Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

196. Memorandum From John Froebe and Robert Hormats of the NSC Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, November 9, 1974.¹ ²

Washington, November 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

November 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. [JR initialed]
ROBERT HORMATS [RH initialed]

SUBJECT: Japan NSSM: SRG Meeting on November 11, 1974, at 11:00 a.m.

You have scheduled an SRG meeting for November 11, 1974, at 11:00 a.m. to consider the interdepartmental response to the Japan NSSM.

Issues

The EA/IG examined the range of issues in U.S.-Japan relations, but limited its development of options to those issues requiring the President’s decision in advance of his visit to Japan. The study thus produced options on four is issues —Yakutsk natural gas, fisheries, U.S. agricultural exports to Japan, and U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. We believe only the first three need new Presidential guidance at this point.

As regards the other issues examined, the study concluded that either existing policy guidance remains effective, or that further in-depth functional studies are required. Such studies, in our view, are needed on U.S.-Japan cooperation in international trade and monetary reforms, the U.S.-Japan-Western Europe trilateral relationship, and Siberian resource development in general. (As you will recall, a study request on the last question has just been issued.) These questions should be studied principally in a multilateral context.

The principal deficiencies in this study are that it does not adequately explore the interrelationship between the issues, relate them to some of the potential longer-range problems in Japan’s foreign policy or deal with them in terms of some of the present underlying problems in Japan’s and in our own policy. However, we would note that this NSSM study is a considerable improvement over that submitted last summer. Not only does it advance options for the Presidents consideration—which the last did not—but it also does a much better job than the usual NSSM response in defining meaningful US objectives and in relating policy options to them.

We believe the SRC meeting should focus on the four basic policy issues for which the study offers options, and on identifying issues for further study. The meeting should not get bogged down in the immediate tactical problems of the visit such as nuclear weapons transit and Tanaka’s political survival (which seems assured at least through the period of the visit).

The NSC meeting, if there is to be one, could focus on any policy issues left unresolved by the SRC meeting, but presumably would deal principally with the general state of our basic alliance relationship and would give the President an opportunity to make clear to department heads his basic views on policy toward Japan.

Background

The basic problem in our policy toward Japan at this juncture, as the NSSM states, is how to use this period of relative quietude in our relationship to get Japan to play a much more effective role on global and regional multilateral issues. A subordinate problem is how simultaneously to keep U.S.-Japan bilateral issues under control.

The NSSM study approaches this problem largely in terms of the individual multilateral and bilateral issues involved. At the same time, it would have us deal with these specific issues within a framework of some of the more constant needs of our alliance relationship: (1) to give Japan the confidence it needs in our commitment to the Japan alliance and in our basic intentions in Asia generally, particularly in light of the change of Administrations, and (2) to continue mindful of Japan’s resources vulnerability, the long-term erosion o the LDP’s domestic political base, and basic asymmetries in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

We agree that these remain the central problems in our relations with Japan. Another element which may be coming increasingly to the fore, however, is a basic dilemma in our policy—which reflects a similar dilemma in Japan’s own policy and which underlies almost all of the individual issues in U.S. -Japan cultural cooperation. The dilemma is how, on the one hand, we can get Japan to take a broader approach and to play a more active political role on global multilateral problems and to more greater equality and reciprocity in our alliance relationship, while, on the other hand, we do not put intolerable strains in our relationship with Japan or on the LDP’ s domestic political base, do not push Japan toward regionally destabilizing roles, and do recognize both the current Japanese preference for a low-profile role and the risks in Japan’s moving beyond this role too rapidly. The dilemma has perhaps been sharpened in the past year by the emphasis we have put on U.S.-Japan cooperation on multilateral issues.

Japan has come to grips with the similar dilemma in its own policy probably more squarely than we have. As seen by Embassy Tokyo, Japan is striking the balance between the conflicting objectives by defining its world role as that of a broker—between East and West, rich and poor, socialist and democratic, colored and white. This is not always to our disadvantage. If projected over the longer term, however, a broker’s role will probably not move Japan into the more active leadership role that we have in mind.

To date, we have handled the dilemma in our policy largely through a bureaucratic dialectic. Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury on the economic side and Defense on the security side, wanting Japan to share some of our burdens multilaterally or wanting larger concessions on U.S.-Japan bilateral issues, have been restrained by State’s EA Bureau, which has tended to be over-protective of the alliance relationship. The NSC Staff has at times acted as a mediator between these two groups.

The net result has been that the Japanese have been pulled in both directions at the same time by the U.S. Government, and that the basic coherence of our Japan policy has been wanting.

The Principal Immediate Issues

1. Yakutsk Natural Gas

Japan expects a U.S. response to a proposal for a $49. S million Ex-Im Bank loan for the exploration phase of the Yakutsk gas field. The paper offers three options. All three would allow private U.S. participation. They differ on whether we should (a) decide now to refuse the Japanese request for Ex-Im participation, (b) delay a decision and be noncommittal to the Japanese or (c) decide now to agree to the Japanese request.

a. Departmental Positions. State, Treasury, and Commerce favor U.S. participation in the scheme, but believe that we cannot go ahead without passage of Ex-Im legislation.

b. Our Views. We do not want to give Japan an inflated expectation of what we can provide, especially when the Ex-Im Bill is still on the Hill. A commitment to Japan made public in the U.S. would certainly provoke an adverse Congressional reaction. We can, therefore, do little but indicate that we are as yet unable to respond to the Japanese in this matter. We do, however, want to be as forthcoming as possible. We might, therefore, reaffirm our intention in principle to participate jointly with Japan, where economically feasible, in the development of Siberian resources. We might also give Japan assurance that we support the concept of U.S. firms, where they consider it appropriate, working with Japanese firms in this area.

2. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Japan

The interdepartmental paper offers three options on U.S. agricultural exports to Japan:

• —Do not give Japan, or anyone else, preferential access to U.S. agricultural surpluses.
• —Give Japan preferential access, within the constraints of overall U.S. policy, and encourage Japan to establish stockpiles in the U.S.
• —Accommodate Japan’s interest within a new framework of U.S. policies on stockpiling, long-term supply arrangements, and new GATT roles.

a. Departmental Views. All agencies agree that preferential access is inappropriate at this time and could lead to numerous demands from other countries. All share the view that within the framework prepared by your Rome speech we should attempt to meet mutual U.S.-Japanese agricultural objectives. They believe that Option C is the only appropriate choice.

b. Our Views. We agree that only Option C is appropriate. At the World Food Conference you proposed an international system of nationally-held grain reserves and a number of other measures which would involve Japan. Any decision on the U.S.-Japan bilateral problem should await the outcome of the negotiations on your proposals, in which Japan will be included. We should, as Option C indicates, do what we can to accommodate Japanese interest in this process.

c. Fisheries

The NSSM response offers four options on how to get Japan to reduce its fishing catch in the Northern Pacific by 30 percent:

• —Raise the problem officially with Japan, relying on the likelihood of a 200 mile fishing limit—either under a Law of the Sea Agreement or through U.S. legislation—for leverage.
• —Raise the issue with Prime Minister Tanaka, suggesting that Japanese cooperation would help forestall restrictive U.S. domestic legislation.
• —Offer inducements to Japan such as an increase in steel scrap quotas or special cons consideration of food supplies.
• —Threaten sanctions such as restrictions on exports of U.S. agricultural products or coal and on imports of Japanese goods.

a. Departmental Views. All agencies agree that the issue should be raised with Tanaka, but that special incentives and threats should be avoided. All support Option 2.

b. Our Views. We agree that this should be raised with Tanaka.

This is a major domestic issue in both countries. The President is committed to domestic constituencies—particularly Alaskan interests—to raise it, but he should avoid giving the problem great prominence in the discussions. The objective is to obtain Japan’s full cooperation to reach an accommodation. Too public a posture would make this more difficult.

U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

The interdepartmental paper broaches three issues—further reductions in our military presence in Japan, transferring anti-submarine warfare and airborne early warning functions in Japan’s defense to Japan, and shifting emphasis in Japan’s defense buildup away from major new weapons systems towards strengthening the logistics base for U.S. weapons systems. The paper offers options on the second issue—whether to continue discussing this issue with Japan at the military level, or whether to bring it up at the political level on the other two issues the paper offers no options but merely suggests consultation with Japan.

a. Departmental Views. Defense seems strongly interested in approaching the Japanese on these three issues. Other departments have not voiced views.

b. Our View. These issues definitely seem not ones that the President should raise during his visit. Defense’s intention in raising them at this time is somewhat unclear—the Department may only be interested in trying to interest the President in supporting this latest DOD effort to transfer part of our defense burden to Japan. This is not to say that these are not real issues, but only that the issues need to be defined much more clearly and to be worked through more thoroughly.

Consideration of the Dilemma in U.S. Policy

We believe that a systematic study of the basic dilemma in U.S. policy outlined above is warranted. Such a study would explore first the basic dilemma in Japan’s policy in its historical, cultural, political, and psychological dimensions. On the basis of this, we would then be better able to consider how we might strike a balance between the conflicting objectives that make up the dilemma in our own policy, and how to apply this to our handling of particular multilateral issues. This would, of course, not be a substitute for grappling with the substantive complications in these multilateral issues. What such a study could do is give us a much clearer grasp of the character of the dilemma, and thus a better basis for judging what roles Japan might be capable of playing on which issues at what time. It would also hopefully add coherence to our dealing with Japan on the range of multilateral issues, and thus reduce the strains we are injecting into our relations with Japan and thereby into Japan’s policy itself.

Objectives of the SRG Meeting

• —To resolve, or at least to clarify, the issues on which the NSSM study has offered options.
• —To define the scope of further studies on other issues in our Japan policy needing study.
• —To discuss the need for an NSC meeting and the agenda for that meeting.

Attached are your talking points and analytical summary on the NSSM response, and the NSSM response itself.

Concurrence s
Colonel Kennedy
Dr. Elliott

1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–13, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), SRG Meeting, Japan, November 11, 1974 (1). Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Kennedy and Elliott. There are no markings indicating that Kissinger saw this memorandum. Talking points, an analytical summary of the NSSM response, and the NSSM itself are attached but not published.
2. Froebe and Hormats summarized the response to NSSM 210 and laid out the issues for the upcoming Senior Review Group meeting on Japan.