Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976

62. Telegram 62535 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, March 28, 1974, 2123Z.¹ ²

March 28, 1974, 2123Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
062535

R 282123Z MAR 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH

STATE 062535

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UN, PINT, PFOR, VN, VS, CB

SUBJECT: PRG AND KHMER ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
REFS: A. STATE’S 51556 (3/20/73)
B. STATE’S 64695 (4/6/73)
C. A-4318 DTD 5/17/73
D. STATE’S 149073 DTD 8/3/73 (NOTAL)
E. A-1238 DTD 2/13/74
F. STATE’S 34222 (NOTAL)

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. THE RESULTS OF RECENT CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA BY THE PRG (VIET CONG) AND PRINCE SIHANOUK’S GRUNK TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA ILLUSTRATE THE GROWING DIFFICULTIES WE FACE IN ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK PARTICIPATION BY THESE GROUPS. I REFER SPECIFICALLY TO LAST MONTH’S ONE-VOTE MARGIN DEFEATING THE PRG BID FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GENEVA LAW OF WAR CONFERENCE AND THE THREE VOTE MARGIN DEFERRING THE KHMER CREDENTIALS ISSUE AT THE 28TH UNGA.

2. WE ANTICIPATE INCREASINGLY FREQUENT AND SERIOUS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTATION OF THE PRG AND GRUNK. THE ISSUE MAY WELL ARISE IN NEXT FEW MONTHS AT VARIOUS CONFERENCES, AND PARTICULARLY AT

--ECAFE PLENARY SESSION IN COLOMBO, MARCH 27-APRIL 8;

--UNGA SPECIAL SESSION, BEGINNING APRIL 9 (KHMER CREDENTIALS ONLY);

--27TH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY IN GENEVA, MAY 7-25;

--UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING IN PARIS, MAY 20-JUNE 25;

--3RD LAW OF SEA CONFERENCE IN CARACAS, JUNE 20-AUGUST 29;

--UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION CONGRESS IN LAUSANNE, MAY 22-JULY 5.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ATTITUDES OF SOME GOVTS ARE UNALTERABLE OR BASED ON POLITICAL OR EMOTIONAL FACTORS OVER WHICH WE HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE. NEVERTHELESS, I WANT TO REMIND YOU OF OUR GOVERNMENT’S STRONG INTEREST IN THIS MATTER AND ASK YOU TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT WHENEVER APPROPRIATE OUR VIEWS ARE CLEARLY AND CURRENTLY CONVEYED TO THIRD PARTIES. DEPT WILL INSTRUCT SELECTED POSTS SEPARATELY IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIFIC CONFERENCES AS THEY ARISE. MEANWHILE, EXCEPT WHERE HOST GOVERNMENTS ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE PRG AND/OR GRUNK, YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES, TAILORING YOUR EFFORTS TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO COMMUNICATE FORCEFULLY AND AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL OUR SUBSTANTIAL POLICY CONCERNS OVER POSSIBILITY PRG OR GRUNK ENTITIES MIGHT BE PERMITTED PARTICIPATE IN UN OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING AND REFTELS.

4. THE PRG AND GRUNK ARE ATTEMPTING TO GAIN THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA THAT WHICH NEITHER HAS BEEN CAPABLE OF WINNING ON THE GROUND. THE LEGITIMATE VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENTS ARE RESISTING VIGOROUSLY THESE ATTEMPTS TO UNDERCUT AND ISOLATE THEM. SINCE SUPPORT OF THESE GOVERNMENTS REMAINS A MAJOR ELEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY, WE WILL LEND THEM ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN THIS REGARD. WE HAVE DONE ALL IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS BY MILITARY MEANS IN THESE TWO COUNTRIES; WE DO NOT INTEND TO ACQUIESCE IN A COMMUNIST VICTORY VIA DIPLOMATIC MEANS. IN MAINTAINING OUR FIRM SUPPORT OF THE RVN AND GKR, WE DEMONSTRATE TO NORTH VIETNAM OUR DETERMINATION TO HOLD FIRM IN SUPPORT OF THESE TWO LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS AND TO FRIENDLY ASIAN AND OTHER STATES THAT WE CAN STILL BE RELIED UPON.

5. PRG AND GRUNK ARE NOT GOVERNMENTS, CONTROL ONLY SMALL PERCENTAGES OF SVN AND CAMBODIAN PEOPLES, HAVE NO CAPITALS, BODY OF JURISPRUDENCE OR OTHER ATTRIBUTES COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. IF THE PRG OR GRUNK ARE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR CONFERENCES, IT WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE UN SYSTEM DUE TO THEIR ILLEGITIMATE CHARACTER. YOU SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT NOT ONE OF THEIR NON-COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA RECOGNIZES THE PRG OR GRUNK.

6. THE PRG HAS DECLINED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH THE RVN; IT HAS SPURNED THE LATTER’S PROPOSALS FOR ELECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. SIMILARLY, THE GRUNK HAS THUS FAR REFUSED GKR OFFERS TO TALK. ONCE THE GRUNK REALIZES IT WILL NOT WIN MILITARILY, WE HOPE IT WILL CONSENT TO START NEGOTIATIONS.

7. THE BEST HOPE OF ACHIEVING A LASTING PEACE IN VIETNAM IS THROUGH THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT. RECOGNITION OF THE PRG AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, WHEN THAT IS DEMONSTRABLY NOT THE CASE, WOULD IN EFFECT UNDERMINE THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE SAME IS TRUE OF PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA, SHOULD THE GRUNK--AN AMORPHOUS ORGANIZATION CONTROLLED BY A COMMUNIST MINORITY AND INFLUENCED HEAVILY BY NORTH VIETNAM--OBTAIN GENERAL RECOGNITION AS CAMBODIA’S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. RUSH

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted by Schaller and Rosenberg; cleared by Rothenberg, Buffum, Wenzel, Rives (in draft), Stearns, Ingersoll, and Chase, and in EA/RA (in draft); and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN and the Mission to the U.N. in Geneva.
2. Sisco informed posts of the United States Government’s continued interest in defeating attempts by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and opposition forces in Cambodia to supplant the Republic of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic in international organizations.