Office of the Historian

225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger1

Washington, June 5, 1976.

CHILE—Your Meeting with Pinochet and the FMS Cash Pipeline Problem

The Hill is on the verge of resolving how we proceed on the Chilean pipeline. A decision is likely while you are on your trip. We expect Senate action on the FAA on June 8 and a conference report by the end of next week. An immediate cut-off is a possibility.

President Pinochet will undoubtedly raise the subject with you. He will stress the importance of the U.S. meeting its commitment on matériel deliveries. He may want assurances the Executive would veto any cut-off. However, the President has signaled that he would not veto on the issue of Chile alone. We cannot be optimistic.

We suspended delivery of FMS cases during 1975 because of Section 25 of the FAA, which prohibited new FMS credits and FMS cash sales. With expiration of this provision in June 1975, we proceeded to release matériel and approved F–5 pilot training. Of a total of $5 million which we approved, about $650,000 went for F–5 pilot training [Page 614] and the rest for non-lethal spare parts. Some $112 million still remains in the pipeline, including a squadron of F–5s and a squadron of A–37s.

The House bill would leave the pipeline alone. Were this to prosper, it might be taken as signalling Hill approval for us to move ahead on deliveries. The Senate Committee bill would immediately enact an embargo. We expect the full Senate to vote on the bill June 8 (there are no amendments so far).

If House action this week cutting off all military assistance for Uruguay on human rights grounds is any indication, we may expect some House pressure to accept the Senate version in conference.

The Congressional climate toward Chile has deteriorated further, despite the Simon trip and his meeting with the SFRC. Hence, an immediate shut-down of the pipeline is possible. It is hard to think of a single action which could at one stroke more thoroughly impair U.S./GOC relations. In Chilean eyes, the F–5s have become an unusually important test case of the USG’s reliability and adherence to its pledged word. Impending arrival of the first aircraft has been prominently publicized in the local press. Even the junta’s Chilean critics would view a cut-off negatively in the context of Chile’s defenselessness against Peru.

Pinochet and his colleagues are fully aware of the progress of the two bills. They are surprised at what has happened so far. They thought things were well in hand following the Simon visit. Timely and meaningful human rights measures by them could possibly bear on the outcome. But we can give the GOC no assurances in this regard.

  1. Summary: Rogers informed Kissinger of the possibility of further congressional action to restrict the transfer to Chile of military equipment. Rogers added that a cut-off of matériel that was already in the pipeline for Chile would seriously impair bilateral relations.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760092–1928. Confidential. Drafted by Fimbres and Ryan; cleared by Black.

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