409. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 225 Working Group, Washington, undated.1 2
National Security Study Memorandum 225
REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THAILAND
SUMMARY
In the wake of the collapse in Indochina, Thai-U.S. relations remain friendly but are becoming less intimate. In this new situation, we still believe it is in our interest that Thailand be independent, stable, and prosperous. We also think that we have an interest in Thailand’s playing a constructive role in Southeast Asia, that she support our efforts to build a peaceful world, that we be able to trade with and invest in Thailand, and that the flow of illicit narcotics from and through Thailand be reduced.
Since Thailand no longer thinks it is in her interest to be closely aligned with the U.S. as she has been in the past, several issues arise on which policy decisions are needed. There is the question of our force levels in Thailand, our use of intelligence facilities in Thailand, our attitude toward the Thai constitutional experiment, and our attitude toward Thai efforts to work out new international relationships.
In making decisions on these issues several specific U.S. objectives should be kept in mind. In the political and security field, we would like to be able to use military bases in Thailand with the least possible restrictions, we would similarly like to be able to use our intelligence facilities on Thai soil, we would like Thai support in international fora, and we would like Thai support for peaceful change and general stability in Southeast Asia. In the economic field we would like Thailand to remain a major food exporter, while in the economic and commercial area we would like to have continued and even expanded trade and investment relations with Thailand. In the fight against illicit narcotics, we would like to have Thai cooperation in bilateral and [Page 2] multilateral anti-narcotics programs, and we would like to have access to Thailand for unilateral U.S. anti-narcotics intelligence programs. On ideological grounds, we would like to have good relations with Thailand not only because it is one of Asia’s few representative governments but also as an example to other Third World countries that a good relationship with the U.S. can be beneficial.
The Thai internal setting — an important part of the environment in which U.S. policy decisions must be made — is characterized by some basic long-term strengths. The country did not undergo a formal colonial experience, and its fundamental political and religious institutions are still intact. The Thais are thus less susceptible to “revolutionary” blandishments. The economy is in better shape than most developing countries; Thailand is a food exporter. On the other hand, modernization is creating social and psychological strains. The unevenness of income distribution is a major problem. After almost thirty years of relatively benevolent military dictatorship, the country is experimenting with parliamentary democracy, and political system is still fragile. Thailand has had to cope with small-scale, communist-inspired insurgency in rural areas for over ten years.
Externally, the Thais are trying to adapt to the new situation in Southeast Asia. They see the need for accommodation with the Vietnamese, but they have been encouraged by what they consider to be indications of possible Chinese Communist support in a military confrontation Hanoi. They still value their connections with the United States, since they know that a Washington connection is an essential part of a balancing diplomacy in today’s world.
- Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–15, Senior Review Group Meeting, U.S. Force Reductions in Thailand, October 17, 1975 [1]. Secret. Habib sent the summary and the paper with three annexes to Kissinger under his covering memorandum of October 8. The paper is attached, but not published. (Ibid.)↩
- The NSSM 225 Working Group summarized its review of U.S. policy toward Thailand.↩