407. Note from the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 4, 1975.1 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 4, 1975
Henry,
Here is another in our long series of analyses about residual force levels in Thailand. I have the same problem with this one that I have had with all the others; namely, (1) it does not start from any strategic premise of what we think we would really like to retain in that area and (2) it takes as gospel political statements by the Thais about what they are willing to tolerate in the way of U.S. military presence.
On the first point, I just have a gut feeling that we should at least attempt to retain some sort of combat capability in SEA. Mayaguez was a good example of the completely unforeseen contingences which can arise.
On the second point, the Thai initially told us some time ago that we had to remove all of our forces. State and Defense—including the Ambassador—took that as immutable. Now we apparently are doing the same thing on the basis of the recent statement by Khukrit. I am not at all sure that this is the last word nor that the Thai military necessarily concur in it.
In sum, I don’t like the paper. My inclination would be to hold an SRG meeting on it to try to sort out once and for all just where we would like to end up in Thailand.
Paper okay as is
Schedule SRG [HK
indicated his approval]
See me
[signed Brent]
- Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, 1974–1976. No classification marking. Kissinger checked the option to hold an SRG meeting. Scowcroft’s note was probably in reference to Schlesinger’s memorandum to Kissinger of September 23 (Document 405). ↩
- Scowcroft criticized a paper on force levels in Thailand and recommended that Kissinger convene an SRG meeting on this subject.↩