214. Telegram 904 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
904. Subject: Call on President Pinochet. Ref: A) Santiago 745; B) State 21202; C) State 24117.
1. Summary: President Pinochet Feb 2 summoned to his Vina Del Mar summer residence visiting State Department Bolivia/Chile Country Director Fimbres. Polcouns accompanied. Pinochet’s performance was extraordinary during hour and half of conversation and tea. He went from expected tough interrogatory pose on US position at Geneva UNHRC meeting and deplored past US votes in UN and OAS, to comradely bonhomie over the pastry. Chilean concern over Geneva meeting was reflected in that FonMin Carvajal will leave for Geneva this week, passing through Washington on his return. Pinochet reaffirmed that he will not let Allana study group of UNHRC enter Chile, although he reiterated he would be willing to accept anyone who comes without prior publicity. He chided the Embassy as for partiality to the Christian Democrats and ex-President Frei, but appeared somewhat more open and flexible than usual. End summary.
2. Geneva UNHRC meeting: Pinochet began session with direct interrogation on USG position to be assumed on Chile at current Geneva meeting on UNHRC. He was evidently reacting to exposition of US position, and suggestion that slate could be cleaned only by allowing Allana working group in, made by Ambassador Popper under instructions to FonMin Director General Illanes last week (refs A and B). Pinochet, with Carvajal behind him, was concerned less US position was already frozen. Vote against GOC would influence others, since no one wants to be the right of the USG and resolution against GOC in Geneva would strengthen campaign against Chile. The approach [Page 587] paralleled that of Ambassadors Diez and Trucco to Ambassador Hewson Ryan (ref C). Pinochet said he could not understand what had brought USG to current impasse with Chile, and why Chile—such a friend of the US—should be singled out as it is.
3. Fimbres said US position is not inflexible and that among other things US vote would depend on text of resolution presented. He hoped that with respect to new GOC decree intended to protect detainees against torture (Santiago 0756) GOC would make full explanation assuring that deficiencies in Decree 1009 would be overcome. Pinochet stressed decree was intended to regulate Decree 1009 more closely. He also insisted new decree was wholly Chilean in concept and in no way reflected outside pressure.
4. Pinochet reacted sharply with familiar words against alleged prejudices of Allana, asserted that he had been right to prevent Allana group’s visit to Chile, and that group would not be allowed to come to Chile. He said visitors would be welcomed and could see everything, if they arrived without prior publicity, so that opposition forces would have no time to set up anti-GOC stories. Pinochet also reacted against what he thought was intimation that new decree was the result of foreign pressure: he said it had been strictly sovereign decision of GOC’s free will. He added that it will be strictly applied; GOC will come down hard against any transgressors. In fact, he claimed three persons had been found abusing detainees so far this year, and they would be severely punished. Pinochet also recalled that torture was nothing new in Chile: civil police had always been tough with criminals. Fimbres recalled US position at last OASGA and asserted Pinochet action on working group had cut the ground from under US. Accordingly, US accommodation was more difficult now.
5. Carvajal to Geneva: In a further indication of concern over the outcome of the Geneva meeting, Carvajal said he would be leaving for Geneva later in the week, via New York, and would pass through Washington for talks next week on his return. His plans are being held tightly. He hoped he could time visit to Washington to coincide with expected appointment of Trucco with the Secretary.
6. World Bank and PDC: For openers, Pinochet spoke strongly against the way the World Bank was handling the Chilean loan request, and against the Chilean Christian Democrats. He said he was aware the Embassy keeps in close touch with the PDC. He also attacked ex-President Frei’s criticism of the GOC, and warned the USG against trying to force on Chile a return to party government. He said forcefully that he had cut off discussions of the Frei document.
7. OASGA and foreign reporters: Pinochet said all foreign reporters would be allowed in to cover the OASGA. He hedged a bit when asked about the Washington Post’s Joanne Omang, recounting the familiar [Page 588] story of her supposed bad faith in interviewing him last year. But he left the impression that she would be admitted.
8. Pinochet relaxed somewhat after his initial outburst but returned again to his theme of US abandonment. He warmed to memories of American military and civilian friends, and his harshness toward the USG reflected sorrow that the US had taken an incomprehensible path. There was little said about a weakening US vis-à-vis Communism—rather a sense that the US had abandoned its old friends. But there were very strong words describing Senator Kennedy.
9. Fimbres replied nonpolemically, underlining the considerable amount of US cooperation made available to Chile, and accenting when possible what the USG expects of the GOC.
10. Despite his strong views, the impression was of a President with a healthy regard for US power and a reservoir of good will still remaining for the US and its government. The new decree and the release of the asylee-terrorists (miristas) seemed intended to placate the US and other democratic critics. Pinochet did not appear interested in Fimbres’ exposition of what the US is doing for Chile economically and militarily; he was not even aware of details. His concern seemed more directed at the lack of approval, the psychic pat on the back, and continued appreciation which he sees as not forthcoming from the US.
11. The Embassy takes with some skepticism Pinochet’s assertion that anyone could inspect Chile who comes without publicity. The qualification, if nothing else, probably makes the offer a non-starter.
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Summary: Pinochet deplored past U.S. votes in the U.N. and OAS that criticized Chile’s human rights record. He also stated he would be willing to accept human rights investigative groups other than the UNHRC.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760041–0207. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to USUN and the Mission in Geneva. In telegram 298 from Santiago, January 14, the Embassy reported that it believed that the Chilean Government employed torture but that it could not assess the frequency or extent of the abuse. (Ibid., D760014–0881) On January 28, noting rising opposition in Congress and the public to the junta’s human rights abuses, the Department instructed Popper to inform Chilean officials it wanted Chile to accept a group from the UNHRC. (Telegram 21202 to Santiago, January 28; ibid., D760032–0782) On January 29, the Ambassador reported that Illanes ruled out a UNHRC visit, and wanted to shift emphasis away from the U.N. Commission to an inter-American human rights commission. (Telegram 745 from Santiago, January 29; ibid., D760034–0696) Telegram 24117 is Document 213.
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