Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

396. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Caracas, February 17, 1976, 8:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Breakfast Meeting between Secretary Kissinger and President Perez

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Notetaker)

• Venezuela

  • President Carlos Andres Perez
  • Foreign Minister Escovar Salom

The Secretary: You know Mr. President, Rogers’ party may in fact win.

Perez: Well I have to admit we have more faith in the Democrats.

The Secretary: But the fact of the matter is, Mr. President, they’re not always competent in the field of foreign policy.

Perez: In Latin America, however, people have the feeling that the Democratic Party cares more. There has traditionally been more to their policy on Latin America. Roosevelt was a great leader. He seemed to have respect.

The Secretary: Well, I have worked for several Democratic presidents. And on the whole the foreign policy of Democratic presidents has often not been competent. They have had no theory. Now in terms of internal social policy, I am perhaps closer to the Democrats. And the same may be true of the economic aspects of our foreign policy.

Perez: It is a disturbing thing to contemplate the exercise of world leadership by people who do not understand the world.

The Secretary: There is a definite ambivalence in the American people at the present time. They loved Moynihan because he seemed to talk firmly. But the American people don’t like it if policy leads to crises. There is the most virulent anti-communism among the same Congressmen who scream no intervention. They try to suggest we use our economic aid to punish the Russians. But they are distinctly ambivalent. Take JFK for instance. I thought he was intelligent but a leader needs a sense of direction.

Perez: The problem in Latin America is what does the United States want of Latin America, and what does Latin America want of the United States.

The Secretary: Some Latin American leaders seem to feel it essential for their political responsibilities to kick the U.S. from time to time. Mr. Rogers will apologize to you tomorrow for my saying so.

Perez: I want to tell you quite frankly that we are very much afraid about the Caribbean. That is to say, Williams evidently feels the same way about us, that he has to kick us from time to time.

The Secretary: The last time I saw Williams, he advanced a very interesting theory about international law. He felt he ought to have 200 miles. And he was prepared to start measuring the 200 miles from the farthest oil derrick under his jurisdiction. I accused him of harboring the notion that he would put an oil derrick in Florida waters.

Perez: There is also a contradictory sentiment in Latin America. Power, you should understand, creates both an attraction and a fear. We are afraid because there have been interventions. Anti-U.S. attitudes are strong. And they are manipulated constantly by the ideologically committed and the terrorists. The big question is how to meet this threat. In one instance, the ex-Christian Democratic youth has protested your visit. This is all a way of conducting politics. The Christian Democratic Party will not say anything but they use youth to insinuate that COPRI is opposed to your visit.

The Secretary: You know, this is too bad in connection with the visit because the U.S. press will report that Latin America is against us.

Perez: You need to demonstrate the interest of the United States in maintaining its important relationships with Latin America.

The Secretary: This is a difficult problem. I’ve said a hundred times that we regard Latin America as of great importance to us and this is all very well as a general proposition. But the real problem is how do we do something concrete, because if we don’t figure out something on which we can all go to work, the whole discussion degenerates into rhetoric. The Alliance for Progress had its problems but it certainly enthused people to do something. The problem is now how do we work together.

Perez: We must systematize our relationships. In the first instance, we have to improve our bilateral relationships. In the second, the US also has to pay attention to the community of Latin America, and to the integration sentiment of the region. Integration is a growing movement. Latin American attitudes favor it.

The Secretary: I’m going to propose in my speech to the Symposium that we work with SELA and particularly that we try to work with them on transfer of technology.

Perez: This is good. But, at the same time since technology involves the free enterprise system in the United States, it raises the problem of the recent scandals of the TNEs.

The Secretary: I agree. It’s absurd. I condemn bribes. But for the most part, these people have done nothing illegal in the United States. They are being held to an abstract moral principle.

Perez: The Europeans are certainly a good deal less scrupulous along these lines.

The Secretary: Look what happened to the royal family. Bernhard has been severely hurt.

Perez: Then there’s the issue of agriculture. I am glad to see that the provisional fund is developing. What we are interested in is the carrying on of investigatory research in Latin America. You proposed this in Houston. We want to follow through.

There is another problem and that is trade. Your law really hasn’t affected Venezuela in its pocket, but it has done grave moral damage. I speak also of the Hickenlooper Amendment. I realize it is the parliamentary system that is at fault. Your Congressmen don’t understand us and Congress does great damage to our relationship.

The Secretary: Congress is out of control. We have to have strong leadership. Any pressure group can alter Congress’ direction.

Perez: The United States did very badly with respect to the Cuban move in Angola. Castro is clearly an adventurer. But the matter was poorly handled by the United States because it didn’t listen to our advice.

The Secretary: I agree with you. I have to emphasize that I take Latin America seriously. But sometimes the style of politics here is confrontational. It is hard to develop a relationship like ours and Europe. In human terms, our relations with Latin America are in fact warmer than with Europe, but our relations with Europe have a constancy which doesn’t exist in Latin America.

The President: What we need is to have systematic exchanges. I agree this is important. It is true that a President here, if he gets too close to the United States, is subject to public accusation. But we must cut the Gordian knot.

The Secretary: Take Echeverria. He gives a blood curdling public speech about the US and then he’ll send a private letter to me saying that we shouldn’t pay too much attention to what he said publicly.

Perez: We need more cooperation between the United States and Venezuela. I’m looking forward to reading your speech. You are right that there is more than the issue of consultation. We must have evidence that we are really treating our problems. Another major issue is the mosaic of politics in the region. Legitimacy is a major concern for a number of countries. Which raises an important question of whom the United States should deal with in such countries as Argentina and Chile. Real leaders and truly representative persons are hard to find. We must solve this problem of legitimacy.

The Secretary: We will help. Tell us occasionally what you need. With the best of intent, we sometimes lack imagination.

Perez: First, as to Cuba. We meet in the wake of a major active intervention. U.S. support is important. In the missile crisis we supported the United States totally. This was not so in the Dominican Republic case. On détente, in Latin America, we’re beginning to have a problem with the relaxation of tensions with Castro. He is responding; his language is better. We are concerned about the possibility of a surprise in the announcement of new U.S. relationships with Cuba, as well as by a surprise news announcement of an invasion. In either case, we would find ourselves in a difficult position. We need more consultation. We urged you to move at Quito. What would have happened, I ask you, if at Quito the United States had, in fact, improved its relations with Cuba. Might this have changed things and avoided Angola?

The Secretary: I don’t agree with that [at] all. Quito was a Latin American failure, in the first instance. In the second, we have had contact with Cuba. It knows we were prepared to normalize relations. We were prepared to follow the same pattern of evolving relationships that we used in China. Cuba went into Angola, after the Costa Rican meeting. I don’t think Quito provoked them. We had private messages which we sent through intermediaries which went much farther than our speeches.

I don’t care really much who runs Angola. But when a little country sends 10,000 troops across the water, we are now forced to demonstrate that they can’t do it again. We are not going to provoke them. But what we are afraid of is that once they have done it in another part of the world, they will do it in Latin America.

We realized that U.S. policy toward Cuba two years ago was not right. So we moved systematically to change it. I even discussed the possibility of meeting with Castro.

Perez: Something of the same thing happened to me. The Prime Minister of Guyana sent word suggesting a meeting with Castro to talk about the Caribbean. I responded that I would probably meet one day with Castro but Angola would not permit us to think seriously about altering our relationship now. Later I was sent a message that there was an attempt against my Government by the United States. I gave this no credit. But as to Burnham, Castro has convinced him that Brazil might invade him with a helping hand from the United States.

The Secretary: Mr. President, as to any report that we were going to make an attempt against your government, it’s not true. That should be obvious enough. It’s not been reported in the New York Times, and these days if something isn’t in the New York Times, it’s not true. Seriously, however, it is easy for other countries to create difficulties in the Western Hemisphere. But as to your government, we have every reason to help it. You are an authentic popular leader. So the idea that we would move against you is a total lie. There are absolutely no CIA activities in your country of any sort like this.

Perez: I didn’t take it seriously when it was first mentioned to me.

The Secretary: But the problem of Guyana is a serious one, particularly in their apparent willingness to refuel Cuban aircraft.

Perez: I am concerned. It is a small country but it is a spiny problem. I have told them that I can’t go through with any plan to supply them with oil at lower costs now because of Cuba. But I can’t create too much of a problem as far as Guyana is concerned because I want to avoid a reaction against Venezuela from the other black Caribbean states.

The Secretary: I had great admiration for De Gaulle. He knew that a country must move straight ahead. But the French are now prepared to recognize the MPLA. In our view, we feel there is no point in moving too quickly on the MPLA. We’re prepared to adjust over time, but not immediately.

Perez: What about Cuba and Panama.

The Secretary: If Panama identifies itself with Cuba, we will have to stop it, even if it leads to war.

Perez: I am grateful for your frank assessment. We tried to prevent the rapproachement of Cuba and Panama because we said to Torrijos that this would oblige the U.S. to respond with hostility. Of course we would have to show solidarity with Panama throughout all this. But we tried to hold them back.

The Secretary: I am quite persuaded we can settle the problem with Panama and I think it’s also fair to say that Torrijos behaved rather well in Cuba.

Perez: Torrijos has told me that there are two issues remaining. One, the duration of the treaty and, two, the lands and waters issue. As to duration, he takes the position that the treaty should not extend beyond the end of the century. If we can make any contribution to the solution of either of these problems, we would be glad to do so.

The Secretary: We can solve this bilaterally. On duration, we’re quite close. But we can’t say what the final result is going to be. I do know, however, that Panama is an explosive issue in the United States. Our effort must be to facilitate the possibility of a treaty. We are moving the negotiations along. I hope to have a treaty before the end of the year.

Perez: How will you arrange this. I’m prepared to talk to Torrijos any time I can be of help. In spite of all his defects, Torrijos is a man who is trustworthy. He wants to resolve the problem of the Canal. And he regards it as the problem of the Canal and not the problem of the U.S. We all know that failure would damage the relations of the United States with all of Latin America.

The Secretary: This time next year we’ll have a treaty to present to the Congress.

Perez: I’m also concerned about Peron. She has recessed the Congress and I think this is very dangerous. It’s very unstable in Argentina. She is discredited.

Escovar: She doesn’t understand politics. I met her once. She had a good man in Robledo and he’s gone.

Perez: I think you’re wise not to go to Argentina. But your visit to Peru on the other hand is very important. They have been tempted to confrontation but Morales Bermúdez is a moderate. These are, however, difficult times for him. We are negotiating a possible oil loan to Peru. And the Minister of Foreign Affairs has proposed the reduction of military expenditures which is a healthy sign. There is also the problem of Chile. The Bolivian outlet to the sea is the one really promising solution. The Bolivians and the Chileans are ready to exchange territories. The problem is Peru. Perhaps during your visit to Lima you could ask if the United States could do anything, and say you would be happy to help if you could.

The Secretary: I’ll do that and let you know what Morales Bermúdez says.

Perez: This is very important in Peru. We are thinking about $50 million of economic aid in the form of central bank note purchases. Peru has a very serious balance of payments problem. Morales Bermúdez is making some progress in Peru towards democracy. And they need the relations with you. What is needed is a cooperative agreement on military aid among all the countries. The prices of conventional weapons are going sky high.

The Secretary: I’ll get involved. I look forward to seeing you shortly, Mr. President.

1. Summary: Kissinger and Pérez discussed regional issues, in particular Cuba and Panama.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0876. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rogers; approved by Covey on March 8. The meeting took place at Pérez’s residence, La Casona. On February 16, Kissinger and Pérez discussed inter-American relations and Panama. (Ibid., P820117–0886) In a second February 17 conversation, they discussed oil, and Middle Eastern and Soviet politics. (Ibid., P820117–0990) Kissinger was in Caracas during a February 16–24 Latin American tour that included stops in Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Kissinger’s February 17 speech to the U.S.-Venezuelan Symposium II in Macuto, Venezuela, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1976, pp. 313–321.