349. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, August 6, 1976..1 2
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
August 6, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: THOMAS J.
BARNES [TJB initialed]
SUBJECT: Marcos-Robinson Meeting August 6, 1976 and Philippine Negotiating Strategy
The GOP used Deputy Secretary Robinson’s visit to press the U.S. for a more explicit statement of its obligations under the U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty. President Marcos made clear (Tab B) in his first meeting with Deputy Secretary Robinson and Ambassador Sullivan, and in an aide memoire (Tab C), that he is seeking this statement primarily in connection with Philippine claims to the Reed Bank. In addition, Marcos, Romulo and Enrile all rehashed with some show of bitterness the alleged U.S. failure to be responsive to their need for military equipment when Muslim attacks began in Mindanao in 1972. They stressed that this failure gave them cause to doubt that, in a future crisis, the U.S. would be willing to respond positively to assist the Philippines.
The aide memoire given to Robinson quotes the 1969 testimony of the Deputy Chief of Mission James Wilson before the Symington Subcommittee, and statements of Ambassador Sullivan;as proof that the U.S. will respond only to attacks on the Philippines which endanger U. S„ bases. Secretary Romulo echoed this same line in an August 3 interview with the London Times (Tab D). Romulo also used that interview to emphasize that the GOP wants to have Philippine Base Commanders in charge of U.S. bases to “prevent unilateral action by the United States.” He then used a hypothetical situation in which Thailand would ask for U.S. military help against “Indochina” to demonstrate his point. Romulo said that such a use of the Philippine bases would adversely affect Manila’s current efforts to improve its relations with Indochina, and therefore the GOP needs to have control of the bases to insure that the U.S. does not unilaterally act to the detriment of the Philippines.
Robinson reported to the Secretary (Tab A) that in their following private 20 minute session Marcos expressed appreciation for the Secretary’s [Page 2] concern over the base negotiations. Marcos added, however, that he believes any final solution will require some fundamental political decision on which he hopes to deal with the Secretary more directly. Marcos reiterated that he needs a reaffirmation of our commitment to defend the Philippines, and a further clarification of the specific response we would make to an attack against the Philippines or its flag vessels in connection with the Reed Bank dispute. Marcos said this response need not be written; however, he expects it to come from the highest level of government, presumably President Ford and the Secretary, to him personally. Marcos agreed we should continue the base negotiations and mentioned the possibility of finalizing them in a month if we provided a satisfactory response to the aide memoire removing the ambiguities of our defense commitment.
An intelligence report (Tab E) from a reliable source quotes Emmanuel Pelaez, a senior member of the Philippine negotiating panel as saying July 29 that the GOP believes a Jimmy Carter victory would be favorable to it. The Philippine delegation considers Carter a “hawk” who would place more value on the U.S. bases. Pelaez added that the GOP is prepared to wait until after the Republican convention before really getting down to serious negotiations, and therefore is “digging in its heels now” to slow down the talks. In addition, Pelaez said Marcos believes a strong stand against the U.S. will help him achieve a preferred status at the forthcoming Non-aligned Summit.
Our View
In light of the intelligence report, Marcos’ arguments may be purely tactical. He could be trying to stall the negotiations until after the U.S. Presidential elections. Alternatively, although the GOP has not presented the bargain in the following terms, the quid pro quo may be our agreeing to militarily support their claims in the Spratlys against the PRC and Vietnam in exchange for a free hand in use of the bases. Since we cannot give the Philippines assurances that we will defend them in a military conflict that occurs in contested territory, early conclusion of the base agreement appears unlikely.
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (5). Secret. Sent for urgent information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. At Tab A was telegram 11763 from Manila, August 6, describing Robinson’s meeting with Marcos. At Tab B was telegram 11733 from Manila, August 6, describing Marcos’ earlier meeting with Robinson and Sullivan. At Tab C was the aide memoire from Marcos contained in telegram 11734 from Manila, August 6. At Tab D was Romulo’s August 3 interview with the London Times.↩
- Barnes described the Marcos-Robinson meeting of August 6 and speculated on Philippine negotiating strategy for the base negotiations.↩