Office of the Historian

420. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, April 20, 1976.1 2

Washington, April 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
6846 (redo)
ACTION

April 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT [BS initialed]

SUBJECT: NSSM 225: U.S. Policy Toward Thailand

In response to NSSM 225, a review of U.S. policy toward Thailand has been completed. The resulting inter-agency study (Tab B, with Agency views at Tabs D, E, F) outlines U.S. interests and objectives, and presents policy options aimed at achieving these objectives. (You have already decided the policy questions on the retention of military forces and intelligence facilities in Thailand after March 20, 1976 [Tab C]).

Current Situation in Thailand

In apparent response to domestic political pressure, the Thai Government asked us to withdraw all our remaining military forces by July 20, 1976. In the April 4 Parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Khukrit lost his seat and a new Prime Minister will come to power. Despite this change, Embassy Bangkok considers a reversal of the Thai decision on our force withdrawal unlikely. Even were that to take place, the Embassy believes our remaining would spark violent demonstrations in Bangkok which could force us to leave anyway. Should the new coalition government prove weak and unable to provide firm leadership, it is probable that the Thai military, after a decent interval, will take control of the government by force. While these military leaders would most likely permit at least some of our forces to remain, our withdrawals should be well advanced by then and complete reversal would be difficult. Additionally, a military takeover, let alone an RTG decision to permit U.S. forces to stay in Thailand, could cause political violence in Bangkok.

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U.S. Objectives

In the wake of events in Indochina, the study has identified the following U.S. objectives which remain valid even though the Thai have asked us to withdraw our remaining military forces:

  • — An independent and non-Communist Thailand.
  • — Increased Thai support for U.S. positions in international fora, such as the UN and such specialized assemblies as the Law of the Sea conference.
  • — Continued Thai support for peaceful change and general stability in Asia.
  • — Continued access to Thai markets for U.S. suppliers and investors Expanded Thai-U.S. trade.
  • — Continued and increased Thai interest in anti-narcotics programs; and access to Thailand for U.S. anti-narcotics intelligence programs.
  • — Friendly and mutually beneficial Thai-U.S. relations.

Policy Options

All agencies agree that we should adopt the following policies toward Thailand:

  • — Continue a security assistance program whose grant MAP component will decline from the FY 75 level.
  • — Not hinder the Thai in their efforts to adjust to new relationships with their Communist and non-Communist neighbors, and with us.
  • — Focus our bilateral economic aid program on problems of the poorer rural areas.
  • — Improve U.S.-Thai trade and access for U.S. businessmen and investors in the Thai market through the following:
  • - Point out to the Thai those steps necessary to create a favorable investment climate.
  • - Insist on a genuinely reciprocal aviation agreement, and not attempt to compensate the Thai for their own failure to exploit fully their aviation rights and opportunities.
  • - Continue to advise the Thai of our stockpile disposals and of our PL-480 sales in traditional Thai markets.
  • — Support anti-narcotics activities in Thailand through the following:
  • - Gather intelligence to the fullest extent possible on narcotics trafficking in Thailand.
  • - Work with the Thai to reduce the amount of illicit opium produced in Thailand.
  • - Cooperate with the Thai in suppressing narcotics traffic in and through Thailand.
  • — Continue to conduct information, cultural, and Peace Corps programs designed to demonstrate that good relations with the United States are advantageous to Thailand.
  • — Reduce the size and tighten up the organization of our official presence to make it more in tune with our reduced activities in Thailand.

Decision Memorandum

At Tab A is a proposed directive outlining our policy toward Thailand based on the agreed study.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my signing the memorandum at Tab A.
APPROVE [GRF initialed]
DISAPPROVE

  1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, NSDMs, NSDM 327, U.S. Policy Toward Thailand (1). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which, once signed, became NSDM 327. (See Document 421) Not published are Tab B, attached, the undated NSSM 225 paper, which is summarized in Document 409; and Tab C, not attached, which is likely Kissinger’s memorandum of October 24, 1975 on force reductions in Thailand, printed as Document 411. Not published are Tab D, attached, a memorandum from Colby to Kissinger of October 23; Tab E, attached, a memorandum from Ingersoll to Kissinger of October 27; and Tab F, not attached, a memorandum from Clements to Scowcroft of November 4. (Ibid., Box 36, NSSMs, NSSM 225, Review of U.S. Policy Toward Thailand [3])↩
  2. In response to NSSM 225, Scowcroft recommended that Ford approve a memorandum setting U.S. policy toward Thailand.↩