Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

243. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs (Fimbres) and the Officer-in-Charge of Chilean Political Affairs (Driscoll) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman)¹

Washington, August 25, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Charles Horman Case

This case remains bothersome. The connotations for the Executive are not good. In the Hill, academic community, the press, and the Horman family the intimations are of negligence on our part, or worse, complicity in Horman’s death. (While the focus of this memo is on Horman, the same applies to the case of Frank Teruggi.)

We have the responsibility:

—categorically to refute such innuendos in defense of U.S. officials;

—to proceed against involved U.S. officials if this is warranted.

Without further thorough investigation we are in a position to do neither. At the moment we do not have a coherent account of what happened (see attached “Gleanings”). That is why we believe we should continue to probe.

Based on what we have, we are persuaded that:

—The GOC sought Horman and felt threatened enough to order his immediate execution. The GOC might have believed this American could be killed without negative fall-out from the USG.

There is some circumstantial evidence to suggest:

—U.S. intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman’s death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia.

Our leads are:

—Rafael Gonzalez: His mental condition is open to question. Yet this may be selective since he can also be pretty lucid. If he is unbalanced, it is for Chilean intelligence to explain why they kept him on the payroll for so many years and used him as contact with us on Horman. We should question him further along the lines suggested in the enclosure.

—Enrique Sandoval’s brother: Inquiry would have to be made with considerable discretion. Approaching the brother (most likely, Colonel Guillermo Sandoval Velasquez) to confirm Horman was shot at the stadium would be terribly sensitive. Revelation of his indiscretion in 1973 would endanger the Colonel and possibly others. We are skeptical that anything positive can be accomplished through this line of inquiry.

—The GOC: The Chileans have failed satisfactorily to explain why Gonzalez was chosen to deal with our Consulate in the search for Horman’s body. We could press them on this point. Preferably after we clarify a few things with Gonzalez. We could also ask for a complete copy of the autopsy of Horman’s body, which we do not seem to have.

— CIA: [4½ lines not declassified]. Further, we find it hard to believe that the Chileans did not check with the Station regarding two detained Americans when the GOC was checking with Horman’s friends and neighbors regarding Horman’s activities. The Station’s lack of candor with us on other matters only heightens our suspicions.

—Other Actors: Accounts by Mrs. Horman, Terry Simon, Frank Manitzas, Capt. Davis, and others don’t all fit in place. There is room for further inquiry here. But this should wait a bit.

—Coroner/morgue: We have accepted without questioning the morgue record that a body, later identified as Horman’s, was dumped in the street and was logged into the morgue at 1330, 9/18. A death certificate was issued a week later and an autopsy was performed October 5 putting the time of death as 0945, 9/18. This implies that Horman was killed no later than about 17 hours after being detained. That is, he was shot early 9/18. This is in conflict with reports the Chilean intelligence was trying to get a line on Horman throughout the morning of 9/18. Is it possible the records are phony to conceal the time of death? And why?

—DIA/FBI: We have asked INR to question both DIA and FBI about any records they might have on Horman and Teruggi. We have assumed all along that the liaison, if any, was the CIA. We may be wrong. This is an avenue we have to either follow or close.

—Teruggi: Finally, the Horman and Teruggi links are interesting. Both worked for FIN (clipping service), did chores for Professor Fagin at the Ford Foundation, and both were arrested and almost immediately shot. Of 80 Americans who required the Embassy’s attention, only these two appear to have been tortured and then shot. In their October 30 memo to Colonel Hon the Chileans lumped them together as radicals. Gonzalez’ statement that Horman was considered as knowing too much comes to mind. Further inquiry must tie in the circumstances of both deaths.

1. Summary: Three officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs reported their research and findings in Department of State records on the disappearance and death of Charles Horman.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Information Management Services, Job 09–02528R, Box 2, Horman/Teruggi/Weisfeiler [3 of 5]. Secret. Forwarded through Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The memorandum was also signed by “W.V. Robertson,” possibly referring to William Van Bogaert Robertson, who at the time worked in the Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but may have been temporarily detailed to the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to assist on the Horman case. The “Gleanings,” which provided more detail on the memorandum’s findings, is attached but not published. None of the other referenced documents, in particular, the October 30, 1973, memorandum to Colonal Hon, are attached.