Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

390. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 10, 1975, 8:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Venezuelan Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• VENEZUELA

  • Ramon Escovar Salom—Foreign Minister of Venezuela
  • Dr. Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas—Ambassador of Venezuela to the United States
  • Simon Alberto Consalvi—Ambassador of Venezuela to the United Nations

• US

  • The Secretary
  • William D. Rogers—Assistant Secretary, ARA
  • William H. Luers—Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
  • Thomas W. Sonandres—Chief of Venezuelan Affairs (Notetaker)
  • Anthony Hervas—Office of Language Services (Interpreter)

The Secretary: (On balcony) Good morning, Mr. Minister. It is very nice to see you again. Mr. Ambassador (Ambassador Consalvi), I understand that you have read my books. A London Times reviewer years ago pointed out that it is not a question of Henry Kissinger being a great writer, but that he requires great readers.

Amb. Consalvi: I am a very good reader.

The Secretary: Why don’t we require everyone attending the OAS General Assembly to read one of my books?

(Ushering the Minister to the Madison Room breakfast table) I am very appreciative for your understanding of the cancellation of my trip. I don’t know if you comprehended that the events which caused it were totally unexpected.

The Minister: We know that you have to face unexpected events. Our response was calm.

The Secretary: I appreciated how you handled the situation and your understanding. There are no headlines when Venezuela makes a calm statement.

The Minister: Calmness does not produce headlines. It was unfortunate that you couldn’t go, but understandable why you could not.

It (the explanation for the trip cancellation) demonstrated that you understand Latin America. We know that you want to go and that you can do a great deal.

The Secretary: I’m thinking now of visiting Latin America in August, if you consent.

The Minister: I think that this is fine, in principle. However, at the end of August we are planning a meeting of chiefs of state.

The Secretary: Of Latin America?

The Minister: Yes.

The Secretary: May I come as an observer?

The Minister: Perfect. It is not a meeting against the United States. Moreover, if you are present . . .

The Secretary: I’m going to the Arab Summit meeting. I’ve seen some Arab ministers more often than they have seen each other. However, there are two possibilities—either you change your summit meeting or I change my trip. I’ll discuss this with an open mind.

The Minister: There is a third possibility. You could come as an observer.

The Secretary: I can give a better anti-US exposition than you can. Pass your resolutions against the US Congress and we will support them. Note the candidate (Assistant Secretary) Rogers is supporting for Secretary of State. (Senator) McGovern has five supporters in the country for his presidential candidacy and Rogers is one. One of these days I’ll have to select an assistant secretary who supports administration policy.

The Senate has opened diplomatic relations with Cuba. The trouble with (Prime Minister) Castro is that if he continues to give each visiting senator a gift, a few prisoners, a few million dollars, what will he have left to give us when we begin negotiations? He’s got a real problem over what to give to the United States Government.

The Minister: It is a problem which has become very complicated. Previously, we had to deal with the power of the United States Executive Branch. Now, we understand that it is also important for us to deal with the United States legislature, to present it with the Latin American viewpoint.

The Secretary: When Senator Javits was preparing to visit Cuba, I was in New York to give a speech. I said there that my opposition was not with the Senator’s trip to Cuba, but to his coming back. He didn’t talk to me for several weeks.

Seriously, we basically encourage these visits which help create public interest and spread the responsibility. However, it is best that there is only one Secretary of State.

The Minister: We are extremely interested in relating with the Congress. We would like to improve our image in the United States.

The Secretary: Senator Kennedy has, beginning with the days of his brother, made important contacts in the Department of State. He telephones me, beginning the conversation with reference to a cable number. Since the Department is based upon not showing me any action cable of importance, I don’t know what he is talking about.

It is important for Latin America to be understood.

The Minister: This is our interest too. We want to reach the US Congress. We want to be a mature country. For this reason, we are interested in your visit. You can carefully analyze events and can reach very intelligent conclusions. In spite of the days of (Presidents) Roosevelt and Kennedy when there was interest in Latin America, there was never anything concrete implemented. This was due to the inexperience of Latin America and also to the lack of experience of the United States and to the too mechanical US interpretation of the facts.

The Secretary: This was one of the errors of the Alliance for Progress.

The Minister: What troubles us now is the position of the United States after Vietnam. Will the reaction be one of harshness or one more tranquil and receptive? We have seen elements of this reaction in your public comments, but it is not always easily understandable what to expect next.

The Secretary: Let me put it this way. After Vietnam, we cannot yield to any other pressure. On the other hand, we see it crucially important that we build a new international system in which a larger number of countries participate, a system in which justice is more evenly distributed. If countries choose to deal with us through confrontation, we will not react in a conciliatory fashion. Progress is not produced by confrontations.

The Minister: We strongly agree.

The Secretary: This certainly will be our policy so long as this Administration is in office and it won’t change in another Administration.

The Minister: There is anxiety, not only in Venezuela but in Latin America, that the great power of the United States, which has been, in a sense, withdrawn from Asia, will be concentrated in this area of the world in an inflexible manner. In this context, I think that the anxiety over Panama is a very interesting question of the moment. I think the world could benefit from some deflating (desinflar). The United States would be in a good position, with regard to Panama, to engage in deflating. Next year is the 600th (Note: translation error) anniversary of the Congress of Panama and the world would like to see the resolution of the issue this year.

The Secretary: 600th?

Mr. Luers: Sesquicentennial anniversary.

The Secretary: What?

Mr. Luers: 150 years.

The Secretary: I thought that Venezuela had perhaps come up with a new theory of history.

With regard to Panama, I’ll tell you exactly our position. The Administration wants to conclude the treaty and I think that we have the framework in which it could be mutually accepted, but we have massive opposition in the Congress and we have to take massive action to avoid that there be difficulties on Panama in the Congress. If there are delays in the course of our transactions, they are to further our objective. Frankly, the worst which can happen is to bring pressure against us now. The Administration does not need it and the Congress will react the other way. I think that we can manage. We also have opposition from our military. It requires some careful handling. We are now meeting in the government on this issue this week. I will try to move it to conclusion this year.

The Minister: I would be prepared to make contacts in the Congress.

The Secretary: It would help.

The Minister: What we need to do is to dialogue with both branches of the (US) government.

The Secretary: Not for long. In the long run, we cannot tolerate every country lobbying in our legislature. It (lobbying) could become intolerable. If it does, we are going to make it into a political issue next year. We don’t object if a foreign minister expresses his point of view, but only if this does not detract from the normal course of our relations. (To Rogers:) Has the Minister seen Congress? I don’t mean to object. This is fine.

The Minister: There is no need to worry. It is our political task to deal in states where there are varied political factors. The need for dialogue (with the Congress) was made obvious by the passage of the Trade Act. I understand your position and, if I were you, would feel the same way.

Another problem which worries me is the US view toward integration. It is important that each time we talk about LAFTA or the Andean Pact it is understood that we are not talking against the United States.

The Secretary: You usually are.

The Minister: Not always. I read your Houston speech. I saw that you referred to the identification of Latin America with Latin America and against the United States. Although I recognize that this Latin American identity is primary, the United States has, at times, helped us to exercise it. There are two reasons (for this identification characterization). First, as the Secretary knows, it existed in Latin America prior to Independence, a generalized identification due to being part of the Spanish Empire. In the last few years, it has expressed itself in economic independence, an expression which I use in prudent terms, because it is clear what it means. In spite of the distinct regimes in Latin America—military dictatorships as well as democracies, we concur to a great extent that this is what really identifies us, notwithstanding what the Secretary said in his Houston speech. I think that it is very important to be aware of our goal of seeking economic independence. I believe that we are providing consistency and firmness to this Latin American position.

I would like to make a very specific reference, in concrete terms, to the Venezuelan case; that is, the reaction to the nationalization of petroleum. We believe that the nationalization which we are now undergoing of the iron ore and petroleum properties is a model of democratic nationalism. I state this with little modesty. It is without revolution, without chopping heads and within juridical norms.

The Secretary: We have recognized this. I substantially agree with your position. We have had no problem with you on this. On Latin American integration, we think that it is principally a Latin American problem. We didn’t like the holding of a Latin American caucus prior to the OAS meeting as it turns the General Assembly into a confrontation. We don’t object to other efforts to integrate Latin America. We don’t object to the meeting (of Latin American chiefs of state) you described. We may object to a speech, even a Venezuelan one, but not to the concept. It is more popular in Latin America to be critical of the United States than to be in support. This is a fact of life.

Amb. Burelli: More or less.

The Secretary: I’ve been struck by the warm, personal friendships (between government leaders) upon which to build better relations. We are not in principle against Latin American integration. It should lead to some form of cooperation between the United States and Latin America. However, we understand that there has to be a process of construction first.

The Minister: Now, the moment is excellent. We have to seek a new form of cooperation. Your assistance in our fertilizer, food, agricultural production would be useful. This might be the best opportunity we have. I would like to suggest a certain reevaluation of certain principles on which our relationship is founded. For example, when we discuss multinational corporations, when we regulate their conduct, we should reevaluate the concept of ethics. We have common, historical principles and a common independence movement. In this case, the Bicentennial of the United States offers a good opportunity, one in which to think of means of cooperation between the United States and Latin America. Your own (personal) political health can help in this effort. We know that you can contribute ideas and imagination.

The Secretary: If you want to say good things about me to the Congress, I take back what I said earlier.

The Minister: In the case of Venezuela, we are a mature country. We have learned through experiences similar to those of the United States and England. We consider that we have passed through the milk-fed stage—(after translation) I was curious how lactante would be translated. Democracy is a very brief phenomenon but a very important one which gives us a good pedagogical experience. It is useful in our relations with the United States, Latin America and the Third World. In spite of everything stated against democracy, the fountainhead of democracy is still respected throughout the world. Here, Venezuela can act as a bridge.

The Secretary: I agree very much. It is a reason why our relations with Latin America and with Venezuela in particular are so crucial to us now. But, if I may be frank, ideally we should be able, if not to agree, at least to cooperate in some of the international forums being created. For example, we are, in principle, very eager to have prior consultation before something like the (Paris) producers-consumers conference. On the other hand, at the conference itself, Venezuela very often joins with the most radical group. At Paris, Venezuela was closer to Algeria than to us. If relations between the developed and developing world are to become those of bloc confrontations, then, sooner or later, the rule of power will prevail. This would be a disaster for the developing countries. It is not logical to presume that the developed nations will remain paralyzed forever. I don’t want to get into the issues of the Paris conference. They are capable of solution. We do not oppose discussing raw materials although we cannot discuss all issues at the same time. We think at some point that the conference will begin again. But we also think that we should have bilateral contacts as we do with Iran. It is natural for the United States and Venezuela to be in some regular contact. Of course, we don’t expect you to be our spokesman. We will still have disagreements. It is not even desirable, for either of us, to agree, for then some great speeches would never be made. One idea which has occurred to me is that we should discuss scientific, technological, and, occasionally, political themes. This could be through a bilateral joint commission as in the Middle East. It could allow a more natural and informal contact. We cannot do this with every country, but we thought that it could be done with Venezuela, which is in a crucial position between the developed and the Third World.

The Minister: We are fully in agreement.

Amb. Burelli: But we already have one.

The Secretary: But we can enlarge upon it. (Note: After the meeting, Mr. Rogers explained to the Secretary that bilateral talks had begun between the Department and the Venezuelan Embassy, but that nothing akin to a joint commission had been formed.)

The Minister: We have a group in the Foreign Ministry of qualified personnel including representatives of the opposition, at least of the principal opposition party.

The Secretary: Take the Paris preparatory conference. Preliminary talks could have resulted in our taking several of your ideas seriously and, perhaps, your taking a few of ours seriously. That conference was premature. We are prepared to talk about commodities, but you undoubtedly will agree that we cannot discuss all commodities. It was like the (UN) Special Assembly, it accomplished nothing.

The Minister: Undoubtedly.

The Secretary: A schedule could be set up on each commodity.

The Minister: I think that we are embarked on a path toward solution. The problem of the conference was that it tended to be too ecumenical. Like the Ecumenical Council of the church, it needs time.

The Secretary: Some developing countries call for cooperation but at a conference seek confrontation. There only can be one or the other. Some developing countries think that they can get individual advantage by maneuvering, but this will not work either. Anyone can engage in rhetoric, but, sooner or later, he must face concrete reality.

The Minister: I would like to add, with regard to our relations with Algeria, that they must be seen in the Third World context. They do not prevent Venezuela from making its own points or from holding discussions with the United States.

The Secretary: I think that this is important. The degree to which the pressure of the non-aligned is becoming a solution in and of itself. The moment could come when the most cohesive alliance is that of the non-allied which could produce a counter-organization.

Let me make an aside. I personally like the Algerian leaders, especially (President) Boumediene. My experience there has been that he has his problems in resolving what he says publicly with what he is prepared to do realistically. I blame myself for not speaking with him before the Paris conference. The Europeans confuse him. They do him no favor by not telling him the truth. I already think that Boumediene is a good man, but the position which he takes depends upon the advice he receives. We must prevent the elevation of rhetoric. I think that we have to set up a more formal structure which can be helpful. There is no reason for confrontation. We have no reason to split Venezuela off from her friends. You are mature enough to know what are your own interests. So, if we can proceed on this basis, it would be useful.

We’ll send Rogers to some meeting. He never says much.

The Minister: We agree. I understand that there are some subjects which we can discuss. I don’t want to take up too much of your time, but with regard to the OAS, there is the matter of Cuba. What produces unnecessary concern are the leftist groups in Latin America taking it as a cardinal problem, a crucial issue. I understand that prevailing criteria, that of you yourself, is to seek that the matter is not resolved now. I would express our concern that the matter be settled as soon as possible. Venezuela is not engaging in any escalation of rhetoric.

The Secretary: It has escalated to a pretty good level already. Rogers will apologize for me later.

The Minister: I would like to state that the Inter-American system, the OAS Charter, the Rio Treaty, as they function now, are rather inefficient in solving this irritating problem. I cannot analyze the internal domestic problem of the United States, the internal factors which operate. However, finding the way to resolve Cuba and other bilateral and multilateral issues would clear the way for your own Latin American trip. This could be done before you go to Latin America. This is of the greatest interest now, here at the General Assembly. As it stands now, it will be an innocuous meeting.

The Secretary: The best way out of this dilemma is to put the issue to a special meeting, in June if you want. At that conference, we would vote to permit each nation to maintain the pursuit of its own policy. This can be taken up before I go to Latin America, but we don’t think Washington is the best place to make this decision.

The Minister: I think that you underestimate Washington.

The Secretary: But this could be done in the next six weeks. We would be in a position to agree to arranging such a meeting. We would support both procedural solutions and the result at the conference.

The Minister: I think that this position is very positive, even though I am not aware of what internal factors are involved. Our concern is with an OAS decision. Its prestige has deteriorated and could be weakened still more. Its weakening is not good, neither for the United States nor Latin America.

The Secretary: The OAS can grant powers to a special organ of consultation and we would all have the matter going in the right direction. The meeting could be in June.

The Minister: This could renew the new dialogue. There are disadvantages. There are great expectations at this (OAS) meeting that we are going to find a magical formula for the Charter and the Rio Treaty. I personally believe that we should be conservative in modifying the norms of the OAS. We can object extensively to the watch mechanism of the OAS, yet not produce anything better. Since there is no great thing which will result from the Assembly, the resolution of the Cuba issue would give a great psychological expression to it. I emphasize the psychological because Dr. Kissinger gives great significance to psychological factors. We must also grant new value to this aspect. We must not give the impression of rigidity to gain time. I will have to consult with the President of Venezuela.

The Secretary: Do so. We are prepared for a solution in June.

Mr. Rogers: We can comment on this now.

The Secretary: We can issue a statement at this (General Assembly) meeting.

The Minister: This could be done in a fashion so that we do not create the image of dilatoriness.

The Secretary: We could discuss all reforms of the Charter and Rio Treaty and ratify them too.

The Minister: Possibly.

The Secretary: Why don’t you consult with your President?

The Minister: I agree.

The Secretary: What else? The secretary generalship of the OAS. If there is an impasse, I shall be the candidate. The State Department would unanimously support me. I’ve now reached the point where I only occasionally swear in an ambassador who doesn’t want my job. I swore in one ambassador who wanted it. He held a press conference before the swearing in saying that he wanted the job and then again afterwards at another. But, do you have any ideas? We are interested in your position.

The Minister: We haven’t decided. We are consulting. Monday perhaps, maybe tomorrow we will have a position.

The Secretary: We are not supporting any candidate.

The Minister: We can discuss this point.

The Secretary: On the boat?

The Minister: Monday I’ll be seeing you.

(Rising) I think that we are on a positive road.

The Secretary: I’ve been very pleased with the meetings which we’ve had. I think that we are developing a good relationship. We think that a strong Venezuela pursuing its own policy is in our interests. We want to maintain rational positions. (Escorting the Foreign Minister to the elevator and then to the Diplomatic entrance)

The Minister: I had a good talk with Ambassador Shlaudeman before coming to the United States.

The Secretary: I’m pleased. He’s a good man.

The Minister: Until later, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary: Good-bye.

1. Summary: Kissinger and Escovar discussed the trade bill, Panama, the Paris producers-consumers conference, Cuba, and the OAS.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125–0215. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Sonandres. The conversation took place in the James Madison Room at the Department of State. On April 23, President Ford informed Pérez that Kissinger was cancelling a planned trip to Latin America because of the “tragic events in Indochina,” adding that he had asked Kissinger to give high priority to rescheduling the trip. (Telegram 93044 to Caracas; ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Kissinger’s March 1 Houston speech is published in the Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1975, pp. 361–368.