365. Telegram 4623 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, March 22, 1973, 1236Z.1 2
TELEGRAM
Department of State
BANGKOK 4623
P 221236Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1702
RECD: 22 MAR 15 17Z
E.O. 11652: GDS 1981
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, MARR, MOPS, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL CLIMATE AND US MILITARY PRESENCE
REF: A.
BANGKOK 3313
B. BANGKOK 2643
C. BANGKOK 4622
SUMMARY: I AM PERSUADED THAT OUR OVERALL POLICY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THAILAND WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY ANNOUNCING BEFORE THE END OF APRIL A MODEST, INITIAL REDUCTION IN US FORCES STATIONED HERE. I FULLY RECOGNIZE THE IMPERATIVES OF MAINTAINING A STRONG DETERRENT/RETALIATORY POSTURE IN THAILAND TO HELP ASSURE NVN ADHERENCE TO CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS NEED TO AVOID GIVING “WRONG SIGNAL” TO HANOI. HOWEVER, OUR COMBAT POSTURE HERE WOULD NOT BE MATERIALLY AFFECTED BY A MODEST CUTBACK AND RAPID REINTRODUCTION COULD BE EFFECTED IF REQUIRED. ON OTHER HAND, IN CURRENT THAI CLIMATE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF FIRST CUTBACK, HOWEVER MODEST, WOULD BE VERY SUBSTANTIAL. WITHOUT COMMITTING OURSELVES AT THIS TIME TO ANY FURTHER WITHDRAWALS WE WOULD INDICATE A TREND FULLY IN ACCORD WITH RTG THINKING. THIS WOULD MATERIALLY ASSIST RTG IN COPING WITH DOMESTIC DISSENT WHICH CONTINUES TO FOCUS ON US PRESENCE. ACTION REQUESTED: THAT WASHINGTON GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT PRIOR TO END OF APRIL. FURTHER, THAT UNIT FOR THIS WITHDRAWAL BE THE MARINE WING AT NAM PHONG, FOR DEPARTURE BEFORE THE END OF MAY. WITHDRAWAL OF THIS UNIT, ONLY ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF US MILITARY PRESENCE, WOULD ENTAIL SIGNIFICANT ADDED BONUS BOTH IN POLITICAL TERMS AND IN ACCOMMODATING RETURNING THAI VOLUNTEERS WHICH WILL OTHERWISE REQUIRE COSTLY CONSTRUCTION. END SUMMARY.
- 1.
- IN A NUMBER OF MESSAGES WE HAVE REPORTED ON THAI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US MILITARY PRESENCE. IN REF A WE HAVE ANALYZED ITS POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS WHICH CUT ACROSS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ASPECTS OF THAI POLICY. THE US PRESENCE IS PROBABLY THE MOST [Page 2] IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT ISSUE IN US-THAI RELATIONS TODAY. HARDLY A DAY GOES BY WITHOUT SOME REFERENCE TO 17 IN THE PRESS OR BY PUBLIC FIGURES. HOW WE MANAGE THIS ISSUE WILL AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIPS HERE AND IN SEA GENERALLY FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE SUGGESTED (REF A PARA 17) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY FRAMEWORK WITH THE PURPOSE OF MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE OUR FORCES HERE FROM THEIR PRESENT HIGH LEVELS, CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING, I.E., THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SEASIA AND HANOI’S ADHERENCE TO THE PARIS AGREEMENTS AND THE LAOS CEASEFIRE.
- 2.
- WHILE THAI DOMESTIC DEBATE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT DEFUSED BY DEPFONMIN CHARTCHAI’S STATEMENT THAT US PRESENCE IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED PERMANENT (REF B), WE HAVE NUMEROUS INDICATIONS THAT ISSUE CONTINUES TO SMOLDER AND MAY FLARE UP ANY TIME (REF C). NVN DECISION TO INTRODUCE IT MORE SPECIFICALLY INTO VIENTIANE REPATRIATION NEGOTIATIONS OR AN ATTACK ON A BASE HERE NO DOUBT WOULD REOPEN ISSUE PERHAPS IN ACUTE FORM. (BASE ATTACK, OF COURSE, WOULD POIGNANTLY DRIVE HOME WHITLAM’S REMARKS WHICH CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THOUGHT IN POLITICAL AND PRESS CIRCLES HERE.)
- 3.
- IN MY VIEW, TIME HAS NOW REPEAT NOW COME TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY A FIRST REDUCTION IN THE US COMBAT PRESENCE AS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAINTAIN PERMANENTLY OUR STRENGTH AT PRESENT LEVELS. I RECOMMEND THAT, BARRING A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE TURN OF EVENTS IN INDOCHINA, WE ANNOUNCE NOT LATER THAN THE END OF APRIL OUR INTENTION TO REMOVE SOME FORCES FROM LAND AND THAT THIS BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE END OF MAY.
- 4.
- I THOROUGHLY APPRECIATE WASHINGTON THINKING THAT HANOI MUST BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR CAPABILITY AND DETERMINATION TO USE FORCE IF CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS ARE TO BE MADE TO WORK. NEVERTHELESS, I AM PERSUADED THAT NECESSITY TO CONVEY THIS POLITICAL SIGNAL DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REQUIRE THE RETENTION OF FULL AUGMENTATION FORCE BROUGHT IN LAST SPRING. MODEST (ABOUT 5 PERCENT) REDUCTION OF PRESENT FORCE LEVELS CAN BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO INTERPRETATIONS WE WISH TO AVOID, ESPECIALLY WHEN PRESENTED IN CONTEXT OUR ABILITY TO REINTRODUCE FORCES RAPIDLY, AS WE DID MOST EFFECTIVELY LAST SPRING.
- 5.
- ON OTHER HAND, A MODEST REDUCTION WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD [Page 3] ALLEVIATING PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED POLITICAL PRESSURES HERE IN VERY COMPLEX SITUATION DESCRIBED REF A. BY POINTING A TREND TOWARD FORCE REDUCTION, WITHOUT ACTUALLY COMMITTING OURSELVES TO SPECIFIC FURTHER REDUCTION AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME OR TO ANY ULTIMATE FORCE POSTURE IN THAILAND, WE WOULD ENABLE RTG LEADERS TO DEFUSE THE ARGUMENTS OF THE CRITICS, WHILE GIVING SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE WHO ARE BASICALLY WELL-DISPOSED TOWARD US, BUT HESITATE TO TAKE A POSITION IN IGNORANCE OF OUR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS (SEE REF C).
- 6.
- SPECIFICALLY, I PROPOSE THAT PROMPT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF A UNIT FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT AND I RECOMMEND AS MOST SUITABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE THE MARINE WING (TASK FORCE DELTA) AT NAM PHONG.
- 7.
- THERE ARE AT LEAST FOUR GOOD REASONS FOR REMOVING THE MARINES AND
TO DO SO WITHIN TIME FRAME SUGGESTED ABOVE:
- A.
- WITH ABOUT 2,300 PERSONNEL AND ONLY 39 COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN ITS THREE SQUADRONS, TASK FORCE DELTA IS THE SMALLEST, MOST READILY IDENTIFIABLE UNIT WHOSE REMOVAL WILL VACATE AN ENTIRE BASE, THUS YIELDING OPTIMUM POLITICAL RETURN FOR THE LEAST DIMINUTION OF REAL COMBAT STRENGTH.
- B.
- THE MARINES HAVE FLOWN NO COMBAT SORTIES SINCE 25 FEBRUARY. THEIR UTILIZATION IN THE ONLY CURRENT COMBAT AREA (CAMBODIA) WOULD NOT BE COST-EFFECTIVE IN VIEW OF MUCH GREATER PROXIMITY OF COMPARABLE USAF UNITS BASED AT UBON AND KORAT. MARINES HAVE BEEN FLYING SOME TRAINING MISSIONS; WE MUST ASSUME THEIR CONTINUING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS WILL COMPETE WITH THOSE OF USAF FOR EXTREMELY SCARCE TRAINING AIR SPACE IN THAILAND, THUS COMPOUNDING ANOTHER TROUBLESOME PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH AN UNEMPLOYED COMBAT FORCE.
- C.
- NAM PHONG IS LARGEST AND MOST SUITABLE OF ONLY THREE FACILITIES WHERE THAI VOLUNTEERS RETURNING FROM LAOS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED WITHOUT INCURRING ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES WHICH U.S. WOULD HAVE TO UNDERWRITE IF VOLUNTEERS ARE BE KEPT IN A READINESS POSTURE. ASSUMING MAY 23 (I.E., 60 DAYS AFTER FORMATION OF NEW RLG) IS MAGIC DATE BY WHICH FOREIGN FORCES IN LAOS WILL HAVE TO HAVE FADED AWAY, REQUIREMENT FOR FACILITY TO ACCOMMODATE SOME VOLUNTEER UNITS IN THAILAND MUST BE ANTICIPATED DURING MAY.
- D.
- MARINES LIVE IN TENTS AND CONDITIONS AT NAM PHONG ARE MOST AUSTERE OF ANY US-TENANTED BASE; DESPITE USMC PRIDE IN ROUGHING IT UNDER MOST ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND EXCELLENT LEADERSHIP, CONDITIONS AT NAM PHONG MAY LEAD TO MORALE PROBLEMS WITH ATTENDANT RISE IN INCIDENTS, DRUG ABUSE, ETC.
- 8.
- I AM PERSUADED THAT AN INITIATIVE OF THE KIND RECOMMENDED ABOVE WILL PAY US GREAT DIVIDENDS IN HELPING THE THAI LEADERSHIP TO HANDLE THE GROWING QUESTIONING OF CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE HERE WITHOUT OUR IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DETERRENT ON HANOI.
- 9.
- DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EMBASSIES VIENTIANE, SAIGON AND PHNOM PENH, CINPAC, CINCUSSAG FOR INFO.
UNGER
#4623
NOTE: NOT PASSED VIENTIANE, SAIGON, PHNOM PENH, CINCPAC AND CINCUSSAG BY OC/T— 3/22/73