Office of the Historian

178. Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 30, 1973.1 2

Washington, July 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

July 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.
SUBJECT: Tanaka Visit: U.S.-Japan Joint Statement

The purpose of this memorandum is to ask your guidance on the conceptual aspects of the draft Joint Statement (Tab A) to be issued at the end of Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit. I have also raised questions on a few specifics, but intend to ask your approval on a greater range of specifics after the next round.

The draft which State has worked out with the Japanese Embassy here is intended to give primary emphasis to U.S.-Japan cooperation on global and regional concerns, and secondary emphasis to bilateral issues. Thus, paragraph 2, states that “the primary focus of this meeting” was U.S.-Japan cooperation on global and regional issues, while paragraphs 3-5 describe the President and Prime Minister’s review of particular issues and reaffirmation of the need for continuing U.S.-Japan consultations on these problems. However, their discussion of how the two countries might strengthen cooperation in multilateral questions is not taken up until paragraphs 7 and 11-13, which deal with the Atlantic partnership, international trade and monetary reform, energy, and uranium enrichment. The basic U.S.-Japan alliance is reaffirmed in paragraph 6 and the Mutual Security Treaty in paragraph 8.

An alternative to this means of emphasizing the new focus on multilateral cooperation would be to begin (as in the Kuilima Joint Statement) by reaffirming the basic alliance, and then turn to the emphasis on multilateral cooperation, leaving U.S.-Japan bilateral economic problems until last. (In the Kuilima Joint Statement, the bilateral questions of China policy and trade were discussed first, and then U.S.-Japan multilateral cooperation was taken up.)

This alternative approach would make clear that the new focus was not downgrading the importance that the U.S. attaches to the strength of the basic alliance — a point on which many Japanese and other are skeptical — [Page 2] and that the new emphasis on multilateral cooperation was being undertaken very much on the basis of and in order to help strengthen the alliance. I do not agree with State’s interpretation that the President’s desire to shift the emphasis of the relationship from bilateral to multilateral requires that in the Joint Statement the new multilateral focus must be introduced first, and only then can any bilateral questions be taken up. State claims, however, that the Japanese, at least at the working level, prefer the order that State has suggested just as strongly as State does.

The several specific points which I want to raise at this point are:

  • — I would recommend that, wherever in the Joint Statement the question of U.S.-Japan multilateral cooperation is taken up, this question be treated holistically: that the specific issues be treated immediately after the general question is introduced, rather than scattered through the remainder of the statement as in the present draft, in order to make the point more forcefully and coherently.
  • — In dealing with the question of the Atlantic Declaration (paragraph 7) the present draft uses the term “Declaration of Principles.” This reflects the Japanese preference for a term that more accurately reflects the Japanese involvement than one that identifies the Declaration largely only with the Atlantic community. I agree that a more neutral term could better reflect the basic trilateral character of the arrangement.
  • — I would recommend that we also include in the treatment of the U.N. (paragraph 16) a statement reiterating U.S. support in principle for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat for Japan. Secretary Rogers about a year ago made our support for this a matter of public record. Reiterating our position in the Joint Statement would please the Japanese greatly as our recognition of their global stature — the main theme of the meetings.

Recommendations:

That the Joint Statement first reaffirm the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and then introduce the theme of U.S.-Japan multilateral cooperation.
Approve [HK initialed]
Disapprove

That the theme of U.S.-Japan multilateral cooperation be treated holistically, with the specific issues of multilateral cooperation following immediately after the introduction of the main theme in the Statement.
Approve [HK initialed]
Disapprove
[Page 3] That the term “Declaration of Principles,” rather than “Atlantic Declaration” be used to describe the trilateral declaration on the new partnership between Europe, Japan, and ourselves.
Approve [HK initialed]
Disapprove

That the Joint Statement include a reiteration of our support in principle for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat for Japan.
Approve [HK initialed]
Disapprove

Concurrence:
Mr. Hormats

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 927, VIP Visits, Japan PM Tanaka’s Visit, July 31, 1973 [1 of 3]. Confidential. Sent for action. Concurred in by Hormats. A draft of the joint draft statement is attached as Tab A. Kissinger initialed his approval of all four recommendations on August 1.↩
  2. Froebe asked Kissinger for guidance on conceptual aspects of the draft joint statement to be issued at the end of Tanaka’s visit.↩