374. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) to Acting Secretary of State Rush1

Venezuelan Election

On December 12, Lorenzo Fernandez, the COPEI candidate, conceded victory to the Democratic Action candidate, Carlos Andres Perez. Perez’ electoral triumph by 350,000 votes, an 8% majority, was a landslide. (For background, see attached memo—Venezuelan Elections, Tab B.) Unlike Caldera’s outgoing Social Christian (COPEI) Administration, Perez appears likely to enjoy a majority in Congress.

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From the standpoint of major United States interests, Perez’ election may be significant along the following lines:

Petroleum

Primary U.S. interest in Venezuela continues to focus on petroleum. (Venezuela supplies 30% of all U.S. petroleum imports.)

President-elect Perez stated during a recent press conference that:

—He would never impose an embargo as Venezuela’s OPEC associates have done.

—Like it or not, the U.S. is Venezuela’s main petroleum market.

—His government would “speed up implementation of the Reversion Law” by which foreign oil concessions begin to revert to the state in 1983.

In view of Venezuela’s rapidly diminishing reserves (12–14 years at current production levels), Perez favors development of the Orinoco Tar Belt. While he recognizes that such development will require foreign investment and technology, Perez stated that the Tar Belt would be exploited according to Venezuela’s interest; it will not be exploited to serve the needs of developed countries.

Energy Agreement

Perez stated on December 11 that “our oil policy will be a great instrument to break down trade barriers—it will be a Latin American weapon against the totalitarian trade policies of the industrialized nations against the developing countries.” This suggests that in return for the “security” of Venezuelan oil supply to the U.S. market, the new government will endeavor to win from the U.S. assurances of unrestricted supplies of the foodstuffs, raw materials and commodities needed for Venezuela’s industrial development. Perez will also seek preferential access to the U.S. market for non-traditional Venezuelan exports.

Foreign Affairs

Perez stated that “Venezuela will endeavor to have good relations with all countries . . . above all with the U.S.” AD leaders cherish their long history of close relations with U.S. Government officials, as well as with U.S. political and labor leaders.

Perez is likely to:

—continue, but on a lower key, Caldera’s Caribbean initiative;

—play a greater leadership role in the Andean Pact;

—continue President Caldera’s policy of negotiations on the Colombian border dispute;

—dissipate Caldera’s momentum to establish relations with Cuba.

—continue Venezuela’s moderate Law of the Sea stance.

  1. Summary: Kubisch informed Rush that on December 12, COPEI candidate Fernandez conceded defeat to AD candidate Andrés Pérez in the Venezuelan presidential election. Kubsich discussed the significance of Pérez’s electoral victory for United States-Venezuelan relations.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of North Coast Affairs, Records Relating to Venezuela, Lot 73D423, 1973 Presidential Elections, Political 14, Venezuela, 1973. Confidential. Drafted by Forrester. Tabs A and B were not attached. In telegram 8948 from Caracas, October 18, McClintock reported that the election would be close and that the United States could live with either the AD or the COPEI candidate. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 222224 to Caracas, November 10, the Department observed that it was in the U.S. interest “for December 9 to witness free, orderly, honest exercise in representative democracy followed by peaceful and constitutional turnover of power to whatever leaders people of Venezuela may freely elect to govern them during coming five years.” (Ibid.)