRESENT ACTIONS CAN BE PRESENTED FOR ALL THE WORLD TO WATCH. WE CAN THEN SAY THAT WE ARE, HOWEVER, FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO PRINCIPLES--ON THE ONE HAND THE ADHERENCE BY PARTICULAR COUNTRIES TO UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES, ON THE OTHER HAND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF. THE TWO PRINCIPLES CONFLICT IN THIS CASE, AND OF THE TWO THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY TO BE THE MORE IMPORTANT. ACCORDINGLY WE HAVE DECIDED TO ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION AND SO PERMIT THE ENTRY OF THESE TWO NATIONS.
3. ON THE SAME OCCASION THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REITERATE OUR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT FOR THE ADMISSION OF SOUTH KOREA, EITHER ALONE OR WITH NORTH KOREA. WE COULD ALSO DEMAND OF OUR FELLOW COUNCIL MEMBERS THAT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND OF PRACTICALITY THAT THEY ENABLE SOUTH KOREA TO BE ADMITTED AS WELL. WHETHER WE SHOULD TABLE A RESOLUTION THEN AND THERE IS A MATTER WE CAN DECIDE LATER. AS WASHINGTON KNOWS, THERE IS PROBABLY NOT NOW A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF VOTES AVAILABLE EVEN TO GET THE SOUTH KOREAN APPLICATION INSCRIBED ON THE COUNCIL AGENDA.
4. AT THE SAME TIME THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD MAKE AN EXHAUSTIVE AND UNYIELDING STATEMENT IN DEFENSE OF THE RULE THAT FOLLOWS FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY, WHICH IS THAT NATIONS ONCE ADMITTED ARE NOT TO BE ARBITRARILY AND ILLEGALLY EXPELLED FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SUCH LIKE ORGANS. IN BOTH CASES WE ADDRESS OURSELVES TO A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, AS THE SECRETARY STATED IN MILWAUKEE. WE WILL HAVE THE OCCASION TO REMIND THE WORLD THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS A SYSTEM BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATION. THIS IS A WESTERN PRINCIPLE, NO DOUBT. MOST MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DO NOT THEMSELVES HAVE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS. BUT IF THEY WANT A UNITED NATIONS THEY WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT PRINCIPLE IN THE WORLD BODY. IF THEY DO NOT, THEN IT IS THEY WHO MUST BE SEEN TO BLAME.
5. WE WILL NOT GET SOUTH KOREA INTO THE UNITED NATIONS UNLESS THE NORTH CHANGES ITS VIEW, BUT THIS AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE WILL DEMAND DAILY TO KNOW WHY WE HAVE NOT, WHY THE COMMUNIST POWERS ONLY WANT OTHER COMMUNIST POWERS AS MEMBERS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A LONG WHILE THE INITIATIVE WILL BE WITH US, AND UNMISTAKABLY BEST ARGUMENT WILL BE WITH US. WE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT AT THE VERY MINIMUM, HAVING DENIED KOREA MEMBERSHIP, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MUST PROVIDE IT THE SECURITY OF AN ORDERLY TRANSFER OF COMMAND: KOREA, OF ALL PLACES, IS THE ONE NATION THAT MUST BE THE SPECIAL OBJECT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S CONCERN.
6. WE WILL HAMMER AT THIS THEME THROUGHOUT THE ASSEMBLY. THE UNITED NATIONS NEEDS SEOUL. DAY AFTER DAY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMUNITY WILL BE BROUGHT TO SEE THE RELATION OF THIS TO THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP. THE NON-ALIGNED WILL END UP WISHING THEY HAD NEVER HEARD OF VIETNAM, A SENTIMENT WHICH WOULD THEN INDEED APPROACH UNIVERSALITY.
7. THE ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO, OF COURSE, FOLLOWS FROM A VETO. I MUST REPORT THAT IT IS THE UNANIMOUS AND FIRM CONVICTION OF THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL OFFICERS OF THIS MISSION, AND IT IS MY OPINION, THAT FOR U.S. TO VETO THE ADMISSION OF THE VIETNAMS WOULD BE A CALAMITY. WE WOULD BE SEEN TO ACT OUT OF BITTERNESS, BLINDNESS, WEAKNESS AND FEAR. WE WOULD BE SEEN NOT ONLY TO HAVE LOST THE HABIT OF VICTORY, BUT IN THE PROCESS TO HAVE ACQUIRED THE MOST PITEOUS STIGMATA OF DEFEAT. BUT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE PITY. THE OVERWHELMING RESPONSE WOULD BE CONTEMPT, NOT LEAST FROM OUR ALLIES.
8. THIS SATISFACTION SAVORED, THE NEXT STEP OF ASSORTED ENEMIES AND ADVERSARIES WOULD BE TO MOVE DIRECTLY TO EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN VETO OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY. (THE FIRST VETO BY U.S. OF A MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION, AND ONE PRESUMABLY BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS ADVISED IS ILLEGAL.) SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE EXPELLED FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. CHILE PERHAPS. THEN ISRAEL. IT IS THE OPINION OF THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THIS MISSION THAT THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDES WHICH A VIETNAM VETO WOULD AROUSE COULD MAKE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VICTORY AND DEFEAT ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI EXPULSION FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IF ISRAEL IS EXPELLED, THE WORLD WILL BE ASSURED THAT THIS CAME ABOUT BECAUSE OF AMERICAN BLUNDERS WHICH UNDERMINED EVERY PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE ARAB DEMAND MIGHT HAVE BEEN RESISTED. THIS VIEW WILL INEVITABLY BE SHARED BY MANY IN THE UNITED STATES.
9. AFTER THE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THAT BODY, INDIFFERENT TO ANY APPEAL WE MIGHT MAKE OR ANY THAT MIGHT BE MADE ON OUR BEHALF, WILL PROCEED TO DEMAND THE EXPULSION OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM SOUTH KOREA. FOR A QUARTER CENTURY OUR FORCES HAVE SEEN THERE AT THE BEHEST OF WORLD OPINION AS CONSTITUTED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THEY WILL THEREAFTER BE THERE IN DEFIANCE OF IT, HOWEVER LEGALLY. IN THE BEST OF COMING CIRCUMSTANCES IT WILL BE HARD INDEED TO GAIN A MAJORITY FOR OUR RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO BECOME SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND THERE. BUT IN THE PROFESSIONAL OPINION OF THE MISSION OFFICERS CONCERNED, OUR CHANCES WOULD FALL DRAMATICALLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF A VIETNAM VETO. SOUTH KOREA WILL BE INCREASINGLY ISOLATED. OUR SUPPORT WILL INCREASINGLY BE DISPUTED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. THE QUESTION OF WAR OR THE ABANDONMENT OF AN ALLY BECOMES A QUESTION OF WHEN. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL KNOW THIS, AS FOR EXAMPLE IT KNEW ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR TWO, BUT CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION WILL BE UTTERLY INACCESSIBLE TO ALL WARNINGS.
10. WHAT WOULD COME WITH WAR OR ABANDONMENT WE CAN HARDLY SAY. BUT THE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL WILL BE DISASTER ENOUGH. THE UNITED STATES SENATE HAS ALREADY RESOLVED THAT IN SUCH A EVENT WE MUST CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF. WE COULD QUICKLY FIND OURSELF HAVING WITHDRAWN FROM THE VERY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WE OURSELVES CREATED, LEAVING IT TO OUR ENEMIES. THEY WILL PROCEED TO TREAT US AS AN OUTCAST AND INCREASINGLY OUTLAWED NATION IN A WORLD SYSTEM THAT IS THEIRS NOT OURS.
11. THIS NEED NOT HAPPEN. WE CAN ACCEPT THE VIETNAMS AND FROM THERE COMMENCE A SUSTAINED AND IF NEEDS BE NOISY INSISTENCE THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS LIVE UP TO THE CHARTER AND TO THEIR OWN PROFESSIONS. WE WILL HAVE RIGHT ON OUR SIDE, AND WHO KNOWS BUT THAT AFTER A POINT A FAIR NUMBER OF MEMBERS WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE A VERY CONSIDERABLY AMOUNT OF POWER ALSO. MOYNIHAN
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750254–0652. Confidential; Flash. Sent to Kissinger from Moynihan. Ford’s April 23 Tulane speech is published in Department of State Bulletin, May 12, 1975, pp. 593–595. Kissinger’s July 14 Milwaukee speech, subsequent press conference, and related documents are ibid., August 4, 1975, pp. 149–184. ↩
- In a telegram sent to Kissinger, Moynihan advocated acquiescing in the admission of both Vietnam governments for membership in the United Nations.↩