Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

339. Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 8, 1975.¹ ²

Washington, August 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

August 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
THROUGH: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. [JAF initialed]

SUBJECT: Possible Call on Mrs. Ford by Philippine First Lady

Mrs. Imelda Marcos arrived in New York today on one of her periodic informal visits. She would almost certainly like to call on Mrs. Ford — and also the President, if she thought a meeting with him were possible. She apparently will not, as in the past, ask for a call, given the fact that she has been consistently turned down in the past two years.

Mrs. Marcos has just visited Bolivia and other countries, where she reportedly has explored alternative sources of petroleum for the Philippines. According to some reports, she might leave next week for Cuba to discuss common interests the Philippines and Cuba have as sugar producers.

You are familiar with the difficulties which resulted from Mrs. Marcos’ meeting with President and Mrs. Nixon. In 1970, when she met with them over tea, she pleaded emotionally for massive new U.S. assistance to the Philippines to avert what she said would otherwise be a communist takeover there. When she returned from Manila, she claimed publicly that the President had promised her a half billion dollars in new economic assistance to the Philippines. At the time of the 1973 inaugural, when she was given no answer on her request to meet the First Family and when the status offered her for the inaugural ceremonies did not meet her liking, she attended a counter-inaugural ball with Jack Valenti. Since then she has let her continued interest in meeting with the First Family be known, but has not pressed her case.

Ambassador Sullivan argues vigorously that the time has come to stop cold-shouldering Mrs. Marcos. He believes that she has assumed new importance in Philippine diplomacy — her trips earlier this year to Peking, Moscow, and the Mid-East — and that, because she has not had access to the White House in recent years, she has injected an anti-American bias into her efforts to improve Philippine standing with the Third World.

Sullivan made this pitch to General Scowcroft here last month, and General Scowcroft agreed in principle that it would be useful if Mrs. Ford could receive Mrs. Marcos. Sullivan on August 7 sent General Scowcroft a backchannel (Tab B) to urge that Mrs. Ford see Mrs. Marcos on August 8 or 9.

It would be virtually impossible for Mrs. Ford to see Mrs. Marcos on such short notice before the President and Mrs. Ford leave on August 10 for two weeks in Colorado.

At Tab A is a draft State cable which tells Ambassador Sullivan that we intend to inform Mrs. Marcos informally that an immediate meeting is impossible for scheduling reasons, but that Mrs. Ford would like to see Mrs. Marcos at “some future date.”

I agree that it would be useful if Mrs. Ford could receive Mrs. Marcos. This could be done in a way which limits the risk that she would repeat her past performances. Her awareness of our sensitivity should itself reduce her proclivity to exploit a call on Mrs. Ford, or to push too strenuously for a meeting with the President.

The draft State cable by implication leaves open the possibilities that Mrs. Marcos will suggest that she meet with the President and Mrs. Ford in Colorado — which she suggested last December when they went to Vail — or that she wait until they return to Washington in late August. We presumably could refuse a Colorado meeting. At the same time, we could leave open the possibility of a late August meeting, or one late this year during what will probably be another trip here by Mrs. Marcos.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft State cable to Ambassador Sullivan at Tab A.

APPROVE [BS initialed]
DISAPPROVE

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (3). Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed his approval of the sending of a draft State cable to Sullivan. Attached but not published are Tab A, the draft cable to Sullivan, and Tab B, the August 7 backchannel telegram from Sullivan. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates that at 10:30 p.m. on August 8, the NSC staff directed the Department of State to send the telegram.
2. Froebe recommended that Scowcroft refuse a short notice meeting between Mrs. Marcos and Mrs. Ford.