Office of the Historian

396. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, February 6, 1975.1 2

Washington, February 6, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION

February 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER [HAK initialed]
SUBJECT: Long-Term US Military Force Levels in Thailand

In response to NSDM 249 on US Deployments in Thailand, the Secretary of Defense has forwarded five options for a US residual force level in Thailand (Tab B). The Thai have been exerting almost constant pressure since the overthrow of the military regime in October 1973 for us to present our long-term US military force plan. The recent election of a non-military coalition to the Thai National Assembly would indicate that this pressure will intensify until our decision is announced. The Thai are not opposed to a long-term US military presence but they do feel that it should be considerably less than our current force of approximately 27,000 military manpower spaces. At the same time, they believe we have been slow in bringing them in on our withdrawal intentions.

The key considerations are (1) the residual force level appropriate to support continuing US interests in the area and (2) the pace at which we make our reductions. It is important that we accomplish our force reductions in a manner that will not be misinterpreted by Hanoi as a diminution of our resolve and readiness to carry out military operations in the area. To do this we must have a credible force and facilities available through the period that has the highest potential for an all-out North Vietnamese offensive — the 1975-76 dry season (November 1975-April 1976) — and the months preceding our own national election.

A decision on our long-range force plan at this time, followed by US-Thai consultations, will do much to defuse the issue in Bangkok and preserve the degree of flexibility which we will need as we execute the plan.

[Page 2]

The chart below summarizes the five options presented by Defense:

Personnel A/C Air Bases
Option 1 21,300 (Indefinitely) 15 B-52s 3 Bases
4 Tac Air Squadrons
1 AC-HO Squadron
17 KC-135 Tankers
USN P–3 Detachment
Option 2 12,000 (by May 1, 1976) 6 B-52s 1 Base
2 Tac Air Squadrons
1 AC-130 Squadron
7,000 (by Sept 30, 1976) 1 F-4 Squadron
Option 3 7,000 (by June 30, 1976) 1 F-4 Squadron 1 Base 1 Base
6 RF-4s
Option 4 3,300 (by June 30, 1976) No combat A/C 1 Base
Then reduce further if Thai agree to manage bases and to let us rotate combat aircraft.
Option 5* 10,000 (by the end of FY 76) 2 Fighter Squadrons 2 Bases
6 Tac Rec Aircraft
4 U-2 Rs
3 P–3 Aircraft
*Not originally submitted.

Defense now favors Option 5, reducing US forces to a level of 10,000 spaces by July 1, 1976. All airbases except Utapao and Korat would be closed by the end of FY 76. State also favors Option 5 but would delay reaching the 10, 000 level until October 1, 1976.

After reviewing alternative force levels, I recommend a modified version of the favored Defense option in combination with the retention of Udorn Airbase in caretaker status at least through FY 77. This option would include the following: [Page 3]

  • — Reduction of military manpower spaces from 21,300 on June 30, 1975 (after the current dry season) to 12, 000 on June 30, 1976 (end of the next dry season). The largest portion of the reduction in actual combat elements would take place in the fourth quarter of FY 76. This level would provide six B-52s, two fighter squadrons, one AC-130 gunship squadron, six RF-4s, three UN P–3s, four U-2Rs, and necessary support aircraft.
  • — Further reduction to 10,000 spaces by December 31, 1976 by withdrawal of the six B-52s and the AC-130 gunship squadron. The bulk of the reduction would take place in the second quarter of FY 1977.
  • — Retention of Udorn Airbase in caretaker status at least through FY 77. (Specific timing for termination of US operations at Utapao and Korat Airbases would be decided later. Operations at Udorn would be terminated in the second quarter of FY 1976. )

The purpose of this option would be to leave a reasonably effective fighting force in place together with sufficient facilities and access rights during the present dry season, the 1975-76 dry season, and the months preceding our own national election. These are periods during which we expect high levels of North Vietnamese military activity and we need to be prepared for them as well as to have enough forces to serve as a deterrent. The CIA also believes that the extent and rate of our Thailand drawdown could affect the timing of a North Vietnamese decision to launch a major offensive (Tab C). At the same time, we want to reduce our forces for very real political and budgetary reasons. This option would meet those concerns. It would also leave a sufficiently large residual force and enough active and caretaker bases to give us some flexibility through the end of FY 77.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the attached National Security Decision Memorandum. (Tab A)
Approve [GRF initialed]
Disapprove

  1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–57, NSDMs, NSDM 286, Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (2). Secret. Sent for Action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which became NSDM 286. Tab B apparently refers to two memoranda from Schlesinger to Kissinger on “Long-Term US Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 76 and Beyond),” the first, which presented four options, dated October 11, 1974 and the second, presenting a fifth option, dated January 18, 1975. Both are attached but not published. Tab C, not attached, is apparently a reference to Colby’s Memorandum to Thomas Bigley, then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, of July 9, 1974 providing comments on Defense’s memorandum entitled “Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond).” (Ibid., Box 245, Folder 4, NSDM 249) ↩
  2. Kissinger asked Ford to determine long-term U.S. military force levels in Thailand.↩