Office of the Historian

405. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 23, 1975.1 2

Washington, September 23, 1975

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S. Force Reduction in Thailand

(U) In response to your memorandum of 1 July 1975, subject as above, the following force withdrawal options and intelligence facilities/activities have been identified,

Withdrawal Options

  • (S) Option I. A phased drawdown to a residual force level which includes a combat element. Combat and support aircraft would be withdrawn to the residual level between September and December 1975 to permit the retrograde of US assets and the orderly turnover of excess materiel and facilities to the Royal Thai Government. By 31 March 1976 military manpower requirements for the residual force would be reduced to about 3,800 spaces. Approximately 1,000 additional logistical support personnel will remain after 31 March 1976 to complete the retrograde of materiel. It is anticipated that retrograde actions will be completed and the associated personnel will depart by early summer 1976, The withdrawal rate schedule and composition for this option are listed at Tab A.
  • (S) Option II. The accelerated drawdown of all US forces from Thailand, except the Defense Attache Office, the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), and the SEAT0 Medical Research Laboratory, by the end of March 1976. The residual US military presence would be about 300 spaces. The withdrawal rate schedule and composition for this option are listed at Tab B.
  • (S) Option III. The phased drawdown to a residual level which excludes a combat element. Military manpower requirements for the residual force would total 3,000 spaces. Approximately 1,000 additional logistical support personnel will remain after 31 March 1976 to complete the retrograde of materiel and would depart, upon completion of retrograde actions, by early summer 1976. The withdrawal rate schedule and composition for this option are listed at Tab C.

(S) Under both Options I and III additional savings of approximately 700 military manpower spaces could be realized by September 1976 through partial civi1ianization, combined US-RTG operation and demoting of selected intelligence activities. If such procedures are undertaken the residual force totals for Options I and III would be further reduced to 3,100 and 2,300 respectively.

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(S) Under all three options USMACTHAI would be disestablished. Timing for the disestablishment and arrangements for the assumption of USMACTHAI’s residual function are currently under reexamination in light of recent discussions with the RTG.

Intelligence Facilities/Activities

(TS) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), with the concurrence of the Director Central Intelligence, has recommended that certain facilities and activities be retained in Thailand. In order of priority for retention they are:

  • Priority 1. [text not declassified]
  • Priority 2. Continue the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) mission at Chiang Mai.
  • Priority 3. Continue the SPACETRACK (COBRA TALON) radar facility at Ko Kha; retain the ability to conduct P-3 Ocean Surveillance Air Patrols out of U-Tapao; continue HUMINT activities under the Defense Attache Office Bangkok.

(TS) It is the position of the Department of Defense that Option III provides for the most realistic long-term presence of US forces in Thailand, other than intelligence. With regard to the intelligence activities it is the position of the Department of Defense that we should attempt to retain all facilities and activities identified as priority 1 and 2. Additionally, the capability to conduct P-3 operations should be considered a priority 2. The retention of Ko Kha and HUMINT activities will be difficult to explain to the Royal Thai Government. Therefore we do not recommend their retention. To optimize the effectiveness of potential JCRC operations its location should be as close as possible to crash/grave sites, therefore this humanitarian activity should be retained in Thailand for the interim.

(TS) Regardless of the option selected, it is imperative that the decision be made as soon as possible so that negotiations can commence with the Royal Thai Government. A prolonged delay will compound our problem with Thailand and, in the end, our departure will appear to be a precipitous withdrawal.

(U) The Department of State and Director Central Intelligence concur.

James R. Schlesinger [signed]

Attachments
Tabs A, B, C (Secret)

  1. Source: Library of Congress, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 22. Top Secret. Tabs A, B, and C, the withdrawal rate schedules for options I, II, and III, are attached but not published. Schlesinger received this memorandum, with a recommendation that he sign it, under a covering memorandum, September 2, from Ellsworth.↩
  2. Schlesinger presented Kissinger with options for U.S. force reduction in Thailand.↩