Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

198. Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, November 19, 1974, 11 a.m.¹ ²

November 19, 1974, 11 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME & PLACE: 11:00 a.m., November 19, 1974
Guest House, Tokyo

PARTICIPANTS:

• Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
• Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura
• Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
• Deputy Foreign Minister Kiyohiko Tsurumi
• Toshio Yamazaki, Director General, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA
• Hidetoshi Ukawo, MOFA (Interpreter)
• Akitane Kiuchi, Private Secretary to Prime Minister
• The President
• Secretary Kissinger
• Ambassador Hodgson
• General Scowcroft
• Assistant Secretary Habib
• James J. Wickel(Interpreter)

SUBJECT: President: Ford- Prime Minister - Tanaka First Meeting

PM Tanaka: It was a great honor to participate in the welcome ceremony for you this morning, Mr. President, on this first visit by an American president during the 114 years of diplomatic relations between our nations. It is a matter of particular pleasure to know that arrangements for a visit to the United States by Their Majesties are to be decided in discussions with Secretary Kissinger.

President: Thank you Mr. Prime Minister. It was a great privilege for me to meet HIM at the welcome ceremony this morning. I look forward to the discussions we are to have today and tomorrow.

PM Tanaka: I might explain that welcome ceremonies for State visitors have been conducted at the airport up to now, but this morning, for the first time, we have begun the practice of conducting them at the new Guest House. At the airport, the people could not easily get in to view the ceremony, but here they can view it through the fence, from a distance. I might add that many of the modern buildings you see in Tokyo date from the Olympics of 1954.

President: I am impressed by the appearance of this Guest House. It is beautiful to look at from the outside, and the restoration of the interior is equally beautiful. I deeply appreciate the opportunity to stay here.

PM Tanaka: The frescoes on the walls and ceilings were restored over a period of several years by many art students who were mobilized for that purpose. They too will be pleased at your visit.

President: Are the frescoes of some national significance?

PM Tanaka: No, they do not depict scenes from Japanese history. Originally, this Palace was modeled after Versailles; the paintings are not drawn from Japanese history.

President: We think this visit has great significance, as a reaffirmation of the close working relations between our two countries and as an extension of the firm relations we have developed in the past.

PM Tanaka: The Japanese people deeply appreciate the more than century-long friendly relations between Japan and the United States, and particularly appreciate the central role played by the United States in the post-war period when Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers. They know that the United States, in it central role in the Occupation, spared Japan the fate of such countries as Germany which was divided between East and West. They also appreciate Japan’s good fortune in receiving a variety of assistance from the United States, including GARIOA, EROA and Marshall Plan aid, and in being exempted from reparations by the DRAPER Mission. The Japanese people fully appreciate these good relations and the fact that Japan’s recovery from the war and its present prosperity are due to the cooperative role played by the United States. However, no matter how much good is done, there is bound to be some opposition in an open society, for example, when opposition forces prevented President Eisenhower’s visit in 1960. I’m sure, however, that you, Mr. President, and the members of your party can see and feel for yourselves the welcome which the people of Japan are extending to you from their hearts on this occasion of the first visit to Japan by an incumbent President. Surely, this must mark the highest point in the more than a century long history of our relations.

President: We also believe this visit is most beneficial to both countries. As you have said, we have developed a remarkably close relationship since the war. We might consider this as a foundation for further development in the future. We have had relatively minor differences since the war, but these have all been overcome. As we look at the future we can be confident that we will continue to work together in dealing with energy and energy-related problems, expanding programs for peace in Asia and the world, and dealing with the many other problems we face. Our relationship provides a fine foundation for the better, more peaceful world we seek to create. And so I welcome this opportunity, today and tomorrow, to continue our open dialogue, which contributes not only to healthy relations between the United States and Japan, but also throughout the world.

PM Tanaka: The very keynote of Japan’s diplomacy is the maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States, and we believe it is essential to maintain the Mutual Security Treaty, not just for Japan’s sake, but also to maintain peace in Japan and Asia. In that sense, we believe it essential to expand our excellent, friendly relations with the United States, including firm support for the maintenance of the MST.

With respect to bilateral problems, direct trade between Japan and the United States is expected to exceed $20 billion in 1974, and it is only natural for some unavoidable frictions to arise when contacts are this intensive. However, our experience these past two years in reducing the trade imbalance from about $4 billion in Japan’s favor to near equilibrium demonstrates that we can cooperate effectively to restore normal conditions, such as prevail now; therefore, I wish to emphasize the communication between nations is essential, particularly the continuing dialog between Japan and the United States. Given the good relations between us there should be no problems which Japan and the United States cannot solve, and thereby contribute to world peace.

Secretary: Mr. President, I might point out that when the Prime Minister took office (July, 1972) he took energetic action to reduce the serious trade imbalance between us. He carried out his promise to do so, which we feel was most constructive.

PM Tanaka: One more point I wish to emphasize, Mr. President, is that the only country in Europe which would seem to be comparable to is Japan West Germany. The UK, France, Holland and other major industrial nations can cooperate with each other, to maintain their joint position, while they develop contacts with adjacent nations of East Europe and the Soviet Union: for one thing, NATO is strong. On the other hand, Japan is close to the Soviet Union, the biggest communist nation, and the cradle of communism. Nearby is another large communist nation, China. The Soviet Union, in fact, flies a reconnaissance flight, the “Tokyo Express,” in the vicinity of Japan, almost daily, like a scheduled airliner. The nearby Korean peninsula is divided into two states, north and south, and Taiwan and China present another problem. In that sense, the position of the West Europeans in maintaining peace differs from Japan’s, as we continue to aspire to the maintenance of peace and democracy in Asia, and we should approach this challenge from a different angle. As I have noted, the maintenance of the peace we enjoy today depends on the maintenance of the system of cooperation and understanding between Japan and the United States, centered on the MST. In comparing Asia with Europe, a number of nations have begun to move in the direction of peace, and should do so, but in my view the last area to which peace may come to Asia, which is a big, poor continent, divided by religion and race, and afflicted with population problems. If peace could be achieved in Asia, world peace could be maintained. I wish to emphasize my understanding that it is essential to maintain Japan-US cooperation for this purpose.

President: I assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we wish to continue that kind of relationship, with the MST, of course, as the basis for our cooperation. As we advance, we may expand cur efforts in other ways, for example, in dealing with energy and energy-related problems, and handling economic assistance to the developing countries, especially in SEA. We consider all parts of the world to have a vital importance. We recognize that problems in Europe are different from the problems in our relations elsewhere. If one looks at the record, the importance we attach to our relations in Asia and the Pacific is fully evident; we believe the record shows that they rank highest in a listing of priorities. The fact that I am making my first visit abroad to Japan indicates how strongly we feel the importance of US-Japan relations.

As we look at the Pacific, we continue to follow the path of developing good relations with the PRC. We feel the historic step we took continues to benefit all of us.

I will also visit Vladivostok, to meet with General Secretary Brezhnev, to discuss the US-Soviet detente which aims to create stability and broaden relations with a former adversary. Broader relations, I feel, would benefit not only the nations of the Pacific, but also those of Europe.

My visit to Seoul demonstrates the importance we attach to our relationship with a courageous and strong ally.

All of these visits, to the Soviet Union, China, the ROK, and of the utmost importance, to Japan, are clear evidence of the fact that the United States feels the Pacific is as important ins any other area.

Secretary: Mr. President, the fact that I have been asked to come back from Vladivostok and Japan to brief our Japanese friends on those visits also indicates the importance we attach to our relations with Japan.

President: Mr. Prime Minister, the subject of trade to which you referred is vitally important subject for us to discuss. We hope to continue to expand our trade with Japan. We wish to continue as a big supplier of an adequate food supply for Japan. We have been greatly encouraged by Japan’s purchases of some $3 billion in agricultural products this year. Let me say that we are taking steps to make certain that you may continue to rely on the United States for an adequate supply of food. Four to six weeks ago we took firm action on the unexpected large purchases of grain by the Soviet Union, but this problem has been worked out. We intend to keep an adequate supply of food moving to Japan. We are also grateful for the purchases by Japan, as are our growers. This administration is not going to take arbitrary action to cut off agricultural exports; on the contrary, we hope to expand our exports.

PM Tanaka: Japan imports 90-100% of the wheat, soybeans and feed grains it consumes, almost all of it from the United States, and all of the Japanese people will appreciate your assurance of adequate fool supplies.

President: We are encouraging full production in the United States. We had some disappointments this year, with a wet spring, a hot dry summer and an early frost. But we had the biggest wheat crop in the history of the United States, and the fifth largest crop in corn, even though the corn crop was not as large as anticipated. We will make a maximum effort to expand all production in 1975. Hopefully, the weather will be more encouraging than this year; it could hardly be worse.

I have a question, Mr. Prime Minister, relating to agriculture. We wish to sell as much grain as Japan wishes to buy, but at the same time I have been under pressure in the United States by the cattle growing industry. This is one area where the prices are down because of overproduction, and we think it is important to negotiate the removal of Japan’s embargo against American cattle, at the working level.

PM Tanaka: Japan’s consumption of beef has been growing for ten years, but last year a tendency toward reduced consumption appeared not just in Japan, but also in the European Community. Wages have increased in Japan, and there ought to be a comparable increase in beef consumption, but instead, savings are up and beef consumption is down. We have been importing 130,000-140,000 tons to meet our needs this year, but under present circumstances have temporarily suspended imports. First of all, there has been a steep decline in consumption, and second, the cost of feed grain has risen so sharply that our cattlemen cannot afford feed to fatten their cattle. As a result, the farmers have been asking the Livestock Agency to buy up their calves. Even though we have halted beef imports, the Livestock Agency finds itself with 60,000 tons of beef on hand, all of which it bought from distressed farmers. Of course, we would like to see the people increase their beef consumption as soon as possible, to reduce this stock of beef, and thus open the way to resume our normal beef imports. Only three years ago the then Secretary Connally persuaded us to import 5,000 feeder calves, but we couldn’t get more than 500 to 1,000 head. We have, incidentally, been importing about 100,000 tons of beef from Australia and 10,000 tons from New Zealand and I am aware that they are turning to the United States, as an alternative market, for the meat which Japan and the European Community no longer import because of declining consumption.

President: As I pointed out, this is an important matter, which has been raised with me by the growers in the United States. It ties in with our effort to increase agricultural sales to Japan as a whole. It is in our mutual interest to work things out in this area, too.

There is another area, Mr. Prime Minister, in which it is in our mutual interest to cooperate. As I said, the United States considers the Pacific a vital and important area for peace, as important as any other. We have, therefore, continued to help the South Vietnamese. We give them substantial economic aid, and continue to give them military assistance, within the framework of the Peace Treaty. The anticipated need for assistance in Vietnam this year is in the range of $ 1 billion in magnitude. We hope to provide substantial help, but the Congress has not been as generous as I might wish. It is important that South Vietnam be able to continue its recovery, and economic growth. We have been encouraged greatly about their prospects by reports of the discovery of significant oil deposits under the sea off the coast of South Vietnam. Let me say that we feel strongly that it is important that South Vietnam continue to rebuild and strengthen itself. We recognize that Japan has made a good contribution to South Vietnam, including a total of about$64 million in aid this year, which we applaud. We hope that Japan in its next FY will expand its contribution to the recover and rehabilitation of South Vietnam.

PM Tanaka: We fully respect the great amount of assistance the United States is providing South Vietnam. Japan’s policy is to expand its economic and technical contributions to South Vietnam to the maximum extent possible, since we are unable to extend military aid. The opposition parties, in the Diet, however, strongly oppose any aid to South Vietnam. Therefore, we have to balance our aid to Vietnam within the context of economic cooperation with the five ASEAN nations, Burma and Bangladesh. However, we do wish to consider what might be possible under the AID section of the JFY 75 draft budget we must draft by December. I assure you that our aid for Vietnam will not be less than this year, and we would hope to increase it to the extent possible.

President: That would be helpful. We believe that two nations tied as closely as the United States and Japan have a mutual interest in strengthening South Vietnam. I might say I have been most interested in the encouraging reports recently about the oil potential of South Vietnam, which offers some grounds for optimism about their future.

This leads to a new subject of great mutual interest to all of us. I personally appreciate Japan’s cooperation in energy, in the IEG and the IEP. Both are vitally important to the consumers throughout the world. It is vitally important for us to have a lEG and a strong IEP. We should be prepared to move strongly, not to antagonize the producers, but to make sure that we consumers don’t have to assume a defensive posture in bargaining with the producers without any strength. In our judgment it is essential for Japan to support both the lEG and the IEP firmly. I can assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will continue to give the kind of leadership in this area, which Secretary Kissinger has been giving. Progress up to now has been encouraging, and we feel that anything which further strengthens the consumers will benefit both the consumers and the producers in the long run.

PM Tanaka: In my view energy is the greatest problem we face. I understand Secretary Kissinger’s proposal very well. Japan has a deep interest in the oil question, which is really at the root of the reason many countries around the world are eating less meat. However, I hope you understand that Japan’s circumstances differ from some other countries, like the US, UK and France. For example, Japan has no coal; it is dependent on oil for most of its energy. Consuming about 300 million tons of oil per year—almost all of it imported—it is natural that Japan should try to conserve oil. However, 73% of Japan’s oil is used for industrial purposes, and only 27% for private consumption. (note: Kiuchi gave PM Tanaka these figures in writing.) By comparison, the 31% of the United States consumption is for industrial purposes and 69% for private purposes. Therefore, any conservation program automatically means an immediate reduction of industrial production in Japan. I would hope that these special circumstances could be reflected in any program devised to deal with the oil question.

Secretary: May I, Mr. President, comment on two problems, consumer solidarity and the specific measures by which we hope to attain it. In preparing my Chicago speech, I linked consumption and the development of a new system because I recognize the special position of Japan. Obviously, all nations can’t conserve oil to the same degree as the others, and therefore should try to compensate by increasing their reliance on alternative supplies. We would be prepared to work with Japan, within the framework of our joint agreement on uranium enrichment and other alternatives, to take into account Japan’s specific requirements relating to industrial use in working out a conservation program for the consumers. I can assure you this energy program is not designed for conservation at the expense of growth, but instead is planned to achieve the conservation of energy and growth by also developing alternative sources of energy. If the consumers could achieve greater solidarity along these lines, it would improve their position to bargain for oil.

President: We are devoting a great deal of effort to R&D in potential alternative sources, such as solar and geothermal energy, and to make cool a more effective and cleaner source. We are thinking of sharing the results of these R&D programs as a part of the lEG and the IEP. The development of alternative sources lessens our dependence on oil, and thus increases our independence.

PM Tanaka: As I noted, Japan imports almost all of its oil, and our BOP cannot continue to bear the increased cost of oil. Therefore, the most serious consideration for us is the development of alternative sources of energy, including nuclear, solar and geothermal. However, Japan cannot conduct these programs alone—all of the advanced industrial democracies should combine their total efforts for this purpose.

Secretary Kissinger: We would like within a few weeks to meet quietly with a suitable official from Japan without any public dramatics to discuss this issue. Perhaps the Prime Minister could send someone to Washington, or we could send someone here to discuss our thinking on this in detail, without making any dramatic announcements. In my speech I used forthright language to express what we think must be done to meet this situation.

PM Tanaka: We could continue our fruitful discussions of energy, food and the international situation tomorrow, but if I may I would like to discuss another matter about five minutes.

President: I agree that our discussions this morning have been fruitful, and look forward to continuing them tomorrow, when there would be less pressure of time.

PM Tanaka: May I? The GOJ firmly supports the MST, which is important not just to the peace and security of Japan, but also Asia. There is one important problem, however, nuclear weapons. Japan and the United States began their discussions of this question originally in the context of strategic nuclear weapons, but now tactical nuclear weapons have proliferated, and perhaps we should discuss this matter from this new point of view. I can understand that the Americans and the Europeans think about this matter in terms of a different kind of perception, but the Japanese people have a special sensitivity to nuclear weapons, which is mobilized by certain political forces for their own political ends. The question of nuclear weapons became an urgent one for the GOJ, beginning with the homeporting of the US carrier Midway at Yokosuka. You may say that it is difficult to respond to Japan on this matter, because Japan’s security is assured by the United States nuclear umbrella, but nevertheless, Japan does have a special sensitivity to nuclear weapons. I raise this issue as one for experts from both nations to examine closely; I don’t raise it simply as an argument for argument’s sake. It presents a political issue on which the GOJ must be responsive to the people. Therefore, following the publication of Adm. LaRocque’s testimony we requested your cooperation, and I now wish to reiterate that request.

President: I do understand, the special sensitivities of the Japanese people, Mr. Prime Minister, and I am familiar with the language of the MST. We are anxious to cooperate, and we understand your political problem. Our position is that something could be worked out. Secretary Kissinger will work with your people to do so, within the context of keeping the special relationship we have already developed.

Minister Kimura: What should I tell the press in the briefing scheduled for 3:30 p.m.?

Secretary Kissinger: You might mention both their Majesties’ visit to the United States; that the President and Prime Minister reconfirmed the firm relationship between both countries, including the MST; that the two leaders reconfirmed that both nations would cooperate more closely on bilateral and multinational issues, such as food; and that they discussed oil, the World Food Conference at Rome, my speech in Chicago and other world problems on which both countries could cooperate in their mutual interest.

Minister Kimura: I might say that the President gave assurance to the Prime Minister that the United States would continue to serve as a stable, long-term source of supply for food and feed grains.

Secretary Kissinger: That the President expressed his hope that Japan would remove its restrictions on beef imports.

Minister Kimura: That the Prime Minister explained Japan’s circumstances, and his desire to resume beef imports at some time. But I don’t plan to refer to Vietnam.

Secretary Kissinger: We won’t refer to the nuclear question.

Minister Kimura: That the Prime Minister expressed Japan’s wish to firmly support the MST, in the operation of which both countries ore cooperating closely. Should I say that both sides confirmed the views they have clearly stated many times, and that the United States understands Japan’s special sensitivity to nuclear weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: That could lead to other questions. I plan to follow the same line as you, in my briefing at 3:30 p.m., but I would prefer to begin by describing the importance the United States attaches to its relations with Japan. I might also say that we explained our energy proposal, and expressed appreciation for Japan’s cooperation in this area.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret. The conversation took place in the Guest House. Drafted by Wickel. For public remarks, toasts, and the joint communiqué issued during Ford’s trip, see The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1852, December 23.
2. Ford and Tanaka discussed security issues, agricultural trade, aid to South Vietnam, energy, and the mutual security treaty.