Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

229. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 14, 1976, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Raul Cardinal Silva

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.CHILE

  • The SecretaryRaul Cardinal Silva
  • Under Secretary William D. Rogers
  • ARA/BC/C, Robert S. Driscoll (notetaker)
  • Anthony J. Hervas (Interpreter)

Secretary Kissinger: Do you speak English, Your Eminence?

Cardinal Silva: Unfortunately, no.

Kissinger: As you know, I’ve just come back from Chile.

Silva: Yes, the Ambassador called me in Panama to say that you wanted to meet with me. I am here at your disposition this week.

Kissinger: I was very moved by the Chilean people.

Silva: We are in a situation which is perhaps the most serious in our history. Our chief is now an army general—the first in 150 years. We have never had one before. We find ourselves greatly surprised.

Kissinger: Do these military people have a Nazi mentality?

Silva: Most do not—however, the group in power does. They have found support in a tiny fascist group in Chile.

Kissinger: It is hard for us to judge that what is happening is not the result of previous conditions.

Silva: I believe that the coup was due to the lack of political tact on the part of the Marxists. They used, preached and glorified violence. They declared class war—especially against Chile’s powerful middle class. The middle class combined with the upper class and made possible the military takeover. They managed to overcome the old tradition that the military not interfere in politics. Once the military took power, the people did not oppose them. The majority were not with Allende. I would say 70% of the people were against the government.

Kissinger: Yes, but that 70% was not united.

Silva: The 70% were against Salvador Allende. When the military took power the extreme right got on the bandwagon and became the real power. Now the situation is reversed. Now I would say that only 30% are with them. All of the democratic forces, and this includes most of the right, and the left are against the military. Because of this they prohibit all elections, labor unions and other organizations. There is no possibility of doing anything against them.

Kissinger: What do you think, Your Eminence, should happen?

Silva: The military must change the manner of its behavior. Because the military is united no one else has a chance of forcing this change. We must return to a democratic system. We cannot expect abrupt change. It will be gradual change. Human rights and labor rights have to be restored. Then the military must invite all the political parties to collaborate to restore the country.

Kissinger: Over what period of time would this take place?

Silva: It is impossible to say. We are starting to hear among the military of a debate over how the country is being run. We have the possibility, with the help of the U.S., to influence this process.

Kissinger: How?

Silva: Pinochet asked through a military friend that I help him in the U.S. I replied that Pinochet must help me to help him. Your (U.S.) pressure must continue. You have to say, “allow us to help you.” They have to change their manner of governing. They do not understand the U.S. situation. Here you have to consult with the people and you cannot do anything against the will of the people.

Kissinger: This is more or less what I told Pinochet. The thing that concerns me is that many people want to cut off all relations. I do not think this will succeed. Rather, this would bring back the left wing problem of before.

Silva: I do not know. The left wing is made up of friends of Allende. We do not want to help only a small group of people. We want to be sure that we help all the people. We want to assist the democratic forces.

Kissinger: We would have preferred a Christian Democratic Government. But they move the same way the Christian Democrats in Europe are moving. Their program became indistinguishable from the Marxists. This leads to a general demoralization.

Rogers: The left wing of the Christian Democrats are that way.

Kissinger: I have said the same thing to His Holiness, who agreed with me.

Silva: I do not defend the Christian Democrats. Jaime Guzman, the ideologue of the military, asked if the Church’s only solution is Christian Democracy. I replied that we work within a broad Christian framework. The Tomic program lost the election as would any similar one.

Kissinger: What we would have liked to have seen was a Christian Democrat win.

Silva: Yes, but they provided for the success of Allende. The Frei government was a lot different from the one proposed by Rodomiro Tomic.

Kissinger: There is no question about it. We support the return of democracy in Chile. I made that very clear while I was there. Pinochet promised me they would publish a new constitution very soon. But we have not seen it.

Silva: This could be a serious error. They do not plan to consult with the people. What sort of constitution will that be? One without the right to strike? But the constitution will be a step forward. It is not important that it has some bad features because these will be shortly changed.

Kissinger: What does Your Eminence think we should do? You do not want us to single you out? What concretely can we do?

Silva: I can suggest only part of what you might do. You have the over all insight. You have to help the Chilean people. Many are hungry. We have to save the organizations that are necessary for democracy. We have to save the cooperatives and the unions. By repressing these groups the military is giving more power to the Communists. If we do not save the organizations—the unions and the cooperatives—in a few more years, after the emergency period is over, the Communists will be the most powerful group. The Church has many social action organizations. A word from you to the foundations could save these organizations.

Kissinger: Are you going to talk to the foundations?

Silva: Yes, the Ford Foundation and the Inter-American Foundation.

Kissinger: What did they say?

Silva: The Ford Foundation said that if Mr. Parker would say something favorable, it would be very easy to provide funds.

Kissinger: Why should Parker have anything to do with it? I know Mr. McGeorge Bundy. I shall talk to him.

Silva: We have a good program—a food for work program. Our organization is not part of the government. If you could help support this, it would be most important.

Silva: I want to talk to you about something very confidential. I want to ask that the CIA not tell DINA that “so-and-so” is a Communist.

Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge this is not done.

Silva: The Montealegre arrest was due to this. Hernan Montealegre was a lawyer for the Solidarity Vicariate.

Kissinger: It is inconceivable. In any large organization the reserves of stupidity seem inexhaustible. I haven’t heard of it. It is unauthorized. I’ll have to check on it. (To Rogers) Have you heard of this?

Rogers: No, especially not in this case.

Silva: I heard this from another Intelligence Service, not DINA, and they tell me that this is so.

Kissinger: I can’t guarantee it is not true. These things normally do not come through me. If it was true, I assure you that it will be stopped.

Silva: This must be handled with much discretion.

Kissinger: We are interested that you continue as our conscience. We do not want to do anything to make your position difficult. We shall be grateful for your suggestions from time to time.

Rogers: We have seen each other from time to time.

Kissinger: We shall keep in touch.

Silva: I am grateful for the chance to visit you. This gives me support. Pinochet asked that I talk with people in your Congress about economic assistance. We have a human rights problem, yes, it is getting better, yes; I hope the present situation ends. I cannot lie for these people.

Kissinger: The danger is that Congress takes all its ideas from the Allende exiles.

Silva: They want a complete overthrow—this would be a worse error.

Kissinger: If you could point out a middle course, it would be most helpful.

Silva: I could talk with Senator Kennedy.

Kissinger: Could we publicize this meeting, Your Eminence?

Silva: Of course—that is what is needed.

1. Summary: Kissinger and Cardinal Silva discussed the political and human rights situation in Chile.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1245. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Driscoll; cleared by Fimbres; approved by Rogers. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. On May 29, Rogers recommended Kissinger meet with Silva, given the Cardinal’s prominence as a human rights advocate. Such a meeting would demonstrate Kissinger’s sincere interest in the issue, Rogers said. (Ibid., P840150–0525) At a June 25 meeting of ARA and CIA officials, a CIA official reported that “at the present there is nothing going on with DINA; we are providing no equipment, training or technical support–nothing to abet repression of human rights, but if Cardinal Silva spreads stories of CIA–DINA collaboration, we’re in the soup.” (Memorandum of Conversation, June 29; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977)