Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

104. Memorandum of Conversation, Hangchow, February 26-27, 1972, 10:20 p.m.-1:40 a.m.¹ ²

Hangchow, February 26-27, 1972, 10:20 p.m.-1:40 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter

Three Notetakers

DATE & TIME: Saturday, February 26 - Sunday, February 27, 1972

10:20 p.m. - 1:40 a.m.

PLACE: Hangchow Hotel, Hangchow

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Vice Minister, should I start?

VM Chiao: Please.

Mr. Kissinger: As you know, as I told you yesterday, we were going to give this draft today to the Secretary of State and I want to talk to you frankly. We do not need his approval to execute a communique and in normal circumstances we make these decisions regardless of the views of individual Cabinet members. In this particular case, we have not achieved our full objective if we do not succeed in mobilizing public opinion behind the policy we are trying to pursue. So, while normally we can easily survive comments from officials which are critical, in this particular case we can survive them but it will get us into side issues and the Minister must have seen when he was in the United States during the India-Pakistan crisis how a mutinous bureaucracy can get its views to the public. So we would like to gain not his acquiescence but his strong support by letting him get a sense of having done something to the communique. Now he has three suggestions on the crucial paragraph on Taiwan and I will just put them and then let us see how much we can do.

In the first sentence where it says “The United States acknowledges …” The argument is that all sounds a little ridiculous in English. So we would suggest not saying “all Chinese” but “the Chinese.” It’s in English makes almost no difference, and in Chinese it may even translate the same way. I don’t know.

VM Chiao: Mr. Holdridge, “all” means “so yu” (Chinese word).

Mr. Holdridge: It is stronger, but the difference is not all that great.

Dr. Kissinger: His argument is that it sounds silly for us to say “all” and that it sounds excessive for us to say that. We say “all” Chinese but we can say “the Chinese” which in English means almost the same thing.

VM Chiao: That’s one point. Now you will please continue.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to give you the impression that there is wild enthusiasm on his part for the whole paragraph. He wants to say instead of “does not challenge that position,” “does not challenge this.” And the third point—the last point in this paragraph—is he does not like “by the Chinese themselves” in the next sentence and he makes the same point as the President made: “on both sides of the Straits” or something like that. That’s all in this paragraph.

Then there’s an issue at the beginning that is raised. We would like to propose at the beginning—as it is now, after the introduction, you state, your position and we state ours. We propose that you state your position in the Chinese text first and we state our position in the English text first.

VM Chiao: Anything more?

Dr. Kissinger: One other point. All I am now mentioning are minor things. We have a sentence for the ceasefire line in India, for example, which I don’t think is a problem.

VM Chiao: Would you kindly give it to us?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, We would say the following: “Consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution of December 21, 1972, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire of the south Asian sub-continent and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territory and to the pre-war line in Jainmu and Kashmir.”

VM Chiao: Pre-war line. That’s rather vague.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s say ceasefire line. The trouble with that is which ceasefire line?

VM Chiao: When it says ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir then the connotation is clear.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, Let’s say that.

VM Chiao: That is immediately following what you presented yesterday?

Dr. Kissinger: We had had it at the beginning of that sentence. We would shift the sentence around. And then it would be a semicolon after this and it would be followed by what we had, which we have shortened a little bit.

VM Chiao: Anything more?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, this last point is our . . no, we have one other problem and that’s really the last one except for word suggestions here and there. Not to waste time, the argument was made that by listing commitments to two countries and not saying anything about a general attitude toward commitment we are acting ambiguously toward countries like the Philippines, and Thailand, and therefore should have a sentence in there which says that the United States will maintain its commitments … . If we can say the United States will maintain its existing commitments, then we would take it out with regard to Japan and Korea and put in some other words. What we would then do … You see, it’s also a problem for you because supposing we say these two, then every other ally in the whole Pacific will say “what about us?” and we will have to be issuing statements every day.

VM Chiao: I cannot make any immediate reaction to that suggestion.

Dr. Kissinger: But we would then take out “the existing commitments between Korea and the United States will be honored.” We would not use the word “commitment” twice and we would also take it out of Japan.

VM Chiao: I can’t immediately give an answer to that. If you were to say that it will be very obvious that first of all you will include your commitment to Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to bargain about this because I understand your problem.

VM Chiao: We pointed out our position and you yours.

Dr. Kissinger: You don’t have to argue it because I understand.

VM Chiao: The interests of our two sides, the positions of the two sides, are quite clear to each other.

Dr. Kissinger: I will make the following suggestion. We will rewrite the section on Korea and Japan so the commitment is not mentioned, so there won’t be questions why you make commitments to them and not to others. That you can’t object to.

VM Chiao: Well indeed there are so many countries in the world with whom you have treaty commitments.

Dr. Kissinger: We would say, for example, not the final language but just to give you a sense of what we would say, instead of “existing commitments between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea” we would say “the U.S. will maintain its close ties and support for the Republic of Korea.”

VM Chiao: “And support?”

Interpreter (Chi): “Will maintain its close ties and support?

VM Chiao: Please repeat.

Dr. Kissinger: “Will maintain its close ties and support for the Republic of Korea.”

VM Chiao: Anything more?

Dr. Kissinger: And then in this sentence … “the U.S. places the highest value on its …” we would take out “honor its mutual defense treaty obligations” and put in something else, “continue to place the highest value on its friendship with Japan and continue to strengthen the existing close relationship.” So no defense treaty; we haven’t mentioned the defense treaty.

VM Chiao: Any more?

Mr. Kissinger: Well, many of these we will get when we go through the text. I have one

VM Chiao: Question whether the Vietnam part, what is a just basis …

Dr. Kissinger: Have you a suggestion?

VM Chiao: So we maintain our original position that neither side use any adjective.

Dr. Kissinger: You are going to drop “firm support” then?

VM Chiao: It’s not an adjective, “firm support.” What I mean is we shouldn’t spend too much energy on.

Dr. Kissinger: “Its constant primary objective has been the peaceful solution …” What we want to say there to be precise, the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 25.

VM Chiao: That’s fact.

Dr. Kissinger: Factual. As long as we are giving you changes like this, I have one which is at the very end.

VM Chiao: Repeat this sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: “It’s constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by … represents a basis for the attainment of that objective.”

VM Chiao: It’s clear. Anything more?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. “The two sides agreed”—at the end—“that they will stay in contact through various channels.” Instead of saying the United States Government will send a senior representative, this sounds like we have made an obligation to you, so what we want to say is “through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking.” Other things we will get as we go through. When it is a word, do you want every last suggestion now?

VM Chiao: When it is a purely technical, stylistic matter, it doesn’t matter.

Dr. Kissinger: From the point of view of vanity, we favor taking out “also taking part in the discussion” and “also taking part in the talks.” In the part where it says this, could we also mention that the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei also had a useful talk? It’s a minor point. If it gives you any trouble forget it, It’s not worth a lot of effort.

I have one point which is a point of logic. On our page … on page 5 of this document, … he just explains to me that what I had in mind isn’t going to be possible. That sentence, “it is against the interest …” We agree with it. Just logically it isn’t listed among the general principles, and isn’t listed among agreements. It’s just put there between the principles and agreements and my suggestion is that it should be moved into one or the other. I think it’s not substantive; it’s a drafting suggestion.

Another possibility is … which requires less worry—it’s less elegant, is that we begin the sentence by saying “The two sides also agreed that it is against the best interest…” That may be the easiest and really all.

VM Chiao: The questions which you raised are things which we will have to study.

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize it.

VM Chiao: A 15-minute recess?

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly. I want to repeat to the Vice Foreign Minister, this is not a clever negotiating trick on our part.

VM Chiao: No.

Dr. Kissinger: We really think if some of these points could be made, it would help us achieve the objective.

BREAK—11:00 -11:28 p.m.

VM Chiao: Before expressing our views on the suggestions you made, I would like first of all to say that considering the present stage already reached in discussing the communique there are a few minor points which we feel our part would like to put forward.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

VM Chiao: That is, on the four points of common positions of the two sides. That is on these four points, the first point concerns the question of normalization of relations; the second is on the reduction of danger of international military conflict, and the third is on the question of opposition to hegemony. On this third point, we did not quite make our position quite clear yesterday. We wanted to change the words “will seek” to “neither side should seek hegemony.” But in interpreting, my interpretation was not accurate.

Dr. Kissinger: But what is the difference in meaning that you are trying to convey?

VM Chiao: Of course there is a difference between “will” and “should” because Dr. Kissinger’s English is better than ours.

Dr. Kissinger: But your subtlety exceeds mine.

VM Chiao: No, your subtlety exceeds mine. Quite to the contrary, it is not to be subtle that we want this word. It is to make it perfectly clear that whether you do want or do not want it that you should not.

Dr. Kissinger: In principle I am disposed to go along with you, but the question in my mind is that if you say neither will, then you are committed. If you say neither should then you are expressing a general moral proposition which may or may not be carried out.

VM Chiao: Well, then we said “with this principle of international relations in mind” we used the word “should,” for instance “disputes should be settled on this basis” and “the two sides agreed that … . should … .”

Dr. Kissinger: But the previous one expresses general principles, but this one expresses definite action.

VM Chiao: No, that’s not the case. For instance, when we talk about progress toward normalization of relations, what action has been taken? It’s only a direction.

Director Chang: Apart from that, the first sentence of the statement is merely a statement: “Both sides are of the view that it is in the interest …” This is merely a judgment.

Dr. Kissinger: “Neither will seek”—is that too weak or too strong for you?

Director Chang: According to the exact implication of our Chinese version, the word ying kai should be interpreted as “should” and not “will.” Of course we understand somewhat about a legalistic language, but don’t want to debate much of that now. So if you feel that as the Vice Minister was saying, we were very frank with you and it was a mistaken interpretation on my part. . if you don’t agree then we can debate on it.

Dr. Kissinger: Supposing we put in “should” and then someone asks me why this curious word is here. As I understand it, you are trying to express a moral commitment that this should not be done. In other words, you want to say more than “will.”

VM Chiao: It includes that interpretation and accurately reflects the Chinese word “should.”

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s put it aside. We’ll solve this; it can be solved. We can perhaps say it—it is awkward in English.

VM Chiao: It’s a very minor matter. Then we go on to another, also a very small question. We don’t have any major points. That is our declaration on the Taiwan question. We have a technical change and think you will understand when you hear it. It is a matter of language because when we first put forward this draft our statement on Taiwan, it was said … “and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan.” We put it in Chinese, but it meant the U.S. must withdraw all its forces and military installations from Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, of course. Will you just give us your language? It’s more poetic this way, but more accurate the other.

VM Chiao “All U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.”

Dr. Kissinger: All right. That’s fine. In fact, that’s much more correct. You are absolutely right; no problem.

VM Chiao: So that was what I was originally intending to do tonight. To discuss technical and stylistic matters.

Dr. Kissinger: So was I, and we are embarrassed.

VM Chiao: It is late evening on the 26th and this is to be published tomorrow. And this document was already agreed upon by your highest leadership and our highest leadership. And if a major change is to be suggested now, I think the consequences would be we cannot publish it tomorrow. Because some of the questions raised are quite serious. I want to discuss this matter with you and also want to reach agreement with you, and after our discussion last night at the small hours I believed then this question was already solved, and when I sent you off early this morning I was relaxed thinking we had solved this. But I cannot in a most frank way tell my colleagues; the questions you raised today indeed put us in a very difficult position. And for some of the questions, I don’t think it is possible for them to be solved tomorrow. If you persist—of course, you do have the right to persist—there is no question but you do have the right to persist on an equal basis. So now, what after all, are your intentions now?

For instance, your argument on the Taiwan wording, how long we have discussed it. We have spent so much energy from your first visit in July; we spent so much time on this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

VM Chiao: And in our five days of discussions in Peking our energies were primarily devoted to the Taiwan question—and we didn’t spend much time on any other question—because the Taiwan question is indeed the crucial question between us.

I would like again to tell my colleague Dr. Kissinger that what has characterized our relations has been sincerity and frankness. And it is in this spirit that I want to say that we cannot consider the suggested changes in the wording of this Taiwan case. That originally is where we were. So you say you have difficulties. So we went back then you advanced forward, and then you said an agreement is reached and both of us were happy and then in the last five minutes you raised it again and we cannot do it now.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, I understand what you are saying. These difficulties rise from the fact that I did not persist in my proposal to have Marshall Green present because my colleagues do not know with what sincerity and anguish you have worked, and the problems you have had. When I discuss your problems, they ascribe it to my inadequacy rather than to anything else. I am speaking with the frankness with which we speak to each other. And the reason I raise it at all is to get their willing cooperation in defending it before the Congress and our public.

VM Chiao: Precisely. It is because we want to take into account these reasons you advanced that we made concession after concession on this.

Dr. Kissinger: You did, I agree.

VM Chiao: Your President personally put forward a proposal yesterday and we asked for instructions from our Prime Minister. Our Prime Minister accepted it. Now you want to change it; that I cannot do. As you often said, and as the President often says, we must establish mutual trust. If there is no such mutual trust what is the sense of having this piece of paper? So Dr, Kissinger, I think the matter now is very serious. You have pressed me to a corner. And now we attach great importance to this work and have adopted a very positive and cooperative attitude in hoping to succeed in this communique. Why is it that we do this? Because to do this conforms to the needs of both sides, not just to the needs of one. Isn’t that so?

Dr. Kissinger Yes.

VM Chiao: So I will reply to you very clearly. If you persist in your position there will be no need for further discussions tonight. And we will discuss it again tomorrow and the result will be no communique. That is so because Chairman Mao had made it very clear to Mr. Edgar Snow that it is our policy that it is all right whether the meeting with President Nixon is successful or not. We will still consider this visit to be fruitful. But please don’t misunderstand. We still hope to have a communique. But I must sincerely hope you will not persist in your suggestions. You know, Dr. Kissinger, the sentiments of all Chinese are very strong on the Taiwan question. I am restraining myself to the utmost. We have to do much work with our people to enable our people to accept even this. So I am being most frank. If you feel you have to persist in this, let us not continue tonight.

Why is it I agreed yesterday that you may tell the press there is a communique? I thought we had solved our main problems. If I had not believed this I could not have let you tell the press there would be a communique. You really put me in a dilemma. I cannot agree. So I must sincerely hope you will reconsider.

If you feel that you need not persist in these suggestions then we may continue our discussions tonight, Otherwise I suggest we recess. Of course, whether it be a person, a nation or a state, if it is forced to a corner it will resist. So what do you think? Everyone is very tired: We are very tired; you are very tired. As I said, your suggestions on the Taiwan question are unacceptable. All three are. Cannot be. Not a matter of words. I can well make a long statement and I am able to make speeches.

Then, as for the suggestion about the order of the statements of the two sides, we could consider, when you publish it whether it be English, Chinese, or any other translation, you can put your statement first, and when we publish it, whether in English, Chinese or any other translation, our statement can come first.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s acceptable.

VM Chiao: That we can consider. But I still have to say with regard to this point too, I still have to report to the Prime Minister and you have to report to the President. So the first point, on the Taiwan case, we cannot agree to any of the three. The second point, about order of statements, we may consider. The third point we find we can agree, that is on having a clause on talks between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister in accordance with the concerns you advanced, and it also reflects a fact. Of course, on the one hand you do have your difficulties here and also it’s a fact.

And then the fourth is the question of the commitments. I am inclined to not have any change. Because time is too late. And for any changes to be made even in such cases, its rather difficult. Because I am being most frank with you, that is for such a big change by you to be made in the communique, then our Prime Minister will still have to consult leading personages of the Central Committee and how can there be time for that? When you mentioned the time for publishing of the communique, although at that time I hadn’t reported to the Prime Minister, but it was my feeling the Prime Minister’s spirit would be he is willing to consider what is most effective.

Dr. Kissinger: It makes no difference. We can do it late tomorrow.

VM Chiao: But if you are to make such a major change, even though we are all still in China, it would be very difficult. I can tell you that after our meeting at the small hours this morning our government engaged in a very serious and earnest discussion on this draft.

Director Chang: This is the first communique ever published between China and the United States. It is of great importance.

VM Chiao: I am saying all this without any reservations. So if you want to insist on such changes,then there is that danger that there will be no guarantee as to whether there will be time for itor not.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Minister, I want to speak to you with the same frankness with which you have spoken to me.

VM Chiao: Let me finish.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, I thought you had.

VM Chiao: Then, as far as your suggestion about “including the sending of a senior U.S. representative,” we could agree to that. And then we can also agree to deleting that “taking part in Chinese …” And then on your suggestion about the question of any major country colluding with another I believe your suggestion is merely from the point of view of structure. Isn’t that so?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

VM Chiao: This is a point which we could of course consider. If it’s only that question, I don’t think the problem is very big. So the question again is the crucial question, Taiwan. Another major question is that of the commitments regarding Korea and Japan. Now I would like to hear your views. I made my position clear and we do not like to engage in senseless debates. We must be practical.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Minister, first of all, I understand your position and I think it is reasonable on the issue of Taiwan. I believe you have made major steps and as I pointed out, the difficulty arises from the fact that unless people have been physically present at the talks, a paragraph when it is read cannot possibly reflect the anguish that went into it, And I also recognize that Taiwan has special sensitivity to you and therefore I can understand the intensity of your feelings. My motive in raising these issues is to prevent what can become a very bitter debate in America and to keep from happening what happened at the time of the India-Pakistan crisis. A major department pursued a deliberate policy of undermining our credibility. However, considering the fact that you did give me the opportunity to take this document to the President myself, I believe perhaps I should not persist in the proposal on Taiwan. I must tell you frankly, the advantage to us of substituting the word “the” for “all” is so out of proportion to the meaning that I simply want to mention it, but I can see that I should not persist in it.

Director Chang: I don’t agree to that, but don’t want to debate with you at this moment. I don’t want to waste time now.

Dr. Kissinger: Now, on the other point, there I feel frankly your position is not so reasonable. Because we have not in effect made a serious effort to correct your statements on your version. We are not changing the sense of what we are saying.

VM Chiao: Let me interrupt a moment. The reason for the interruption is to make clear my position. That is to say most frankly, unless on this point you are able to give us right away an explicit wording, otherwise I fear very much.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we will give you an explicit wording now.

VM Chiao: Then let us put this question aside.

Dr. Kissinger: We will give you an explicit wording this minute. On Korea we will say: “The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea.” That is all we will say here and then semicolon, “The United States will support efforts …” This is negotiated. Next when we talk about Japan, “The U.S. places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to strengthen the existing close bonds.”

Interpreter (Chi): And then South Asia?

VM Chiao: And then the South Asia clause?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, let me read you. “Consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire in the South Asian subcontinent and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories, and to the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmire; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry,” Just stylistic, no substantive change.

VM Chiao: You wish to put it this way in your statement?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

VM Chiao: There is nothing very strong here, any strong views here. That is, with the exception of mentioning the December 21 resolution of the Security Council and thereby indirectly mentioning India and Pakistan, you didn’t mention India and Pakistan at all. But there is no pressures about that. If you want to say that, we have no strong views. You mentioned Korea, Japan and Vietnam, but what about South Asia? You didn’t mention the name of a country in South Asia. This makes it seem that you have no interest in their status. But please don’t attach too much importance to our words; we never want to play any trick.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no, no, no. You didn’t make the point yesterday unfortunately.

VM Chiao: But you had no formulation yesterday.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, it’s our formulation, but we are asking for your view. Do you think it would straighten it if we said “withdrawal of all Indian and Pakistani military forces”?

VM Chiao: That is your decision. But if you ask my views, I think it is better to mention them. Or you can mention it this way, or that way, or not mention them at all.

BREAK—12:25 - 12:30 a.m.

VM Chiao: On India and Pakistan you preliminarily said that would be the wording.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, you know our policy anyway.

VM Chiao: “The South Asian subcontinent…” Maybe we should say “of a ceasefire between India and Pakistan.”

Dr. Kissinger: Once we have said “between India and Pakistan” we can leave out “of all military forces,” Don’t you think?

VM Chiao: Whatever you think. In Chinese we favor more redundancy. If you decide it in this way it will facilitate our work.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s decided.

VM Chiao: No reporting to our superiors?

Dr Kissinger: It’s decided.

VM Chiao: And then, what about our points that neither will seek hegemony or neither should seek hegemony—there is a question of mistaking interpretation ?

Dr Kissinger: Yes, my only problem is it just doesn’t make any sense in English. It makes no difference because if you are going to seek hegemony or we are going to seek hegemony, you won’t be able to wave a piece of paper and say we are doing something illegal.

VM Chiao: But here, frankly speaking on this point, the policies of the two countries are different. Your view toward your policy and our view toward your policy is different and contrary-wise it might be said the same of our policy. Speaking most frankly, certain policies which you had adopted in the past, you may not have considered seeking hegemony, but we cannot guarantee it was not an attempt to seek hegemony. Nor can we guarantee it in the future. But on the other hand, that principle the United States could also apply to us. So what is the impression we do not want to create. We do not want any person to think we can guarantee on your behalf, or you can on ours in some sense, that we did not exercise hegemony in the past and will not in the future.

Dr. Kissinger: In English, let me just say it means statement of intention by each side for itself that it will not exercise hegemony.

Director Chang: But as this is something in common we think that whether it be in Chinese or in English, the words “should” should be used.

Dr. Kissinger How about “intends.” “Should” just doesn’t make any sense in English. That’s my problem with it. It’s almost meaningless that way.

VM Chiao: But of course this was started out as a mistake in translation and if we had raised this point early it might have been solved and you also expressed that you wouldn’t consider it a matter of great importance. So can we not compromise and use the word “neither should?”

Dr. Kissinger: But I am assuming in the previous sentence my suggestion of yesterday has not been accepted to strengthen the wording.

VM Chiao: Yes, we made it very plain we could not accept it. But even as it is in these sentences we did take in some of your views. Now for instance in the fourth sentence we accept it “with the other” in order to take into account the needs of the English language. Actually, from our side our original thought was when you came there was only one point of disagreement. That was our thought when you first came.

Dr. Kissinger: When I first came here?

VM Chiao: No, when the President first came.

Dr. Kissinger: You can’t blame me for having some difficulties with a proposition I have never heard.

VM Chiao: I don’t quite understand the implication of what you said.

Dr. Kissinger: You said you thought we only had differences about Taiwan when I came. I assume you mean when I came with the President.

VM Chiao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with you, but this is not an issue we are raising.

VM Chiao: And I said I admit our mistake.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, but …

VM Chiao: It was after another re-checking with the Chinese that we discovered we made this mistake in translation. Premier Chou En-lai himself told us “will” cannot be accepted; it should be “should” according to the Chinese. Because we must treat each other on a basis of equality. Chinese, too, should have a restraining effect, as should the English.

Director Chang: The mistake was made in the translation. We admit it. But it is not a change and our position is the same. It is merely to change the interpretation.

Dr. Kissinger: This was originally our sentence; we introduced this sentence.

VM Chaio: Our intention was “should” but I made the mistake in the translation of the word “will.”

Dr. Kissinger: The American illusion is that disagreements arise because people don’t understand each other. The fact is disagreements arise because they understand each other very well.

VM Chiao: That appears to be correct, and also incorrect. I am a legalist. “Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony.”

Dr. Kissinger: You want to keep open the option of accusing us of exercising hegemony.

Director Chang: Exactly, and we give you the same option on an equal basis. You cannot expect to say your way in Indochina is anything against … . You cannot expect us to say nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay, let’s accept this. All right. How should we proceed?

Director Chang: About the Taiwan clause, then you withdraw these points? With regard to the clauses on Taiwan and Japan—frankly speaking at the present moment we are not absolutely sure of the precise implications. So we cannot say at the moment. So if this wording is insisted on we cannot be sure what will be the result.

Dr. Kissinger: We each have our difficulties. I don’t see what purpose of yours is served by myself, who has the major responsibility for this being, being destroyed when I come back for statements that could be modified. But in that case we will just have to wait till tomorrow.

VM Chiao: I think there is a misunderstanding here. I just would like to say this: prior to the final ratification by the leaders of our two countries, can it be that you and I will both resolve with this reservation that it is not finalized until our leaders do. So let us solve the remaining questions, just you and me. Then after talking about the meeting between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai, we can say Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei also hld useful talks.

Then the question of the change of commitments, the wording will be as you have handed over for the time being.

Director Chang: And I, for the sake of better understanding, would like to say, we understand your intention of not saying “commitment.” The question is we are not certain about a point.

Dr. Kissinger: On the other hand, it does not refer to existing obligations.

VM Chiao: “It will continue the existing relationship.” Something in abstract terms instead of relationship?

Dr. Kissinger: How about “foster?

Interpreter (Chi): “It will continue to foster the existing close bonds.”

VM Chiao: “Continue to maintain”?

Dr. Kissinger: I tell you why I like a word other than “maintain.” We don’t want this to be a synonym for treaty” and don’t want people to say “why did you say it here and not there?” “Foster” is an active word; less than strengthen.

VM Chiao: Something in general terms.

Dr. Kissinger: “Foster” is not in English a very strong word.

VM Chiao:“… foster the Japanese militarists.”

Dr. Kissinger: “to promote”?

(VM Chiao suggested another word.)

Mr. Kissinger: I would prefer “strengthen.” We have relations in the previous … .

VM Chiao: Your original word is “honor.”

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but there we are talking about a legal obligation—we are here not talking about a legal obligation.

Mr. Lord: “Cherish”?

Dr. Kissinger: He’s getting silly. “To develop”?

Mr. Holdridge: “To expand”?

VM Chiao: With better English I will conquer you.

Dr. Kissinger: You have already conquered me. I hope you are listening in on my telephones, because then you will know what I am up against. I hope very much, not you personally, but … .

“Will develop” is not a strong word. We have a great ability; no one who hasn’t sat through these meetings would believe what we can do with words. You don’t have to like this. This is our statement. There are a lot of things in your statement we don’t like.

VM Chiao: Just telling you about our feeling. How about “honor and obey.”

Director Chang: How about “reduce”?

Mr. Lord: You must be kidding.

Dr. Kissinger: I think you can explain it on the grounds that we are using a slightly more active verb and a slightly less active noun.

VM Chiao: We will just tell you our thinking and put that aside. Not to create new possible trouble, but still to have to publish tomorrow. That’s still our hope.

Dr. Kissinger: So is it ours. So we use “develop.”

Director Chang: We leave it for you to … .

Dr. Kissinger: Take any one of them?

Director Chang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Except cherish?

Director Chang: Foster, develop … .

Dr. Kissinger: I am slightly torn because I think if we don’t agree we can have another night session and publish it the next morning. All right, lets leave it aside and let Mr. Chang pick one of the three verbs. Shall we continue while Mr. Chang reflects?

VM Chiao: At the beginning of that paragraph, “the two sides agree that it is … .”

Dr. Kissinger: It just doesn’t make any sense otherwise—has no substantive meaning.

VM Chiao: At this stage, it is our inclination if possible not to change it at all—keep it as is. A matter of structure.

Dr. Kissinger: But every other statement says . . It is now there without reference to anything. You said you would consider it, and it doesn’t make any …

VM Chiao: I am just thinking out loud again on this matter. It is not very accurate, but we might consider putting it at the end, after these four points. Then we might use wording like this “both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world, or for major countries to divide up spheres of interest in the world.”

Dr. Kissinger: Is that supposed to be better English?

VM Chiao: Just keep it as it is?

Director Chang: To divide up the world into … .

Dr. Kissinger He’s terribly subtle; you have a good point. That’s a very good point. I know what he’s trying to say.“… or for major countries to agree on spheres of interest among each other.” He does have a good point. I would support you; you have a good point.

Interpreter (Chi): To carve out spheres of influence.

Dr. Kissinger: If you say “carve out” it becomes unilateral. His mind fascinates me. If he is willing to say “both sides are of the view,” I don’t much care where it is placed. We can put it at the end of the four points. It’s more logical there. Logically, it just doesn’t fit here because we say with these principles in mind—what principles?

VM Chiao: Let us decide something ourselves. It will be at the end of the four points. Do you think Mr. Chang is being frivolous?

Dr. Kissinger: Before we get to Taiwan. The trouble with him is he always knows what he’s doing. He’s not frivolous; a nuisance, but he’s never frivolous.

VM Chiao: How about “to divide up areas of the world into spheres of influence,” We are not discussing a document but are engaged in a philosophical argument. Actually “areas of the world” doesn’t help us much. We keep the original?

Dr. Kissinger: We keep the original and we understand we are also opposed to dividing up areas. It’s a very subtle point and maybe something will occur to us by tomorrow morning. I think we should get this typed up and run through it tomorrow morning just to be absolutely sure.

VM Chiao: That’s all right.

Dr. Kissinger: I have just one other suggestion. At the end of page 7, every excluded field is going to scream it is being left out so I suggest we say “they discussed exchanges in such fields as …” so this is just demonstrative. We don’t want this to be an inclusive list.

VM Chiao: At this end they discussed specific areas in such fields as …

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, then this way we don’t have to discuss education… One last change, in the last sentence, we want to include Mrs. Nixon. Say President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon, and the American party …

VM Chiao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We have one other change and that is literally the last one—where it says the leaders of China … we want to say the Peoples Republic of China. In the rest of the document we use China, but here… . Page one, “the leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the …” Leave out the middle names.

VM Chiao: All the middle names?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, mine too. If there is a change I will check it tomorrow. One other slight suggestion … . Add to “accompanied by” … “and other American officials.”

VM Chiao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Now, how should we proceed, because I do want to discuss the press briefing with you before I give it.

VM Chiao: We will do that.

Dr. Kissinger: Tomorrow?

VM Chiao: When?

Dr. Kissinger: As soon as we get to Shanghai?

VM Chiao: The most important things will be finalized by the President and the Prime Minister. As to specific wordings, we can see to it it is a very beautifully worded document.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, how shall we do it?

VM Chiao: Now this communique is fixed between you and me, and now ve will hand it over to our President and our Prime Minister and let us hop they can finalize it tomorrow morning. And for the sake of an early completion of this work, if necessary may we meet once again just for a shot time?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it’s going to be an American press conference on Chinese soil. I want to be fair with you and to make sure I don’t say anything that’s embarrassing to you. And I want to tell you what I intend to say in introducing it, what the certain questions will be and how I intend to answer them.

VM Chiao: Let us do two pieces of work tomorrow morning. First to se if we can finalize this communique tomorrow morning, and then when we have finalized it tomorrow morning the other work will be much easier. And when it is finalized we will discuss how you tell your press.

Dr. Kissinger: When is all this going to happen? I don’t feel that I must go to the industrial exhibition.

VM Chiao: Surely we can delete that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will get this typed tonight. You will be on the airplane?

VM Chiao: Also then, or on the plane tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. So they can’t do it on the plane. Must they do it?

VM Chiao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay, so we go straight from the plane to a meeting place?

VM Chiao: Yes, we can do it. It will probably be very tight. Or early tomorrow morning to meet here.

Dr. Kissinger: What is your definition of early? We will be in Shanghai, at 10:00. If we go immediately to whatever meeting place you designate we can settle this in half an hour. I expect that we will just read it through tomorrow.

VM Chiao: You know our Chinese typing is more difficult than yours. Of course what we want to be able to do is to type out a complete copy in Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: After we are finished, you mean?

VM Chiao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will agree, then get a copy typed. While the copy is being typed, you and I discuss the press conference.

VM Chiao: See how much time we spend on a single word like “foster” or “strengthen” or something like that. We spent about an hour. Although I am a perfectionist I am quite against this perfectionism. It is really not easy.

Dr Kissinger: What do you suggest? What is the practical solution?

VM Chiao: As soon as we arrive in Shanghai we will meet.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to meet to discuss questions for the press conference in any event. We will have a text and in our text we will put the American position first. And everything that is published by the U.S. will have the American side first; everything that is published by the Chinese will have the Chinese side first.

VM Chiao: About that, who is first, only applies to these two paragraphs, nothing else.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh no, on Taiwan you go first. It only applies to pages 2, 3, and 4.

VM Chiao: Just these two paragraphs.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it emphastically does not include anything else. It begins from the top of our page 2 to the top of page 5.

VM Chiao: All right.

Interpreter (Chi): The Vice Minister emphasizes it has to be agreed upon by our two leaders. Both sides consider this to be an important document. And for our side, we are being very serious. What was discussed and agreed upon by us yesterday was discussed and approved by our leaders Of course, I am aware your system is different from ours, so please don’t think I had any other idea in mind when I expressed my views. Because I really had that apprehension.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand this. At the same time, if you can agree to this it will help so much in getting a friend to put this to our people that having to spend another night is worth it.

VM Chiao: I agree to this working method. Once we arrive in Shanghai we will meet.

Dr. Kissinger: Good, and you arrange where we go and so forth.

Director Chang: … . words, “cherish,” “promote,”… .

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s take one and get it over with. “Develop.”

Director Chang: Another word. How about “preserve.”

Dr. Kissinger: You prefer “develop”?

VM Chiao: We prefer “develop.” You are not agreeing to it … just …

Dr. Kissinger Let us say “develop.” If over the night you come up with something else we will still consider it.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, Country Files, Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic of China during the Presidential Visit, February 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; presumably drafted by either Lord or Howe. Ellipses in the source text. The meeting was held at the Hangchow Hotel.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua that Secretary of State Rogers had suggested three minor changes to the Taiwan portion of the communiqué. Ch’iao refused to agree to the changes on Taiwan since both President Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had already accepted the wording on February 26.