Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

274. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, February 23, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following report be passed to you on his visit to Bogota:

The contrast between Brazil and Colombia could hardly be greater. It is not just a matter of hot versus cold, or high versus low—though Bogota, I find to my discomfort, is about 9000 feet high. Brazil is protocol and rush from one mass meeting of ministers to another but with close attention to economic detail, energy prospects, ore exports, arid agriculture and so forth. Here, President Lopez-Michelson suggested that we repair to his equivalent of Camp David, for long philosophical talks in the evening and this morning. I confess I rather like it this way, particularly when the talks are with someone as acute as President Lopez.

He remembers his visit with you warmly. We have picked up where you left off. As you know, we have no bilateral problems with Colombia. They are moderately disturbed that our Senate Foreign Relations Committee cannot even consider the treaty we have proposed to quitclaim our interests over some Caribbean reefs to Colombia. They take this, not as an insult to themselves so much as a hint of what is in store for us all from Congressional management of other, larger foreign relations issues. They are interested in our trade relations, particularly in more flexibility for textile imports. But with Lopez, these issues are too small to create complexes. With him, we can talk broadly about Latin America and the world, knowing that he is not grinding any particular local axes.

He, like every other Latin leader I have met, is profoundly concerned with our current political process. He knows the details of the campaign thus far, is not impressed by the Democratic pack and is well aware that we are in a difficult transition process. He is appalled by the frivolity with which we disclose information extremely damaging to other countries. He hopes that a stronger executive will emerge after November and he can hardly wait.

Cuba is much on his mind. As an international lawyer, he recognizes the juridical issues and talks to them in public. During one meeting with the press, he hinted that he did not see much legal difference between what the Cubans were doing in Angola and our effort in Vietnam, i.e., it was bad. But the real meaning of the Cuban adventure in Angola is for him—he told me privately—the specter of race warfare. He is persuaded that Castro will now be tempted to turn his attention to the Caribbean, emerging from Angola as a successful fighter against white imperialism and with extraordinary credentials as the savior of the blacks everywhere. There are, the President points out, no lack of troubled waters in the Caribbean for his fishing—from Belize in the west all the way to Guyana on Venezuela’s border. Colombia itself has its own festering race problem on the coast and on its several Caribbean Island possessions. But as Lopez wisely points out, it is impossible to talk about this dimension in public, for to do so will only make matters worse.

In private, though, he is prepared to admit that he is as concerned now about Cuba as President Perez of Venezuela is, but that he sees the danger as a new Cuban strategy to exploit the racial dimension in the troubled geopolitics of the region. He thinks Castro will just not go to his grave before he has tried for some role in the world beyond Cuba, and Lopez does not see that Castro role as a constructive or peaceful one.

This is what gives point to his concern about our position in the world, and our capacity, given Congressional division and electoral preoccupation, to manage our own power effectively this year. I stressed to him my conviction that you were a strong President, more able and more conscious of this problem than any other contender, that you would win, and that the United States would regain much of its domestic equilibrium and self-confidence after the November election.

1. Summary: Scowcroft informed the President of Kissinger’s conversation with López, in which they discussed the Quita Sueño issue, textiles, and the racial dimension to potential Cuban intervention in the Caribbean.

   Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 176, Trips, February 1976, Trips Book, Folder 11. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Information. Ford initialed the memorandum. Kissinger held conversations with López and other Colombian officials on February 22 and February 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–0997 and P820117–0809) In telegram 54203 to Bogotá, March 5, the Department informed the Embassy of the follow-up action after the Secretary’s conversations. (Ibid., D760086–0764)