123. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, April 19, 1972, 10:05 a.m.-12:52 p.m.1 2

INFORMATION

May 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

  • HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

  • WINSTON LORD

SUBJECT:

  • Mansfield/Scott Reports on Their China Trip

Attached are the materials that Senators Mansfield and Scott left personally with the President when they saw him earlier this week concerning their China trip:

  • — Tab A - Senator Mansfield’s Report
  • — Tab B - Senator Scott’s Report
  • — Tab C - Memoranda of Conversations with Chou En-lai and CHIAO KUAN-HUA
  • — Tab D - the Senators’ public statement in Hong Kong about their trip
  • — Tab E - a short piece by Senator Scott, apparently given to Roscoe Drummond

There is nothing in these materials that is particularly sensitive or startling. John Holdridge is staffing this package for the President, but you may wish to leaf through it in advance.

A few quick impressions from a fast reading:

  • — Senator Mansfield’s report, which is a genuine effort to be thoughtful, basically confirms the Senator’s prior perspective of China, as well as his great concern over our Indochina policy and its possible impact on U.S./PRC relations.
  • — Senator Scott’s report is very thin gruel. One interesting fact is Chou receptivity to the Senator’s inquiry on Senator [Page 2] Magnuson and some members of the Commerce Committee visiting China to discuss trade and commerce. Also Chou’s generally positive attitude on exchanges in general.
  • — The reception for the Senators and their party was very cordial and very efficient. This was reconfirmed to me by a debriefing of the trip that I got from Ken Calloway, our contact in State who was personally tremendously impressed by Mao’s China.
  • — The conversations with Chou and Chiao did not reach great philosophic heights. The bulk of the time was spent on Indochina, with the Chinese repeating familiar positions and the Senators displaying their own divergent views.
  • Chou specifically ruled out discussions on Taiwan, on the grounds of his confidential exchanges with the President.
  • — I don’t see anything in the attached that bears out Mansfield’s emphasis in the Senate yesterday that no further progress in U.S./PRC relations is possible until Indochina is settled. The current situation since the President’s speech may be a new factor, but in the context of the Senator’s discussions in China in April, the PRC line seems to be similar to the one we have always heard, i.e. that Indochina is the “most urgent” issue for reducing tensions in the Far East.

[Page 3]

FIRST MEETING

Peking, China - April 19, 1972

CHINESE DELEGATION

Mr. Chiao Kuan-Hua, Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Minister of the Chinese Foreign Ministry

Prof. Chau Pei-yuan, Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Peking University

Mr. Chang Wen-chin, Director of Department of American and Western European and Australasian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry

Mr. Chau Ch’iu-yeh, Secretary-General of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Hu Hung-fan, Council Member of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs

Miss Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

Mrs. Tzu Chung-yun, Interpreter

Mr. Chao Chi-hua, Interpreter

Mr. Lian Cheng-pao, Stenographer

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), Majority Leader, U.S. Senate

Sen. Hugh Scott (R., Penn.), Republican Leader, U.S. Senate

Mr. Frank Valeo, Secretary of U.S. Senate

Mr. Bill Hildenbrand, Admin. Asst. Republican Leader, U.S. Senate

Mr. Norvil Jones, Staff Member - Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Meeting lasted 2 hrs. 47 mins. (10:05 a.m.-12:52 p.m.)

[Page 4]

April 19, 1972

The Vice-Minister opened by saying that contacts between the two peoples has increased since President Nixon’s visit. American businessmen (30) will be attending Canton Trade Fair and the pandas have arrived in Washington and President Nixon has received the Chinese ping pong team and understands that they were well received in U.S. cities. The Vice-Minister is very glad to see these visits occurring and feels a frank exchange of views despite differences in two systems is most beneficial. Both leaders (Scott-Mansfield) desire to exchange views on Asia and the world as well as visit various Chinese cities. The Vice-Minister welcomes the opportunity to have a frank discussion of views. 20 years of non-communication has brought many changes in the world that need discussion.

Mansfield - We have been apart too long - China cannot be ignored - China has many problems and the sooner we arrive at communication between the two countries the better both countries will be. Hope the Chinese understand the system of Democratic majority in Congress and a Republican Administration. Will do our best to answer any question and will try and be frank.

Scott - Following President’s visit there was almost a miracle. There has existed for 22 years a feeling among the American people for better relations with China, though politicians of both parties were not fully aware of the peoples’ desire - the high regard for both peoples was there all the time. Both parties endorse President’s visit and visit of the two leaders we would like to say that we laid the groundwork for other visits and exchanges, i.e., House Members, governors, mayors, cultural and athletic. Meetings such as this must not be squandered with small talk but must be meaningful and frank discussions.

Chiao Kuan-Hua - Believe differences exist but believe differences need not obstruct our coming together. We understand the system [Page 5] of two parties, this is natural, we respect your differences between parties—how you resolve them is an internal matter. Mansfield and Scott can give views of their two parties. In our party we cannot say we agree on specific issues but we are all in agreement on direction. Frank exchange of views is not to cover up but to discuss differences openly - debate of differences will be helpful - natural to have differences. I understand President has just indicated a desire to come to China in the spring - you are lucky because you are seeing China in the spring before your President.

Mansfield - Spring is the time for new life, new awakening and better understanding.

Scott - Would you comment on Nixon Doctrine long range aspects despite present unfortunate South Viet-Nam situation?

Chiao Kuan-Hua - As for Nixon Doctrine, have read it and have had it explained. At present, under existing circumstances, not in accord with Nixon Doctrine. Of course, when I say this I am not necessarily in opposition to all President does - agree to his visit - it was good.

Mansfield - As a Democrat I agree with the Nixon Doctrine call for withdrawal of U.S. troops or sizeable reduction from many parts of the world where they now exist. Due in part to vacuum created after great war, U.S. overextended, too far, too wide, too thinly. Bring about gradual withdrawal, facing up to recognition that U.S. has limited number of people and limited resources. Purpose is to make possible more people in all parts of the world to be dependent on themselves and less on others. Nixon Doctrine to take in all the world. (Mentioned NATO.) It means in Asia that the U.S. is basically a Pacific power and not an Asian power - our interest is off the mainland of Asia, not in Asia. Nixon Doctrine cannot be put in action overnight you must recognize we are facing up to political realities and economic realities ot today. Keep in mind we have much to learn compared to China - we are still in swaddling clothes - you have had much time, you have made great contributions. We will develop policies in accord with today, not yesterday. Nixon [Page 6] Doctrine has tremendous possibilities not only to the U.S. but to the rest of the world if the rest of the world will join in that understanding. We recognize the problems but do not have all the solutions - need all countries to join in to find those solutions.

Chiao Kuan-Hua - Believe many points in Mansfield statement we agree with.

Scott - Nixon Doctrine as I view it is directed toward Asia. I agree with Mansfield that what is contemplated but not active is an extension. Mansfield and I disagree with numbers of withdrawal in Europe. Desire never again to be involved in Asia. Our wish to avoid through American power or presence so that Asian countries will not call upon us to get involved. American public will more quickly approve gradual withdrawal. We speak of trends of withdrawal—your view is our commitment should be complete. Is that a fair statement?

Chiao Kuan-Hua - Believe exchange should be frank - we would like to be frank. I would like to enlarge my comments on the Nixon Doctrine. It is nearly 27 years since end of World War II and as for our view since 2nd World War U.S. has been reaching its hands out too far. And in those 27 years both Administrations in America have put forth various doctrines to cope with these situations. Preceding from personal experience - shortly after World War II I met Dulles and at that time it was the Truman Doctrine during Korean War and then Eisenhower put forth his doctrine and then in the 60’s the Kennedy Administration also had a strategy to go any place to meet any challenge. After that Johnson and during that Administration there was an expansion of war in Viet-Nam. This question is of great concern to China. Then came Nixon Administration. I would also like to say frankly our attitude has been consistent in listening to their words but watching their deeds. Would not want to dwell on past matters—although no opportunity to have friendly exchanges—many times we met as enemies. For instance, Korea - 1st Geneva Conference - 2nd Geneva Conference—during “54” Geneva Conference American representative refused to shake hands with Premier. While this belongs in the past, it is in our memory. From what the two Senators just said you have common feeling that world has changed [Page 7] and old policies cannot meet these changes. Should be said that we have noted and attached great importance that Nixon has courage to face the fact that old policies cannot meet today’s problems. Nixon also expressed desire to improve relations with China. This admittance of a changed world reflects desire to have better relations with China and have found common points in this sense. As for Nixon Doctrine, Scott asked whether we wished speedy and complete withdrawal from this area - of course, that is true - one point of difference between two Senators - once military presence is withdrawn from area that area becomes a vacuum—not so. For instance China - I have discussed with Harriman before in Geneva - he took part in Yalta Conference—what we are having now is not diplomatic but friendly—China partly in sphere of influence of U.S. and partly in sphere of influence of U.S.S.R. but more closely to U.S. But later on could also be said the U.S. had to loosen hold on China and what was the result - we both can see China did not become a vacuum. There are two super-powers—U.S. and Russia—China belongs to neither. That is one example and therefore we do not agree to the idea that once American presence is withdrawn that area becomes a vacuum - that when one super-power leaves the other one must enter. Our philosophies different, therefore there is no need to debate at great length. We also take analysis when we discuss Nixon Doctrine. Another question not ready to debate at great length, American involvement in Viet-Nam. Should be ended and we see unfortunately that this has not happened - am not prepared to debate at length - to ease tensions in Far East basic issue is Viet-Nam and the rest of Indo-China. Also in Shanghai Communique crucial question is Taiwan that obstructs normal relationship but Viet-Nam is still overriding and without settlement there can be no normalization of relationship. We believe there has been change since Nixon took office - big change. It is not to say that we agree that the present way the U.S. is handling Viet-Nam government is the way to bring results - I am not prepared to deal at great length because of differences between two Senators. As for aspect of Nixon Doctrine fixing first objective and then gradual approach to that objective - we cannot say there is not merit to that approach. Question [Page 8] of Taiwan not settled - only found some common points of view on this issue - and if on basis of these common points able to reach solution we Chinese are patient and able to wait a while. General view of Nixon Doctrine is analytical, not one monolithic piece.

Mansfield - Don’t intend to engage in debate or make public statement here - will confine to my own country. _You mentioned many doctrines - Truman Doctrine separate from Eisenhower Doctrine—any blame both parties responsible. During Truman became involved in Viet-Nam before “54” Accord. Continued under Eisenhower - maintained military advisor group in Viet-Nam. Continued under Kennedy and 16,000 troops at time of assassination - still advisors. Kennedy statement, “Be prepared to meet any challenge at any time at any place” was spoken in defense of U.S. and not foreign adventures. Under Johnson increased to 548,000 in Viet-Nam. Under Nixon reduced to 85,000 today. As we all know build-up in air and sea power because of increased activity. Deed of reduction fits into desires of President.

Scott - Further reduction by end of this month to 69,000.

Mansfield - Disagree with statement that we met as enemies numerous times - I say only a few times - Korea and Geneva Conference - not even active participant when Dulles refused to shake hands.

Scott - In 1956 at Yugoslavia reception in New Delhi did not agree with American policy but was not permitted to get close enough to Premier Chou to shake his hand.

Mansfield - Also mentioned Guam declaration - Nixon has courage to change - goes to disprove the French saying, “The more things change, the more they remain the same.” Most respectfully disagree that we should withdraw completely from this area - no actual interest in Asian mainland - must maintain peace in Pacific - not alone but hopefully with China and Japan - all have common responsibility. I dislike the word “super-power” - any sovereign nation is a power - completely surprised by your reference to Harriman and dividing China as [Page 9] spheres of influence between U.S. and Russia - never heard of it.

Chiao Kuan-Hua - One misunderstanding: that was my opinion, not that Harriman said this.

Mansfield - Unthinkable position. I was in Chungking in 1945-46 - Russia helping Kuomindong, not Mao or Chou. Is this correct?

Chiao Kuan-Hua - I say again - spirit of discussion - major issues - was reviewing history - if I didn’t express my view would not be frank - don’t think advisable to have misunderstanding in a friendly discussion - this is friendly. We on our side should proceed frankly and sometimes bluntly and give our views and you yours even bluntly - no help to mutual understanding otherwise.

Scott - This is a new experience for me since Sen. Mansfield is regarded as laconic - I revert to statement regarding present American view toward North Viet-Nam is not way to bring results it is our clear intent to withdraw subject to POW issue particularly. Nixon desires to be known as a peacemaker - time is right towards step to peace in Korea time has come - good offices of PRC and U.S. bringing about withdrawal of forces around the world as well as Korea.

Chiao Kuan-Hua - Maybe we can discuss that next time - mention one point - appreciate Mansfield statement that these talks are off record and not for public consumption. So it is important no misunderstanding - also like to mention I did not want to review past 22 years only went into historical significance in answer to question - relations between two countries has not been good and we should look forward. Like to thank both Senators very much for views although we differ, appreciate opportunity to exchange views. This is our first meeting and we do not know each other very well. Just as Scott said, not engage in small talk but discuss major issues - that is spirit of discussions - have great respect for both Senators and will not try and impose our views on you or your views on us. Am surprised by some of your views but glad to have them. Will meet again tomorrow same time.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1038, Files for the President-China Material, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China [April-May 1972]. The precise location of the meeting is not indicated on the memorandum. Lord transferred the memorandum to Kissinger under a May 12 covering memorandum that was sent for information. No classification marking appears on the memorandum of conversation. The covering memorandum is classified Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not published at Tabs A and B are Mansfield and Scott’s reports. Attached at Tab C of the covering memorandum are the memoranda of their conversations with Chou En-lai and Ch’iao Kuan-hua. The text of the first conversation is published herein and is presumably drafted by Norvil Jones, a staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Texts of the subsequent conversations are published as Documents 12426. Tabs D and E are attached but not published.
  2. NSC staff member Lord provided President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger with a brief summary of Senators Mansfield and Scott’s trip to China.