Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

400. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, May 16, 1975, 8:08 a.m.¹ ²

Washington, May 16, 1975, 8:08 a.m.

In Attendance - Friday, May 16, 1975

Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman
D - Mr. Ingersoll
P - Mr. Sisco
E - Mr. Robinson
T - Mr. Maw
M - Mr. Eagleburger
AF - Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
ARA - Mr. Rogers
EA - Mr. Habib
EUR - Mr. Hartman
NEA - Mr. Atherton
INR - Mr. Hyland
S/P - Mr. Lord
EB - Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/PRS - Mr. Anderson
PM - Mr. Vest
IO - Mr. Buffum
H - Mr. McCloskey
L - Mr. Leigh
S/S - Mr. Springsteen
S - Mr. Bremer
S - Mr. Adams

PROCEEDINGS

(The Secretary’s Staff Meeting was convened at 8:08 a.m., Secretary of State Kissinger presiding as Chairman.)

MR. INGERSOLL: Henry, I think you have a telegram that sets out a schedule for withdrawal of the already agreed upon —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. It’s not effective. I will — that’s right. First of all, I want that panic to stop about Thailand.

MR. INGERSOLL: No, no. This was before the Mayaguez. It was entirely just —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We’re withdrawing over half of our strike forces and over a quarter of our troops. I’d much rather do it the other way around. It’s our troops that are annoying people.

MR. INGERSOLL: All right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean I don’t see that there’s any sense, if we are in Thailand at all, not to be with forces to do anything. The worst presence to have is one that can’t fight and is just there to annoy people.

I only saw it last night. I’d like the strike forces to be withdraw last. At least, that way we can get something for our presence.

MR. INGERSOLL: All right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can take more personnel if you want to. You can take the PX out first. (Laughter.)

MR. INGERSOLL: They didn’t get their supplies anyway. The Mayaguez had some.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why? The Mayaguez went back to Singapore.

MR. INGERSOLL: I don’t know. I don’t think they wanted to go back to Thailand right now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did we advise that?

MR. HABIB: The owners, as far as we know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can we send a few tranquilizers to Masters? I think the Thais are basically —

MR. HABIB: They need a tranquilizer — Masters.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let them scream.

MR. HABIB: I think they’re going to be in a position — the latest report we have is they’re going to withdraw their Ambassador from Washington.

MR. LORD: That was on the radio about five minutes ago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. That’s not going to be effective by our being nervous.

MR. HABIB: I haven’t seen any nervousness in any part or any form, either in the Embassy or here — nor have they said nor done anything. I think the problem is that the Thais have their sovereignty infringed, from their standpoint. And they are a weak government that has that habit. And a government that has nothing available to it except its big mouth is going to use its big mouth. And the question comes up now: What do we do to restore some semblance of reasonableness in our relationship with Thailand?

And there’s no question of something we have done to them — or have them just lie there. They can’t get too weak, so they’re buffeted from many sides — not only from their neighbors but from within their own society.

I think that there are things that we can do. I think, for example, we should consider very carefully what we say to them and how we say it at this time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But, above all, I want to consider it.

MR. HABIB: Well, I said we might have a share in in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And I have to see if I can’t find time to see you today. We have to delay your departure. I have to know exactly what’s up.

MR. HABIB: Well, I’ve been trying to see you for that reason. I want to talk to you about a couple of things.

I think in the case of Thailand, for example, we ought to consider the question of whether we owe them an apology.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Don’t be absurd.

MR. HABIB: I’m not being absurd. How do you regard a situation in which we deliberately disregard their view or we didn’t take them into account?

Now, there are ways of doing this in your way and style which would be helpful.

I’d like to get a chance to get out and work something up. We’ve asked the Embassy to take a look and see what there is that might be done in a form that it is — that they want.

For example, we have the remaining Vietnamese equipment, which we were thinking of giving them anyway. There’s no question but that the Thais don’t want to stand naked in Southeast Asia without any protection — or any protection from anybody.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look, if the Thais want to make an issue out of it and if they want to force us out on that issue, I prefer that to being crawled out all over the place. We’re going to do that within a year.

MR. HABIB: Nobody is suggesting that we crawl — disregard all history and relationship with Thailand that we’ve had in this regard? I don’t think it’s necessary now. We can find a way in which we can deal with the problem, restore some semblance of the proper relationship with the Thais — not —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don’t accept the phrase “proper relationship.” We had 8,000 Marines in there under Kennedy. We were bombing these countries from Thai bases. Let’s not be absurd.

MR. HABIB: We’ve always done it with the authority and the approval but with the active participation of the government. This is a weak government, and I think that’s an important factor in judging their reaction.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It won’t be helped by apologizing though.

MR. HABIB: Well, I think the probability of sort of a public reaction in Thailand is quite clear. That’s one of their problems.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then we get out — which we have to do within a year anyhow.

MR. HABIB: All — everything?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then we’ll see that when it develops.

MR. HABIB: We have something that we’d like — that are rather significant to us there in terms of assets: intelligence, presence, and otherwise.

SECRETARY KISSINGER We will not apologize.

[Omitted is material unrelated to Thailand.]

committees — did you know that? (Laughter.)

MR. HABIB: It was a Department cable.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, no, no.

MR. HABIB: There was a summary in one of the daily CIA reports.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The State Department cable was summarized in that newspaper, which I never look at.

MR. HABIB: That’s right; and I remember that article in it.

MR. HYLAND: And the next day they published a correction.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But, at any rate, that goes to six Congressional committees.

MR. HABIB: Yes. I’ve been up there before them, and I see their staff is reading it in front of everybody. We’re not allowed to give it to our Deputies, it’s so secret. But, in any event, the Thai arrangements are very, very ambiguous, in many respects; and they’ve never been formalized in a mutual security treaty the way they are in other countries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can I get a list?

MR. HABIB: We’ll get a list for you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And, also, what is secret on this? — Because Mansfield is sure to hit us on that. I think all of the secret things are status of forces agreements, aren’t they?

HABIB: No. We don’t have a formal status of forces agreements with Thailand. That is one of the things. There are certain arrangements made with respect —

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But there are no secret agreements made with American obligations, are there?

MR. HABIB: No, not that I know of. The only obligation I know of is with SEATO.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What about Rusk?

MR. HABIB: Well, the Rusk one is based upon SEATO.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That’s public anyway.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Oh, that’s public.

MR. HABIB: It’s an interpretation of what our actions will be under the SEATO treaty, if the other members don’t act. That’s what it amounts to.

MR. INGERSOLL: Phil, I think some of the levels of forces there became secret as we got formal with the Foreign Ministry. We’ve drawn down now, so I don’t think it’s a violation with the Foreign Ministry.

MR. HABIB: Well, I don’t think it’s a question of violation. The agreement has always been perfect with the Thais — it always has been.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Senator Mansfield asked me in testimony about the agreement — to produce the secret agreements or tell him what it was. I’ve got to do that very soon, and just give me the subject of these agreements. And I think — I was told; I have no independent knowledge — that they all concern the secret amendments — all concern status of forces, type arrangements.

MR. HABIB: That is secret. For example, they cover such things as how the [unclear] will be treated in terms of criminal jurisdiction, things like that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That’s right.

MR. HABIB: But I wouldn’t call them really secret. They were just arrangements that were made outside of the normal system of status of forces agreements. We’ve done that before in other areas.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You didn’t mean any particular harm. He just read this intelligence report.

[Omitted is material unrelated to Thailand.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret. An undated paper on “Secret Agreements with Thailand Relating to the U.S. Military Presence in Thailand” is at the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand, Senator Mansfield’s Request for Agreements with Thailand (1). On May 19, Masters delivered a note, which the Thai government took as an apology, stating “The United States regrets the misunderstandings that have arisen between Thailand and the United States in regard to the temporary placement of Marines at Utapao to assist in the recovery of the SS Mayaguez.” Telegrams 115952 to Bangkok, May 18, and 4359 from Bangkok, May 19; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
2. Kissinger and his staff discussed force levels in Thailand, the aftermath of the Mayaguez incident, and the basis for the U.S. military presence in Thailand.