Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

223. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, May 28, 1976.

Human Rights in Chile

Summary: I had extensive conversations with Parsky and Ambassador Trucco of Chile, all directed at coordinating your visit with Simon’s. Parsky and I cleared the air regarding a Washington Post story alleging a Treasury/State division over Chile policy. After Parsky checked with Simon, we agreed there are no differences. We were also at one that:

• —the GOC must continue to announce prisoner releases,
• —we must try to obtain a GOC invitation to the UN Human Rights Commission Working Group, and
• —the GOC should announce publicly the proceedings against officials responsible for prisoner abuse.

When Trucco and I met I stressed that:

• —our policy is one of concern about human rights behavior in Chile, not who governs,
• —there is no State/Treasury division on our Chile policy, and that it is disadvantageous to both Chile and the U.S. to suggest that there is,
• —progress in human rights is essential, (e.g. public announcement of actions taken to punish officials who have abused prisoners) and
• —an agreement on a visit by the UN Human Rights Commission would be very helpful.

Trucco concurred on these points and recognized the value of linking prisoner release announcements with the visits of high-level American officials. End Summary.

In our conversations last Thursday and Friday, Parsky and I agreed that it was preeminently desirable to maintain the momentum of Simon’s visit. We both agreed that, to this end, the establishment of procedure for a visit by a Working Group from the UN Human Rights Commission would be helpful. I agreed to raise this point with Trucco when I saw him later in the day. I brought to Parsky’s attention the Washington Post report of a statement by Simon that there were differences between Simon on human rights in Chile and some middling level officers in the State Department. Parsky checked with Simon, who was in California and reported back that in fact Simon said that there was perfect unity between the policy making echelons in State and Treasury. The reporter, one Diuguid, told Simon that he, the reporter, understood that there were some middling level officials that did not agree; Simon did not endorse that statement but said only that whatever the views of the middling level officers were it was the policy making level which counted and that there was unanimity there.

Parsky, Simon and I are at one for the proposition that it is important that Chile continue the announcements of prisoner releases. But we all agreed that this should not be the primary focus of our efforts. Rather, we ought to try to insure that the UN Human Rights Commission Working Group be invited to Chile, and that there be public announcement of the proceedings against those officers who abused prisoners.

As to the signature of the OPIC agreement, Parsky affirmed that Simon said that the agreement would not be signed until there were further advances on the human rights front. Parsky and I agreed, therefore, that we ought to sign when and only when the Chileans move forward “another notch or two” on human rights. This is what the Chileans expect.

With all this in hand, I met with Trucco for an extensive lunch on Friday. I first addressed myself to the statement he had made to the Deputy Secretary to the effect that he had understood from two sources that middle level officers of the Department of State had said that our policy was to change the government in Santiago. I told him that, at the Deputy Secretary’s request, I had undertaken the sternest and most complete inquiry. I was able to affirm to him that no middle level officer had made such a statement. Beyond that, I represented that this was distinctly not the policy of the United States Government. It was our policy to be concerned with human rights behavior in Chile. It was not our policy to intervene. The decision who was to govern Chile was a question for Chile, not for the United States. He said he was glad to have this assurance. We both agreed that it would be desirable to reiterate the point to the German Ambassador to Chile who was one of those who was allegedly under a misapprehension, on the basis of his earlier meetings here in Washington. We will authorize Popper to do so.

I then discussed the importance of continued human rights progress. Trucco agreed that it was desirable to maintain the momentum of the Simon visit through the visit of the Secretary of State to Santiago. As Parsky and I had foreshadowed, I emphasized the importance of an agreement with respect to the visit of the UN Human Rights Commission satisfactory to Chile. Trucco told me that Sergio Diaz and the son of the Minister of Justice were both in New York at that very moment. He would call them and emphasize the desirability of coming to an agreement on the UN Commission matter. He assured me that he was optimistic that an understanding as to procedures for such a visit could be effected in the next day or two.

We then turned to the question of public treatment of Treasury and State’s view about human rights. I emphasized that Treasury and State were at one. He said that he understood that and disclaimed any statements to the press to the effect that there was a difference of view between Treasury and State. I suggested to him that it was disadvantageous both to Chile and the U.S. to suggest that there was a difference between the two Departments.

In terms of additional steps that might be taken prior to the visit of the Secretary, I suggested that more could be said publicly with respect to Chile’s effort to bring to the bar of justice those officers who had abused prisoners. This, I said, would demonstrate the sincere intent of Chile to observe human rights standards. He agreed that more could be done on this and said that he would talk to the Foreign Minister about the possibility of an announcement of the facts with respect to some 41 such cases. Chile could not release the names of the officers. This could lead to retaliation against their families.

Beyond this, he agreed that it was desirable to continue to maintain a steady pace of prisoner releases. The linkage of such prisoner releases with the visits by high level official Americans was not a bad thing. He hinted that this could insure an enhanced public awareness of what Chile was doing. A routine announcement of release in Santiago got no press. When it was linked to Simon or Kissinger, it gets real coverage in the U.S., he said.

I told him that we were contemplating an announcement of the Secretary’s trip no earlier than the middle of the week. We would have to be in a position to respond to questions about the human rights implications of a visit by Kissinger to Santiago. I agreed that I would discuss the general line of our public statement with Trucco beforehand.

1. Summary: Rogers informed Kissinger that he had discussed U.S. policy toward Chile with Department of the Treasury officials and with Chilean Ambassador Trucco. He stressed to Trucco that there was no division within the U.S. Government on policy towards Chile and that progress in the human rights field was essential.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840041–1871. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and Keane. On May 20, the Washington Post reported that Simon stated that while the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury agreed on Chile policy, congressional liberals and “a quietly dissenting sector of the State Department argue that the junta should receive no U.S. support,” due to its human rights abuses. (“Chile Freeing New Group of 50 Prisoners,” Washington Post, May 20, 1976, p. A1) On June 5, Rogers informed Kissinger of an indication received from a member of the Chilean Embassy staff that Trucco “had not been hearing” when U.S. officials such as Simon told him that the ability of the U.S. Government to help Chile depended on improvements in Chile’s human rights image. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760092–1949)