127. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, April 26, 1972, 5:50-6:30 p.m.1 2
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
- Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to UN
- Miss Shih Yen-hua, PRC Interpreter
- Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
DATE & TIME: Wednesday, April 26, 1972, 5:50-6:30 p.m.
PLACE: New York City
The purpose of the meeting was to give the PRC an initial report of Dr. Kissinger’s discussions in Moscow from April 20-24, as Dr. Kissinger had promised the Ambassador at their meeting on April 18. This meeting was also an occasion to reply to the PRC note of April 18 which complained of a new intrusion into PRC territorial waters near Hainan Island.
General Haig: There was not much traffic in the city today.
Ambassador Huang: We came here at a very fast speed.
General Haig: I have something for the Ambassador and I understand you have something for us. Why don’t you begin and give us what you have. I’ll be prepared to discuss at some length Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow.
Ambassador Huang: I have a very short message, so why don’t we go first.
General Haig: Dr. Kissinger is very disappointed that he could not come here, but the President is giving a speech tonight and going to Florida, and he has to go with him. But he hopes to see you next week and give a more detailed report, but I can give you quite a bit this evening.
[Page 2]Ambassador Huang: He is very busy. We admire his energy. [laughter] My message is as follows [reads from note:] “The Chinese side has learned the content of Dr. Kissinger’s talk of April 18 and thanks him for the information he has made available to the Chinese side. With regard to the time of Dr. Kissinger’s visit to China in June, we would prefer June 21-25 as the tentative date.”
That is all.
General Haig: Very good. Dr. Kissinger wanted me to give you a preliminary and prompt, very prompt, report on his recent visit to Moscow.
Mr. Lord is also working on the President’s speech, so I brought Mr. Rodman along, who sat in on the meetings, all the meetings, in Moscow.
Ambassador Huang: Good.
General Haig: Dr. Kissinger hopes to visit with you here, perhaps at the end of next week. This difficulty we had this week leads me to ask whether or not if something ever develops of an emergency nature and needed a meeting between you and Dr. Kissinger, would you perhaps be willing to travel sometimes to Washington - (we could provide transportation, etc.), if perhaps it was impossible for Dr. Kissinger to leave the President?
Ambassador Huang: I will have to get instructions from my Government on this point.
General Haig: We would do this in case of an emergency, if we needed a meeting promptly but for some reason Dr. Kissinger couldn’t come. We would provide secure means for you to come, and so forth—if this is convenient for you.
As for the first order of business, I would like to reply to your message for Dr. Kissinger of April 18. You recall we said we would look into the incident of the intrusion over Hainan Island,
We have confirmed that there was an intrusion by a U.S. radio relay aircraft which inadvertently approached Hainan at the time you indicated. At the time of the incident, our radar picked up this fact as the aircraft was approaching 12 miles from the territorial boundary and we ordered it away immediately. We have forcefully reiterated our orders that U.S. aircraft must stay outside of Chinese territorial limits. We regret this [Page 3] accidental intrusion, and we are doing our very best to prevent any recurrence in the future.
Now, if I may, I would like to talk in some detail of Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow and some of the occurrences there.
You will recall, as he told you last time, he had been invited there to review preparations for the U.S.-Soviet Summit as well as the overall international situation. Despite our position and policy of turning down such invitations, on this occasion the President approved the visit because of the international situation, which had become somewhat more tense. Dr. Kissinger asked me to emphasize that the general principles that we have outlined to Premier Chou En-ial remained in full force during this visit. Nothing was discussed or agreed upon in any way which could harm the interests of the People’s Republic of China.
The main emphasis was on preparations for the Summit and on bilateral matters. Dr. Kissinger outlined our position on Vietnam as he has outlined it to your Government.
First, on the Summit, the agenda for the May meeting was discussed, covering the topics which Dr. Kissinger has outlined to you earlier. Progress was made on certain items. One very definite impression was that the Soviet leaders are very anxious that the Summit go on and that it include as many bilateral agreements as can be negotiated. For our part, we intend to go forward with the Summit, assuming the international situation does not deteriorate between now and the scheduled date. We will ourselves conclude whatever bilateral agreements we determine to be in our national interest during this meeting.
This information is very sensitive. We would hope you would confine it to yourself and Premier Chou and his closest advisers. There were significant discussions on strategic arms limitation, what we call SALT. You recall that Dr. Kissinger mentioned there were two remaining issues in the formal negotiations: (1) anti-ballistic missile limitation, and (2) the question of a freeze on submarine-launched missiles. Regarding ABM, it was a question of the number of sites for each side, and on SLBMs, it was a question of whether there should be a freeze on submarinelaunched missiles.
[Miss Shih and the Ambassador then talked back and forth about the translation of some of the terms. The word “sites” (in English) was heard. [Page 4] General Haig volunteered the spelling of it and offered to be of help if Miss Shih didn’t get it all clearly.]
On both these questions, there was significant progress, and we believe a sound SALT agreement is possible and could be concluded by or during the May trip. There are many details yet to be worked out, but it could be easily completed by the Summit.
I wish to emphasize again how sensitive this is. Because our own bureaucracy knows nothing of this either.
There were also generally inconclusive discussions on European issues. The local election in West Germany, the defection of a member of the ruling coalition, and the vote which comes tomorrow [the confidence vote in the Bundestag] were all discussed. It is obvious that the Soviets are concerned that these events in West Germany could jeopardize ratification of the Treaties and with them the overall Soviet policy in Europe.
The Soviets also expressed great interest in increased trade, with better long-term credit arrangements with the U.S. Government. Dr. Kissinger expressed interest in this and support for this, providing that the international climate was conducive to these kinds of events.
There was some discussion of other bilateral issues, which Dr. Kissinger mentioned to you in his last meeting, specifically space cooperation, cooperation on problems of the environment. Certainly there is a great prospect of progress in both these areas, and we would forsee the creation of joint commissions to carry forward the work in these areas.
Finally, there was some preliminary drafting of the joint communique for the visit. There was not enough time to finish everything.
On Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger had some very lengthy discussions with Soviet leaders. He presented the Presidents position to them—which he has also outlined to you. This presentation included the following major points:
- — The President is determined to bring the conflict to an honorable conclusion, hopefully by negotiations but if that is not possible by a very resolute pursuit of his unilateral course. This will be done at whatever the risk to other U.S. policies. [The Ambassador was impassive but somber through all of this.]
- — The U.S. side did not seek an escalation to the fighting. Our every effort has been just to the contrary—to wind down the war, end our involvement, and seek a negotiated settlement.
- — On the other hand, North Vietnam’s response to these efforts was to refuse to negotiate, and ultimately to launch a massive attack across the Demilitarized Zone and elsewhere in South Vietnam.
- — For our part, we have met this offensive with certain actions. We shall maintain this response—and perhaps other responses—until the North Vietnamese offensive is halted.
- — Despite the continuation of the enemy’s offensive, or Hanoi’s offensive, we are resuming the plenary sessions of the Paris Conference this Thursday, because the North Vietnamese have been so insistent, and we are willing to hear what they have to say. We will not on this occasion just listen to the sterile propaganda which has characterized past plenary sessions. As far as we are concerned, the first order of business is the discussion of measures designed to stop the North Vietnamese invasion. This in turn would enable us to deescalate our operations. Then we could both get on to the business of negotiating a settlement.
- — Specifically, our position is that North Vietnam must withdraw those divisions which it sent into South Vietnam since March 30, They should return to the situation as it existed then and restore the 1968 understandings. Then there should be a genuine negotiation for a peace settlement.
- — The President remains ready to be generous in the terms for a negotiated settlement. The U.S. proposals are not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
We seek a settlement fair to both sides, and therefore one that will last. But the President will not negotiate at the point of a gun. He will not allow North Vietnam to try to embarrass us. He views their offensive as a challenge not just to South Vietnam but to the institution of the American Presidency and to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
You will recall in discussions with Dr. Kissinger that he pointed out we had been going back and forth with Hanoi on the scheduling of private meetings. Our willingness to go to Thursday’s Plenary on the 27th of [Page 6] April was on the condition that a private meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Le Duc Tho would take place no later than May 2. Now, the North Vietnamese have accepted this, and Dr. Kissinger will travel secretly to Paris on May 2. At that meeting, we will press for an end of the invasion, a return to the March 30 position, and for a reestablishment of the 1968 understanding with respect to the DMZ. If the North Vietnamese will not talk seriously at that private meeting, they certainly will not talk seriously at the Plenary session. Thus if the May 2 meeting does not show real progress, we will draw the appropriate conclusions, and act on them - at the conference table, and on the battlefield.
Dr. Kissinger added to me before I left that it was very interesting to note that the Soviet side did not share our view of who was responsible for the North Vietnamese offensive.
That in general is what was covered at the meetings, and it remains to be seen what will come from those discussions.
Now, if I may, I would like to comment on one or two other topics.
Ambassador Huang: Please.
General Haig: First, on the whole, we were very pleased with the visit of your table-tennis team, and on the whole they received a very warm welcome from the American people. The President asked me to convey to you that he was especially pleased to have the opportunity to meet them, and he was impressed with their demeanor and appearance in the White House. I know there must have been some things that didn’t go as well as we both liked, but on the whole, it was a very successful visit.
We will keep you informed as we move towards the Soviet Summit. Dr. Kissinger very much looks forward to giving his personal report to the Premier on his visit in June. I will be back shortly with confirmation on the dates. We would like again to recall that we would still adhere to the general principle that we are prepared to conclude with the People’s Republic of China similar agreements to any that we might work out with the Soviet Union.
I think that concludes all the business of the day, Mr. Ambassador,
If you have anything I can bring back to Dr, Kissinger, I will see him before he goes with the President to Florida tonight.
[Page 7]Ambassador Huang: I have nothing more to discuss with you and I have no other messages to convey. I will promptly report to Premier Chou En-lai what you have said just now. I will also appreciate thanking Dr. Kissinger for the ping-pong team’s visit here.
General Haig: I hope spring in New York … the weather will be more suitable—much like the weather in Hangchow—and that you are comfortable in your new quarters.
Ambassador Huang: Thank you very much. Our new quarters are very comfortable. It is much quieter than the Roosevelt. [laughter]
General Haig: When the weather is good, the Ambassador should take a trip up the Hudson, it is very beautiful,
Ambassador Huang: We are very pleased to live in our new quarters. Because now we can change the food to suit our taste.
General Haig: You have your own kitchen now! I wish events would permit me to visit you for dinner, because I have never had better food than in China.
Ambassador Huang: Maybe next time when Dr. Kissinger goes to China you can go with him.
General Haig: No, when he goes, I have to stay.
Ambassador Huang: Ah. Well, thank you, General.
[The meeting was formally ended, and their car was summoned. The conversation started up again, however.]
Ambassador Huang: There will be a no-confidence vote tomorrow in Germany.
General Haig: They will not vote no-confidence, but there will be a vote on the question of no confidence.
Ambassador Huang: What will happen?
General Haig: It may affect his ability to deliver on the German-Soviet Treaties,
Ambassador Huang: What will the differences of the votes be?
[Page 8]General Haig: It is hard to speculate. One or two votes will decide. There have been shifts in loyalties in the coalition.
Ambassador Huang: It appears that the Soviet Union and other European countries are very concerned about it.
General Haig: Yes. The cause of the vote is economic policies, but the real cause is much more fundamental.
Is your trip here from your new quarters shorter than from the Hotel?
Ambassador Huang: Longer.
General Haig: We will rush back tonight and the President will give a speech at 10 o’clock on television. Then we send Henry to Florida to get some sun.
Ambassador Huang: There was an article by James Reston today.
General Haig: Yes! I don’t know that that will make Dr. Kissinger too popular.
Ambassador Huang: James Reston has a very high appraisal of Dr. Kissinger.
General Haig: We consider James Reston the guardian angel of our opposition party. There are some Republicans who say that if you have him for a friend, you need no enemies. [laughter]
[Their car arrived, and after hand-shakes all around, the Ambassador and Miss Shih departed.]
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, March 1, 1972-June 24, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The precise location of the conversation is not indicated. Brackets in the source text. Presumably drafted by Rodman. Shi Yen-hau was also present. See Document 122 for discussion of the April 18 Chinese note.↩
- The President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig relayed to Chinese Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s discussions in Moscow concerning President Nixon’s upcoming visit, SALT negotiations, events in West Germany, and Vietnam.↩