234. Telegram 158555/Tosec 170316 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger1
158555. Tosec 170316. Subject: Security Assistance to Chile. For the Secretary from Robinson.
[Page 635]The Problem:
1. Humprey is most unhappy about the spare parts package. He thinks we did not deal fairly with him. The $9 million in aircraft spares is apparently acceptable, but the $6 million in army and navy spares now reprogrammed into the pipeline came under highly critical examination by Humphrey’s staff. We could cancel these latter signed contracts (which we can legally do) and probably retain Humphrey’s good will, although at cost to our relations with Chile. Or, we can go ahead as planned, alienating Humphrey and risking Senate action to retaliate, perhaps within the appropriations bill for 1977.
Discussion:
2. Senator Humphrey and his staff have reacted vigorously and critically to our decision to go ahead with the spare parts package for Chile. Humphrey and Kennedy are quoted in today’s Washington Post as complaining that we are rushing spare parts deal through as last-ditch effort to beat Congressional ban. Post quotes “It is a shoddy deal, said Humphrey angrily.”
3. In phone conversation this morning with Humphrey, he urged me to reconsider the $6 million army and navy spare package, which he emphasized was a direct flaunting of the expressed intent of the conference to suspend future spare parts sales. The air force segment ($9 million) he indicated was at least a logical extension of the pipeline F–5 sales, but the army/navy package was not even support for pipeline material. Humphrey urges that we cancel the army/navy LOA’s and substitute $6 million of the air force component into the pipeline. Then he said, he believed there would be little opposition to the remaining incremental $3.2 million spare package which would be strictly support items for the F–5 pipeline sales. This process would assuage Humphrey’s irritation and be seen as a fair compromise.
4. Humphrey told McCloskey in a telephone call yesterday his considerable disappointment that we had decided to go ahead before he could examine all the facts and make a recommendation. His staff subsequently focused on two criticisms: that we sought the Senator’s advice but gave him no real chance to give it; and that the $6 million of spare parts for the army and the navy now reprogrammed into the pipeline relates to equipment the Chileans have had for some time, and not to items in the existing pipeline. This, they asserted, is clearly contrary to the intent of the Congress and not what he had understood from our briefing.
5. We now face leaving Humphrey with a sense of having been dealt with in a less than candid fashion. Considerable Congressional flack can be expected in any case. But Humphrey feels that he did the administration a service in saving the Chilean pipeline from Kennedy’s [Page 636] assault, and serious damage to our relationship could result if he were to be left with sense of having been badly aggrieved. It should be noted that the security assistance legislation (appropriations) is not yet out of the Senate. If we lose Humphrey, there is the chance that Kennedy might yet be able to mobilize enough votes to punish our programs, even though the Chilean package would probably survive.
6. On the other side, the Chileans have now signed the letters of offer reprogramming the $6 million of nonpipeline spares into the pipeline. The Chilean army and navy regard these spare parts as critical. If we cancel, there will be a strong reaction from Santiago. Humphrey’s formula would mean deletion of $6.0 million in army and navy spares which were not in the original pipeline, are not related to the pipelined aircraft and which we in State were not aware were unrelated to the pipelined aircraft until yesterday. It would also delete the $6.0 million in trucks which were in the original pipeline but which the Chileans can purchase from other sources. As you know, the prospects for working out a constructive relationship with the Chilean Government and of obtaining significant progress on human rights are fading as the Chileans perceive US as taking a series of hostile or retaliatory actions.
7. Although perhaps difficult for the Chileans to believe, it is the case, however, that they were most fortunate that the pipeline was preserved. As matters stand, we will be able to deliver the aircraft they want above all else—and to provide the $9.2 million supplemental package of aircraft spares. We would probably be able in time to bring them to the realization that the loss of the spares for the army and the navy could be considered of minor importance compared with the threat of losing the F–5’s.
8. I have discussed this with Scowcroft who agrees that a viable relationship with Humphrey is too important to jeopardize for the sake of preserving $6 million in spare parts for Chile not related to aircraft.
9. Recommendations:
a) That we act expeditiously as urged by Humphrey to cancel the two letters of authority with the Chileans (which we can legally do) which provide the Chilean army and navy with approximately $3 million each of open-ended spare part requisitional authority for established inventory equipment and substitute $6 million of aircraft spares. With the incremental spares package of $3.2 million we would cover the $9.2 million total requirement of spares for pipelined aircraft.
b) Alternatively, we can sit tight, absorb whatever flack we get and hope that Congressional irritation will be manageable.
c) Or, cancel the $6 million army/navy spare LOA’s and reinsert the $6 million original order for trucks in the pipeline. This would leave us with an incremental aircraft spare package of $9.2 million.
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Summary: In order to avoid alienating Senator Humphrey, Robinson recommended that Kissinger approve a $6 million agreement for aircraft spare parts for Chile as opposed to two open-ended $3 million contracts.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760110–0978. Secret; Immediate. Sent for action. Drafted by Robinson, Jenkins, and Shlaudeman; cleared by McCloskey and Jordan; approved by Robinson. Kissinger was in the United Kingdom for meetings with Callaghan and Crosland. Kissinger approved Recommendation A. The first sentences of paragraphs one and three were underlined, as was the phrase, “cancel the letters of authority,” in the first sentence of paragraph nine. A notation on the front of the telegram reads: “SECTO 17079 answers 6/27.” Secto 17079 from Dorado June 28, transmitting the Secretary’s approval of Recommendation A, is ibid., D760249–0371.
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