Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976

39. Telegram 37592 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, February 15, 1976, 0341Z.¹ ²

February 15, 1976, 0341Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
037592

R 150341Z PEB 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
INFO AMCONSUL MONTREAL

STATE 037592

ROME FOR FAO, MONTREAL FOR ICAO

E.O. 11652:
TAGS: PORG, PFOR, US

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN BILATERAL DIPLOMACY
REF: A) STATE 303856 (12/29/75); B) STATE 13264; C) STATE 29255 (NOTAL)

DEPT POUCH BEIRUT AND SUVA. KUWAIT POUCH BAGHDAD.

FOR AMBASSADOR AND MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS OFFICER

1. RESPONSES TO REFERENCED CABLES TO POSTS HAVE PRODUCED A NUMBER OF COMMENTS AND USEFUL QUESTIONS WHICH WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THIS CIRCULAR IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF PROCESS OF OUR MORE REGULAR INJECTION OF MULTILATERAL ISSUES INTO THE CONDUCT OF DECISION-MAKING RELATING TO BILATERAL RELATIONS. THESE ARE DEALT WITH IN Q AND A FORM IN THE PARAGRAPHS BELOW. THEY ARE INTENDED FOR THE INFORMATION OF POSTS ONLY, NOT RPT NOT AS TALKING POINTS.

2. ARE UNGA VOTES ALL THAT IMPORTANT? MOST OF THEM ARE NOT. THE VOTES WE CONSIDER IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN ANY GIVEN YEAR RANGE BETWEEN 10 AND 20 COMMITTEE AND PLENARY BALLOTINGS. THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED IN TWO CATEGORIES:

A. VOTES WHICH AFFECT THE STATUS, LEGITIMACY OR DIPLOMATIC STANDING OF A GIVEN COUNTRY, ENTITY, DEPENDENT TERRITORY OR MOVEMENT IN A NEGATIVE OR POSITIVE WAY, E.G., GUAM, ISRAEL, KOREA, PUERTO RICO, PLO AND PERHAPS NOW THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE.

B. ISSUES INVOLVING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT WHICH WE OR OTHERS ARE TRYING TO LEGITIMIZE: PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, CONFISCATION WITHOUT COMPENSATION (LDC ISSUES); NARROW TRAVERSABLE OR TERRITORIAL SEAS, CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM, TORTURE, (US ISSUES); EVACUATION OF ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY (ARABS VS. ISRAEL, AFRICANS VS. SOUTH AFRICA).

3. WHEN SHOULD THESE ISSUES BE DISCUSSED? THEY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED REGULARLY IN THE COURSE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND BY APPROPRIATE REGIONAL BUREAU OFFICERS WITH FOREIGN AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON. THIS CAN OFTEN BE DONE BY INTRODUCING THE SUBJECT THROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE KEY UN CONCERNS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND ILLUSTRATING US RESPONSES TO THESE CONCERNS AND US EXPECTATION OF CONSIDERATION OF ITS CONCERNS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL MENTIONS THE IMPORTANCE TO IT OF THE LOCAL UNDP PROGRAM, WE MIGHT NOTE THE MAJOR SUPPORT THE US HAS GIVEN THE UNDP OVER THE YEARS IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS OF THE HOST AND SIMILAR GOVERNMENTS, AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT OUR OWN CONCERNS IN THE UN WILL RECEIVE A SIMILAR RESPONSIVENESS BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS.

4. WHY ARE YEAR-ROUND DISCUSSIONS NECESSARY? THE POSITIONS WHICH REGULARLY GOVERN THE ACTIONS OF UNINSTRUCTED REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UNGA AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ARE OFTEN SET DOWN IN GROUP DECISIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP (92 MEMBERS) AND THE G-77 (107 MEMBERS). THE POTENTIAL FOR OVERWHELMING UN VOTES THAT COMES OUT OF THESE GROUP DECISIONS MAKES IT INCUMBENT UPON US TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE FORMULATION OF THESE DECISIONS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AND WELL IN ADVANCE OF THEIR BEING TAKEN. DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS BELONGING TO THESE GROUPS, EMPHASIZING THE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US WHICH THESE GROUPS ARE APT TO CONSIDER IS NATURAL BECAUSE THESE ISSUES ARE PART OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SHOULD BE SO HANDLED, AND BECAUSE SO MANY OTHER NATIONS REGARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS THE BEST WAY TO PURSUE MANY OF THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

5. DOES THIS INVOLVE USING LEVERAGE AND DO WE HAVE ANY? THE EMPHASIS OF THE EFFORT IS ON PERSUASION. CLEARLY, WE CANNOT ARGUE THAT WE ARE MEETING ALL ARAB CONCERNS ON THE ISRAELI ISSUE, OR ALL AFRICAN CONCERNS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUES, BUT WE ARE MEETING SOME OF THE CONCERNS OF THESE COUNTRIES ON THESE ISSUES, AND MANY OF THEIR CONCERNS ON OTHER ISSUES, PARTICULARLY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT MATTERS. IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS THAT WE FEEL ENTITLED TO ASK FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION OF OUR KEY CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THESE ISSUES ARE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO THEM. THE FACT THAT WE WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORING ON AN ANNUAL BASIS THE DEGREE OF THEIR RESPONSIVENESS ON THESE SELECTED ISSUES SHOULD PROVIDE CLEAR INDICATION THAT THIS RESPONSIVENESS WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DECISIONS WE MAKE WITH RESPECT TO BILATERAL RELATIONS.

6. HOW IS BILATERAL AID LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED? IN TERMS OF ONGOING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND PROGRAMS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, WE DO NOT PLAN, AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CONGRESS WISHES US TO PLAN, TO MANIPULATE SUCH PROGRAMS IN RESPONSE TO VOTING PATTERNS. FOR THE MOST PART, OUR REACTIONS TO UNRESPONSIVENESS TO OUR CONCERNS ON UN ISSUES WILL BE EXPRESSED IN OTHER WAYS THAN THROUGH LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAMS. WE EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE RELATIVELY RARE INSTANCES WHEN NEW DECISIONS IN SUCH US PROGRAMS WILL BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED BY VOTING PATTERNS, BUT SUCH INSTANCES MAY OCCUR OCCASIONALLY. BY THE SAME TOKEN US AID PROGRAMS IN THIS CATEGORY WILL ONLY RARELY BE AFFECTED BY MULTILATERAL ACTIONS IN OPPOSITION TO THE US AND ALMOST NEVER AS A RESULT OF A SINGLE VOTE.

7. DO WE BEAR ALL THE BURDEN OR WILL ALLIED DEVELOPED COUNTRIES JOIN IN THIS APPROACH? ON ISSUES WHICH ARE AS IMPORTANT TO OUR ALLIES AS THEY ARE TO US, WE WILL ENCOURAGE A SIMILAR APPROACH; IN FACT, MANY COUNTRIES ALREADY USE THIS APPROACH. HOWEVER, ON A NUMBER OF KEY QUOTE STATUS END QUOTE ISSUES, WE GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO VOTING OUTCOMES THAN SOME OF OUR ALLIES. GUAM, ISRAEL, KOREA, PUERTO RICO, AND PERHAPS SOON PANAMA, ARE EXAMPLES. OUR ALLIES HAVE BEEN HELPFUL ON ONE OR MORE OF THESE ISSUES, BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS THEY MAY NOT CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE AS GREAT A STAKE IN THE OUTCOME AS WE DO.

8. DO WE HAVE THE LEVERAGE WHERE IT COUNTS, E.G., WITH THE LEADING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? WITH A NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WE HAVE, IN A WORLD IN WHICH RESOURCES ARE GETTING TIGHTER, MUCH MORE AT STAKE THAN UN VOTES, E.G., ALGERIA, BRAZIL, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, NIGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, VENEZUELA AND ZAIRE. WITH SEVERAL OTHERS, EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA, FOR EXAMPLE, CONSIDERATIONS OF PEACE-MAKING ARE PARAMOUNT. THEREFORE, THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR VOTING PATTERNS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THEM WILL BE OUTWEIGHED MORE FREQUENTLY THAN IN THE CASE OF STATES WHERE WE HAVE LESS AT STAKE. IN THE RARE CASES IN WHICH NEGATIVE VOTING PATTERNS SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE NEGATIVE DECISIONS ON ASSISTANCE LEVELS, IT WILL MORE LIKELY BE SMALLER COUNTRIES WHICH ARE AFFECTED. THESE COUNTRIES WILL THUS BE UNDER GREATER PRESSURE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR UN CONCERNS. HOWEVER, WE WILL, IN MANY CASES, NOT BE ASKING THEM TO ABANDON POSITIONS SUPPORTED BY THEIR LARGER NEIGHBORS. RATHER WE WILL BE ASKING THEM TO ABSTAIN FROM A POSITION HOSTILE TO US OR TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE A PRINCIPLE WHICH IS EQUALLY AS (DIS)ADVANTAGEOUS TO THEM AS TO US.

9. IS IT OUR OBJECTIVE TO BREAK UP BLOCS BY THIS PROCEDURE? IT IS NOT OUR OBJECTIVE TO BREAK UP ANY REGIONAL OR IDEOLOGICAL GROUPING. WE RECOGNIZE EVERY STATE’S RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE WITH OTHER STATES IN PURSUIT OF COMMON OBJECTIVES, WHETHER REGIONAL OR ECONOMIC. WHAT WE HAVE FOUND IN UN FORUMS, HOWEVER, IS THAT THESE GROUPINGS, PARTICULARLY THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP, ARE FREQUENTLY LED INTO ENDORSEMENT OF POSITIONS WHICH ARE ANTAGONISTIC TO US ON ISSUES WHICH ARE NOT OF MAJOR CONCERN TO MANY OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS. THIS PRODUCES PRESSURES ON COUNTRIES NORMALLY FRIENDLY TO US TO VOTE ANTAGONISTICALLY. WE WANT, THEREFORE, TO GIVE THESE STATES A STRONG MOTIVATION FOR LOOKING AT ISSUES ON THEIR MERITS AS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES RATHER THAN AS A BLOC. IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS WOULD WEAKEN THE PRACTICE OF BLOC VOTING ON SOME ISSUES, BUT WOULD NOT BE DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE BLOC OR GROUP ITSELF. TO BE FRANK, THERE IS A BETTER CHANCE TO DO THIS BY REGULAR CONTACTS WITH MODERATE SMALLER STATES SUCH AS SIERRE LEONE, GABON, ZAMBIA, ECUADOR, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE, THAN WITH SOME OF THE RESOURCE-RICH STATES SUCH AS VENEZUELA, OR ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES SUCH AS SYRIA.

10. SINCE MANY NATIONS DECIDE THEIR UN VOTES IN NEW YORK, OR AT LEAST ARE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN, WHY NOT FOCUS OUR MAIN EFFORT ON THE MISSIONS THERE? WE WANT TO CONVINCE AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE OF THOSE WHO LEAVE THEIR DELEGATES LARGELY UNINSTRUCTED THAT THIS IS NOT A PRACTICE WHICH IS IN THEIR INTEREST. IN MANY CASES, CAPITALS ARE UNAWARE OF ACTIVITIES BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE UN WHICH OFFEND US, AND IN FACT TAKE ACTION PROMPTLY WHEN INFORMED, AS OUR EXPERIENCE DURING AND AFTER THE 30TH UNGA DEMONSTRATED. IN OTHER SITUATIONS, REPEATED APPROACHES SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ABOUT SUCH BEHAVIOR AND ITS EFFECT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS CAN HAVE A CUMULATIVE POSITIVE EFFECT WHEN THE TIME COMES TO CHOOSE A NEW REPRESENTATIVE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW RESOLUTELY INSOUCIANT OR HOSTILE GOVERNMENTS, MOST COUNTRIES DO ACCEPT AT LEAST THE BASIC IDEA THAT AN INTERACTION BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHEREVER IT OCCURS GEOGRAPHICALLY, IS PROPERLY A PART OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. OUR LEVERAGE IN NEW YORK IS LIMITED IN THAT WE CANNOT QUOTE DELIVER END QUOTE IN A LOG ROLLING SENSE THE WAY THE LDC OR NAG BLOCS CAN. WE, THEREFORE, CANNOT MATCH IN NEW YORK THE INFLUENCE WE CAN EXERT BY REGULARLY CONFRONTING GOVERNMENTS IN CAPITALS WITH THE NEED TO WEIGH THEIR MULTILATERAL ACTS AND INTERESTS IN THE BALANCE OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH US. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GET NEW YORK PERMREPS INSTRUCTED TO BE CAREFUL OF OUR CONCERNS.

11. DON’T WE LOOK NEGATIVE IN PUTTING SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON DEFEATING PROPOSALS SUCH AS ON KOREA, ISRAEL, AND PUERTO RICO? WE ARE AMONG THE SMALL MINORITY OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD IN THE UN SYSTEM. THIS MEANS OFTEN BEING ON THE DEFENSIVE. BUT WE ARE ON THE POSITIVE SIDE OF MANY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND THIS SHOULD BE EQUALLY STRESSED, PARTICULARLY TO LDCS. WE HAVE ALSO MADE POSITIVE PROPOSALS ON TERRORISM, TORTURE AND POLITICAL PRISONERS, BUT THESE LATTER HAVE NOT FOUND SUPPORT IN THE THIRD WORLD.

12. IF WE ARE MOVING ON MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, WHY DOESN’T THIS PROVIDE US THE LEVERAGE WE NEED TO IMPROVE THE RESULTS ON KEY POLITICAL ISSUES? THIS FORWARD MOVEMENT DOES HELP, BUT ITS NOT ENOUGH. MANY COUNTRIES--INCORRECTLY IN OUR VIEW--VIEW THIS MOVEMENT AS SOMETHING OWED THEM BY THE DEVELOPED (QUOTE COLONIAL END QUOTE) POWERS. FOR THIS REASON AND FOR THE REASON THAT WE CANNOT MANIPULATE, ON A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BASIS DEVELOPMENTAL RESOURCES IN MULTILATERAL CHANNELS, WE NEED TO DEAL, AS MOST COUNTRIES DO, WITH KEY MULTILATERAL POLITICAL ISSUES AS AN ASPECT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AS WELL.

13. WILL AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN’S RESIGNATION AFFECT ANY OF THIS? AMB. MOYNIHAN WAS THE FRONTLINE SPOKESMAN FOR A LONGSTANDING POLICY REPEATEDLY AND PUBLICLY SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. IN ADDITION, THIS POLICY HAS BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY US PUBLIC OPINION. AMB. MOYNIHAN’S DEPARTURE IN NO WAY SIGNALS ANY CHANGE IN OUR DESIRE TO MAKE DISCUSSION OF MULTILATERAL ISSUES A MORE INTEGRAL PART OF THE CONDUCT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.
INGERSOLL

NOTE BY OCT: POUCHED BEIRUT AND SUVA.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret. Drafted by Washburn and Baker; cleared in draft in EUR, NEA, EA, ARA, AF, and AID; paragraph 6 cleared in substance in H; and approved by Lewis. Repeated to Montreal for the Representative to ICAO and to Rome for the Representative to FAO. Telegram 303856 is published as Document 35.
2. The Department responded to queries from posts about inserting multilateral issues more regularly into bilateral diplomacy.