Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

412. Telegram 282411 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, November 29, 1975, 0120Z.¹ ²

November 29, 1975, 0120Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
282411

DRAFTED BY EA/TB:GBROBERTS
APPROVED EA:PCHABIB
S/S - OJ. HOGANSON
S - J. COVEY

0 290120Z NOV 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE

NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TH, US

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAI’S LUNCH WITH THE SECRETARY

1. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED TO CHATCHAI OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN THAILAND AND OUR POLICY OF SUPPORTING NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. CHATCHAI ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE IN MODERNIZING, REORGANIZING, AND RE-EQUIPPING THE THAI ARMED FORCES. HE ASKED THAT THE PRESIDENT MAKE A SHORT REFUELING STOP ON HIS WAY FROM PEKING TO INDONESIA. END SUMMARY

2. IN HIS NOV. 26 LUNCH FOR THAI FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAI, THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. WAS STILL INTERESTED IN THAILAND AND VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE SUPPORT THAILAND HAD GIVEN DURING THE VIET-NAM WAR. HE REGRETTED THE OUTCOME OF THAT WAR. HE SAID THAT U.S. POLICY WAS STILL TO SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. WE SAW VIET-NAM AS THE MAIN THREAT TO THAT INDEPENDENCE.

WE WOULD THUS SUPPORT THE GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS AS A BARRIER TO VIETNAMESE DOMINANCE. CHATCHAI SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS TACTIC AND WITH THE SECRETARY’S SUGGESTION THAT THE CHINESE BE URGED TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

3. THE SECRETARY ASKED THAT CHATCHAI MAKE CLEAR TO THE CAMBODIANS THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM. THE EVENTS IN CAMBODIA IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE END OF THE WAR WERE UNFORTUNATE, BUT WE WERE STILL INTERESTED IN REPAIRING OUR RELATIONSHIP IN AN EFFORT TO SUPPORT CAMBODIAN INDEPENDENCE.

4. CHATCHAI ASKED FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN EQUIPPING THE THAI ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF AMMUNITION MANUFACTURING SELF-SUFFICIENCY. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN OUR MAP AND FMS CREDIT PROGRAMS, AND THAT HE SAW NO REASON WHY THESE RESOURCES COULD NOT BE USED IN THE WAY CHATCHAI SUGGESTED. CHATCHAI SAID THAT THAILAND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING AN AMMUNITION FACTORY WHICH COULD SUPPLY ALL THE ASAEN COUNTRIES. HE ALSO ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE IN TURNING UTAPAO INTO AN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND MENTIONED THE COLLINS AND LOCKHEED INVESTMENT PROPOSALS. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED OUR PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS, BUT STRESSED THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN THAILAND AND WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS PLACED UPON US.

5. CHATCHAI ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT COULD MAKE A SHORT REFUELING STOP AT BANGKOK ON HIS WAY FROM PEKING TO INDONESIA. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE THAI PEOPLE SAW THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ONLY GOING TO THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA, THE IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS THAT WE WERE RE-DRAWING OUR DEFENSE LINE SO AS TO EXCLUDE THAILAND. THE SECRETARY ASSURED CHATCHAI THAT THE THAI PEOPLE SHOULD DRAW NO SUCH CONCLUSION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE SUGGESTION OF A BANGKOK REFUELING STOP BUT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT’S SCHEDULE WAS VERY TIGHT.

7. THE SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR THAT NONE OF THE FORMER INDOCHINESE MILITARY EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO CAMBODIA, LAOS, OR VIET-NAM. CHATCHAI DID NOT INDICATE HE WAS THINKING OF DOING SO. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE TALK TO THE OTHER SIDE ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT. HE DID NOT OBJECT WHEN THE SECRETARY ASKED IF WE COULD TAKE SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT OUT OF THAILAND BUT DID COMMENT THAT IT WAS ALL IN POOR CONDITION.

8. CHATCHAI ASKED FOR U.S. HELP IN INCREASING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THAILAND AND ALSO ASKED THAT THE U.S. NOT COMPETE WITH THAILAND FOR RICE EXPORT SALES TO SOUTH ASIA. THE SECRETARY MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN TO RE-EMPHASIZE OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN THAILAND AND OUR DESIRE TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO BE OF ASSISTANCE.

9. THE SECRETARY AND CHATCHAI AGREED THAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN VERY FRIENDLY AND HAD COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF THAI-US RELATIONS. IN A CURBSIDE INTERVIEW WITH AP, CHATCHAI SAID THAT THE TALKS WERE VERY FRIENDLY, THAT THAI-US RELATIONS WERE GOOD, AND THAT THE US WAS HIS “SECOND HOME.” KISSINGER

1. Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, June 1974–February 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. The Department of State reported on Kissinger’s lunch with Chatchai.