57. Telegram 6871 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State1
6871. Subject: Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric Over Visit to United States.
1. FonMin Guzzetti returned to Buenos Aires Oct 14 after having spent some two weeks at the UN and in Washington. When I met him at the airport, he appeared tired but anxious to talk to me after he had reported to President Videla. Subsequently, he asked me to call on him at 6:30 p.m. the next day (Oct 15). I did so and after a wait of only a few moments, he bounded into the room and greeted me effusively with an abrazo, which is not typical of him. He took me to his private office where for 35 minutes he enthusiastically told me of the success of his visit.
2. He spoke first of his lunch in Washington with Deputy Secretary Robinson, Asst Sec Shlaudeman and Ambassador Martin. He emphasized how well they understood the Argentine problem, and said that “the consensus of the meeting was to get the terrorist problem over as soon as possible.” He said he agreed fully with Amb Martin’s warning to “be careful with the Catholic church and with anti-Semitism”, and that he had reported this to President Videla.
3. Guzzetti was almost ecstatic in describing his visit with Vice President Rockefeller. One could clearly sense the Prussian-type, simple submarine commander rather overwhelmed by his meeting with the powerful and famous Rockefeller. He complimented the Vice President on his Spanish and his knowledge of Argentina. He said that the Vice President urged him to advise President Videla to “finish the terrorist problem quickly. . . . The US wanted a strong Argentina and wanted to cooperate with the GOA.”
4. He considered his talk with Secretary of State Kissinger a success. The Secretary, he said, had reiterated the advice given to him at the Santiago meeting, had urged Argentina “to be careful” and had said that if the terrorist problem was over by December or January, he [Page 173] (the Secretary) believed serious problems could be avoided in the US. Guzzetti said the Secretary had assured him that the US “wants to help Argentina.”
5. Guzzetti said that his talks at the UN with Amb Scranton and Sec Gen Waldheim were protocolary. He had thought that in his two conversations with Waldheim the latter would raise the issue of human rights, but, in the event, he had not done so. Guzzetti said he had been embarrassed at the UN by the failure of the GOA to inform him fully and promptly concerning the Campo de Mayo bombing attempt against President Videla. This, he said, had made it very difficult for him to answer questions on the subject.
6. Guzzetti said his reception at the State Department, by the Secretary at the UN, and the ceremonies dedicating the San Martin monument had gone far beyond his expectations. He expressed appreciation that high officials in our government “understand the Argentine problem and stand with us during this difficult period.” He said he was “satisfied that the State Dept clearly understands the problem and that there would be no confrontation between the two governments over human rights.” He purposely had not brought up the letters from Congressman Harkin and a second letter from the 56 Congressmen, he said, because he “had found them (the State Dept officials) so sympathetic that he had seen no reason to do so.”
7. The GOA had wanted, he said, to name Roberto Guyer as Amb to replace Musich, but Sec Gen Waldheim at the UN had said that he could not spare Guyer until the end of the year. Guzzetti reported that he had been told agrément would be forthcoming promptly from the USG for Ambassador-nominee Aja Espil. He understood that there was not a chance Aja Espil could present credentials until after the US elections. Hence, he said, Ambassador Musich would be asked to stay in Washington until late October or early November.
8. In apparent recognition that at least for the next few months circumstances will be difficult, Guzzetti noted that he hoped future loans from the IDB might be postponed “until stability returns to Argentina” (read, to avoid the US voting no). Clearly, he hopes by January the human rights situation will be over, and that the loan applications would then go forward, assured of a favorable US vote.
9. Comment: Guzzetti’s remarks both to me and to the Argentine press since his return are not those of a man who has been impressed with the gravity of the human rights problem as seen from the US. Both personally and in press accounts of his trip, Guzzetti’s reaction indicates little reason for concern over the human rights issue. Guzzetti went to US fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warnings on his govt’s human rights practices. Rather than that, he has returned in a state of jubilation, convinced that there is no real problem with [Page 174] the USG over this issue. Based on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must now believe that if it has any problems with the US over human rights, they are confined to certain elements of Congress and what it regards as biased and/or uninformed minor segments of public opinion. While this conviction exists, it will be unrealistic and ineffective for this Embassy to press representations to the GOA over human rights violations.
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Summary: Hill noted that Guzzetti seemed to have returned from the United States without having been impressed with the gravity with which the U.S. Government viewed the human rights situation in Argentina.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760392–0544. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In an October 20 memorandum sent through Habib and Robinson, Shlaudeman informed Kissinger that Hill had “registered for the record a bitter complaint about our purported failure to impress on Foreign Minister Guzzetti how seriously we view the rightist violence in Argentina,” and he proposed to respond to Hill for the record. (Ibid., P840077–1553)
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