Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

249. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, October 8, 1976.

Operation Condor

[less than 1 line not declassified] reporting on the approach made in accordance with your instructions to Colonel Contreras, Chief of the Chilean National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA). As expected, Contreras denied that Operation Condor has any other purpose than the exchange of intelligence. Contreras also revealed that he was already aware of our concern.

The approach to Contreras seems to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor. The other intelligence services are also aware of our concern [less than 1 line not declassified] and now, undoubtedly, by way of Contreras. We will continue to watch developments closely and recommend further action if that should be necessary.

Attachment:

[less than 1 line not declassified]

1. [1 line not declassified] met with Juan Manuel Contreras, Chief of the Chilean National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), and an aide to discuss Operation Condor.

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] is very worried about reports it has received from various sources on the formation of Operation Condor by DINA and its counterparts in the Southern Cone and Brazil. [less than 1 line not declassified] that according to our reliable information, Operation Condor consists of two elements: the exchange of intelligence concerning extremists and the planning of executive actions—assassinations—against extremists in Europe and other foreign areas. [less than 1 line not declassified] is extremely concerned about the latter aspect. Contreras said that he was aware of our concern.

3. Contreras said that our information is distorted. Operation Condor does exist, has its headquarters in Santiago, but its only purpose is the exchange of intelligence concerning the extremists within the participating countries, which include Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil. Contreras added that Condor can already take credit for preventing two assassination attempts against President Hubo Banzer of Bolivia. He commented that any Condor member would be violating the agreement if it carried out any missions independently of the others and expressed confidence that such had not occurred.

4. Contreras denied that Condor is even thinking of implementing executive actions even though the extremists are planning and carrying out such actions all the time. As examples, Contreras cited the attempted assassination of President Jorge Videla of Argentina on 2 October and an uncovered attempt against President Augusto Pinochet of Chile about a month ago. Contreras commented that even if DINA had contemplated executive actions in Europe, which it has not, it could be carried out effectively only by agents who had lived in Europe for a long time and DINA has no agents who meet this criteria.

5. Contreras claimed that DINA has only two officials abroad, a liaison officer in Brazil and another in Argentina, and denied that there are any officials in Europe or Washington. According to Contreras, Colonel Mario Jahn, former deputy director of DINA, reverted back to the Air Force before leaving on his assignment to Washington. (He arrived in January 1976 to become a member of the Inter-American Defense Board.)

6. Contreras repeated that [less than 1 line not declassified] its fears about Condor’s real motives are unfounded.

1. Summary: Shlaudeman reported that, when questioned about Operation Condor, DINA Director Contreras responded that it consisted only of intelligence-sharing operations and that it did not involve the planning of assassinations.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860053–1545. Secret. Attached and published is a memorandum summarizing an October 3 meeting with Contreras in Santiago. In telegram 246107 to Santiago, October 4, drafted on October 2, Shlaudeman informed the Embassy in response to telegram 8210 from Santiago, published as Document 242, that the Department agreed “that our purpose can best be served through [less than 1 line not declassified] approach to Contreras and that the issue should not repeat not be raised with Pinochet. [less than 1 line not declassified] is receiving instructions to consult with you on manner and timing of approach.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, 1963–1979) In an attached note, Shlaudeman informed McAfee, “I have authority from above for this. Would appreciate no clearances shown and distribution confined to S, P, M, you and me.”