219. Telegram 4341 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
4341. Subject: Treasury Secretary Simon’s Visit to Chile: Accomplishments.
1. Summary: Secretary Simon’s nine-hour visit to Chile resulted in specific human rights achievements and generated leverage which will assist further progress. The evening before the Secretary’s arrival the GOC announced the release of 49 political prisoners, the vast majority of whom will go into exile in the U.S. During lengthy and often legalistic discussions with the Chilean Cabinet (virtually every important Minister attended), Secretary Simon achieved:
(A) Commitment from the GOC [to] continue the U.S. parole program and other similar programs and to accelerate procedures; (B) the agreement of the GOC to a public statement that the GOC will shortly meet with the UNHRC working group to establish procedures for a review in Chile of the human rights situation; and (C) a private and fairly detailed admission by the government that officials have been tried and convicted for human rights abuses. GOC officials also tabled an outline of proposed constitutional statues, which were neither new nor significant.
2. During dinner with President Pinochet, Secretary Simon repeated the main themes of his visit: that economic freedoms must be complemented by personal and political freedoms and that Chile must—by making human rights progress—help us to help them. The Secretary [Page 600] publicly and privately made clear that desired economic cooperation depended on what happened in human rights in Chile. End summary.
3. Most immediate measurable impact of Secretary Simon’s trip obviously was the release of 49 political prisoners. Almost all of these persons have been approved for the U.S. parole program, increasing significantly the total who will go to the U.S. Even more important was the clear commitment of all those present at the discussion to the continuation of the U.S. parole program and other similar programs, and the acceleration of procedures.
4. The discussion with respect to a third-party onsite inspection of human rights observance in Chile was a complicated duel. My reading of the exchanges is that the GOC offered to meet with representatives of the UNHRC working group to establish procedures by which some element of the UN will be able to come to Chile for onsite inspection. Others present at the meeting believe that GOC officials committed themselves to work out general procedures but not yet to accept a visit. (Comment: In any case we should proceed to maintain pressure on the GOC for movement in this area as if we had a commitment.)
5. In the past, GOC officials have referred on a few occasions—and in vague general terms—to the punishment of officials guilty of human rights abuses. We have received some reports that the GOC, in fact, has moved against a number of people involved in such abuses. During Secretary Simon’s discussion on this subject, Foreign Minister Carvajal described 41 cases (without using names) and agreed that Secretary Simon could make public reference to this matter. (Comment: This development is significant in that it provides an opening for further efforts by ourselves and others to verify particulars of GOC actions to punish those guilty of abuses of human rights.)
6. We spend hour and one-half on human rights and five minutes on economic issues. Chileans tended to emphasize legalistic and historical justifications rather than discuss specifics. We pressed our interest in seeing specific progress on ending the state of siege and expanding habeas corpus jurisdiction. Although the Chileans made no commitments, they now know what we have in mind.
7. During brief economic discussion, Finance Minister Cauas raised the GOC desire to: (A) sign OPIC Agreement; (B) have EXIM Bank credit and guarantee ceiling increased from its present $700,000; (C) establish links between the GOC and Federal Reserve and EXIM Bank, so that GOC officials can influence judgments on creditworthiness by these institutions and (D) establish consultations between the two governments on copper commodities policy.
8. In the private session Secretary Simon told Cauas specifically that the latter should not expect us to sign an OPIC agreement unless the GOC took steps in the human rights area which brought U.S. public [Page 601] opinion around. In his public statement the Secretary said that the U.S. is prepared to work closely with Chile in the months ahead, but can help promote Chile’s economic prosperity only within the framework of a system ensuring personal and political freedoms. The elimination of U.S. public concern over human rights in Chile would pave the way for dynamic joint efforts in economic development.
9. Comment: We will be reporting in detail by septels on various aspects of Secretary Simon’s discussions. As the above indicates, measurable progress was made in the parole program and other human rights areas; the GOC was made clearly aware of the USG’s continuing interest in specific remedial steps, and we in Santiago were provided leverage for further efforts here. Chile’s considerable group of enemies in the US Congress and press will no doubt try to put down results of Secretary Simon’s trip. This is a bad rap. The results of this trip are significant and measurable and should be used as basis for further progress.
10. On the basis of these long and sometimes tortuous discussions, I have the impression that the best way to get at the human rights problem in Chile is (A) to be firm, and (B) to be specific.
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Summary: The Embassy reported that a visit to Santiago by Secretary of the Treasury Simon had produced tangible improvements in the human rights situation and provided leverage for further progress.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760178–1186. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated immediate to Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. In an April 10 memorandum, Rogers told Kissinger that Simon’s May 7 visit as part of a Latin American trip could encourage progress on human rights. (Ibid., P760057–0539) In telegram 4426 from Santiago, May 11, the Embassy reported that while the Chilean Government had not announced expected policy changes in the human rights field in conjunction with Simon’s visit, Simon had forcefully emphasized to Chilean officials that the U.S. Government saw the human rights situation there as a problem. (Ibid., D760181–1155) In telegram 4475 from Santiago, May 12, the Embassy concluded that a new avenue for human rights inquiries had potentially been opened by Carvajal’s statement to Simon that members of the Chilean security forces had been punished for abuses. (Ibid., D760184–1005) In a May 24 memorandum to Ford, Simon reported that he had informed the Chilean Government it must improve the human rights situation or face a loss of support in the United States and other nations. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box A3, Treasury Department, 5/24/76–10/27/76) In a June 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers assessed the human rights issues that emerged from Simon’s visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760092–1784)
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