Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

143. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, December 9, 1975¹ ²

Washington, December 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

December 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: U.S. Position on Indonesian Actions in Portuguese Timor

Recommended Stance

I am concerned that we may be becoming unnecessarily involved in the multi-faceted dispute over Portuguese Timor. I recommend that we adopt the public line that the U.S. has little information about Timor and no national interest in it. While the latter statement is more accurate than the former, neither strays from truthfulness. We should simultaneously hope for an end to hostilities there and endorse self-determination for the Timorese people.

Background

The Indonesian intervention in Timor is attracting increasingly bitter attention at the UN and in the media. The UN Fourth Committee is still debating a resolution on Timor, which now includes a proposed amendment condemning Indonesia’s actions. Both at the UN and in press statements, the PRC has joined in this condemnation and called for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal.

UN debate will probably become more acrimonious in the near future. The Security Council begins informal consultations on this subject December 9. Formal consideration will probably not occur until the Fourth Committee finishes its deliberations.

Some of the parties involved are already seeking to drag us into this fray. Embassy Jakarta reports that Adam Malik has told the Dutch Ambassador in Indonesia that during President Ford’s visit we told the GOI that we understood its problem, and did not oppose its actions in Timor. He may have told other Ambassadors as well. I fear this statement will be translated in the re-telling into American “approval” of the invasion. In addition, the Portuguese have told Ambassador Carlucci that many people are commenting about the beginning of the operation coinciding with the President’s visit.

Radio Jakarta and Fretilin sources in Australia have commented publicly on remarks about this subject that Secretary Kissinger reportedly made after the Presidents meeting with President Suharto. Radio Jakarta was ebullient because it interpreted the Secretary’s comment as supporting Indonesia’s position. Fretilin’s statement, reported in the December 8 edition of the Washington Post, criticized the Secretary for reportedly saying “the United States understands Indonesia’s position on the question.” On the other hand, Fretilin President Amaral has cabled President Ford requesting assistance.

The State Department is now deciding how we should deal with this problem. The East Asia Bureau at State sent a memorandum December 7 to the Secretary’s party (Tab B) stating that “U.S. interests — would appear to be best served by following Indonesia’s lead on this issue, while remaining responsive and receptive to Australian and Portuguese views.” Given their diametrical opposition, I do not see how we could possibly appease both Jakarta and Lisbon. The State memo also added that we should devote our efforts to getting the three parties together to work out what is essentially their problem. The Portuguese Desk and USUN are arguing for a more even handed approach.

I believe we should remain aloof. Following Indonesia’s lead may prove unwise. Portugal’s appeal to the UN and its overt cutting of diplomatic relations with Indonesia show that Lisbon takes events in Portuguese Timor seriously. The possibility of armed conflict between Indonesia and Portugal, while not probable, exists because there are several Portuguese warships still located off the Timor Coast. [text not declassified]

Controversial Issues

There are several other controversial issues which led me to recommending our staying out of this matter:

• — The Congressional issue of the use of U.S. arms in the action is surfacing in the press.
• — There will be accusations about the murder of innocent civilians during the capture of Dili.
• — [text not declassified]

Conclusion

I do not believe we should get further involved in any aspect of this problem. We have no real interests in Portuguese Timor and we can best serve our own interests by remaining aloof. If a vote comes in the UN in either the Fourth Committee or the Security Council condemning Indonesia’s actions, I recommend we abstain.

I also recommend a noncommittal public stance. Any statements by White House or executive branch press representatives which journalists could construe as supporting the Indonesian or the Portuguese position run the risk of needlessly causing an irritant in our bilateral relations with those countries. To avoid this situation, I recommend that you discuss this matter with Ron Nessen and provide him strict guidance regarding what he might say in response to questions on the U.S. position towards Indonesian action in Timor. We sent suggested Q’s and A’s (Tab C) to Margi Vanderhye on December 8 for the President’s use on this subject.

RECOMMENDATION;

That you discuss this issue with Secretary Kissinger and urge we not become involved.

APPROVE
DISAPPROVE

That you discuss this matter with Ron Nessen and provide him with the strict guidance (Tab A) on this subject.

APPROVE
DISAPPROVE

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (5). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent action. Scowcroft wrote “Is this true?” next to a statement on the first page that“The Indonesian intervention in Timor is attracting increasingly bitter attention at the UN and in the media.” On the last page, Scowcroft check marked his approval of the first recommendation and his disapproval of the second. Tab A, undated press guidance for Ron Nessen, is attached but not published. Tab B, telegram 288596 to the Secretary, December 7, is attached but not published. Tab C, undated suggested questions and answers for Ron Nessen, is also attached but not published.
2. Barnes sent Scowcroft a memorandum recommending that the United States avoid involvement in the dispute over Portuguese Timor.